Three essays in economic history by Carter, Chelsea E.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2020




GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Dissertation
THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
by
CHELSEA E. CARTER
B.A., Boston University, 2011
M.A., Boston University, 2011
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the








Robert A. Margo, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics
Second Reader
James J. Feigenbaum, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Economics
Third Reader
Megan MacGarvie, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Markets, Public Policy, and Law
Acknowledgments
I owe much gratitude to many people who have supported, encouraged, and guided
me over the past six years. My thanks to them appear in no particular order and
words can only begin to express how thankful I am for each one of them.
I will start by thanking my main advisor, Bob Margo. Since I met Bob, he has
been an intellectual inspiration. Through the years that I have known him, he has
gone to great lengths to inspire, support, push, and encourage me. His confidence
in my nascent idea(s) was critical to the completion of my degree. I often doubted
not just my research but myself, and not once did he express uncertainty in my
capabilities. His ability to advise students well is unparalleled. I am grateful to have
crossed paths with him in the fall of 2009 and I will continue to seek and value his
guidance throughout my professional career.
I thank Megan MacGarvie who has played a critical role in my life during both
my undergraduate and graduate years. Perhaps unknowingly, Megan introduced me
to research in economics when I was hired as her research assistant in 2009. She
has taught me much since then, including the importance of mentoring and, above
anything, being kind. I am thankful to have her on my dissertation committee.
James Feigenbaum and Martin Fiszbein have motivated me intellectually, and
my research has benefited from many in-person discussions, email exchanges, and
workshop comments. I thank Martin for being an exemplary teacher to our cohort
during his first few years at BU and for connecting me with previous colleagues at
Brown University who were able to provide guidance when I was learning ArcGIS.
I thank James for his repeated willingness to provide useful feedback, particularly
on the many, many versions of my second chapter. I thank both for serving on my
dissertation committee.
Stefania Garetto has been an important role model for me. She invested time and
iv
energy into my professional development even though I was not her formal advisee.
She is a woman in economics who I look up to and she has always treated me as
a colleague in the profession – even during my early years of the PhD. I always
appreciate her solicited – or unsolicited! – advice and hope that she continues to
provide both even after my time at BU.
I have received generous funding over the years from the Economic History Asso-
ciation (EHA). I am pleased that an organization like the EHA exists and that there
is financial support available to young researchers in economic history. This disserta-
tion would not have been possible without additional funding from the Institute for
Economic Development at Boston University and the Henry S. Newman Graduate
Student Fellowship.
I was blessed to be part of a cohort that added richness to my life both inside
of and outside of the classroom. I am thankful for the impact that each one has
had on my life. We were a small group and I am obliged to name each one of them:
Petra, Anlong, Calvin, Fatima, Gedeon, Gianluca, Katrina, Youming, Undral, Julian,
Taosong, Jake, Xiangyu, Thea, Yeonha, Giovanna, Julian, Hui Ren, and Manni.
My family and friends have encouraged me tirelessly through this process. Each
one of them has extended gracious understanding during the long periods of time in
which I was absent. My parents, Bruce and Jennifer, have selflessly supported me –
emotionally, mentally, and financially – and these words cannot begin to describe my
deep thankfulness for both of them. My siblings, Jordan and Avery, have been critical
players in my mental and emotional health, and without them, I would have missed
lots of fun and laughter along the way. To the members of my extended family – you
have all provided a safe haven when I have needed it and constant prayers through
these six years.
To my dear friends who have exhibited the utmost patience: thank you. In
v
particular, I thank Isabelle, Steph, Sally, Lyndsay, and Eilis. I did not see enough of
them through graduate school and none of them faulted me for this. To my friends
at Barry’s, thank you for providing an outlet outside of BU that was essential for my
mental health.
Finally, to Calvin. You have provided stability, unconditional love, and a sense
of unparalleled warmth and understanding. I look to you for inspiration and support
in all facets of life. I would not trade your empathy, calmness, and pessimism for
anything in this world and I am elated to have you as my life partner.
This dissertation is dedicated to my gram, Florence B. Slick. There has never been
a woman like her and there never will be. She will never know the extent to which






THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
CHELSEA E. CARTER
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2020
Major Professor: Robert A. Margo, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on topics in economic history. The first
two chapters focus on historical place-based policies in the United States. Chapter
One studies the United States Army’s role in shaping the spatial distribution of the
population. Chapter Two studies the construction of the Interstate Highway System
(IHS) in the city of Detroit. Chapter Three examines mechanisms for financing cre-
ativity in the British publishing industry.
In Chapter One, I link the location of US Army forts to spatial patterns in popu-
lation density across counties on the American frontier. Fort establishment predicts
initial increases in density, indicative of their role as man-made factors in explaining
the origins of local spatial patterns. Long after fort abandonment, increased density
persists at fort locations, indicating path dependence. Long-run persistence is driven
by if, and when, a fort county was connected to the nineteenth century railroad net-
work.
Chapter Two studies the political economy behind site selection for urban seg-
ments of the IHS and measures effects of construction on neighborhoods in Detroit.
Using variation at the census-tract level, I show that interstates were routed through
vii
neighborhoods with low property value to minimize land acquisition costs and future
losses to the city’s tax base. Following construction, interstates led to short-run de-
clines in property values, population density, and the percentage of a neighborhood’s
black residents. In the long run, property values declined further in tracts with an
interstate, and tracts closest to construction remained less dense with lower shares of
black residents.
Chapter Three uses book-level data on Romantic Period English literature to
investigate crowdfunding as a mechanism for financing creativity in the publishing
industry. We show that new authors and female authors faced substantially greater
demand uncertainty in the industry, compared to both established and male au-
thors, and these authors are more likely to crowdfund their works. Subsequently,
while crowdfunded works have lower average payoffs, crowdfunded titles written by
females, and targeting a female audience, are relatively more successful than their
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Forts and the Frontier: The US Army and
the Spatial Distribution of Population
1.1 Introduction
Population is distributed unevenly across the American West. County-level densities
in states west of the Mississippi River range from 0.2 to more than 17,000 people
per square.1 While some of the most densely populated counties are concentrated
along the coast, densities among states in the US interior still differ by a factor of
over 5,000.2 A central question in the spatial economics literature asks what factors
can explain such underlying variation across space. While geographic fundamentals
play some role (Bosker and Buringh, 2017; Rappaport and Sachs, 2003; Davis and
Weinstein, 2002; Gallup et al., 1999), only 35 percent of within-country variation
can be explained by attributes of the physical geography (Henderson et al., 2018).
Moreover, in the American West, where large regions of territory are geographically
homogeneous, natural advantages may play even less of a role in the organization of
population across space. In this paper, I show that, in places largely undifferentiated
by natural geographic factors, historical events have the ability to shape local spatial
1Population counts and county boundaries are as reported in the 2010 US Census. The most
densely populated county west of the Mississippi River is San Francisco county, CA with 17,179
people per square mile and the least densely populated is Loving county, TX, with 0.12 people per
square mile.
2I define interior states as states that do not share a direct border with the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific
Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, or the Great Lakes. Using this definition, the most densely populated
county is City of Saint Louis county, MO with 5,157 people per square mile and the least densely
populated is Petroleum county, MT, with 0.29 people per square mile.
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patterns (Redding et al., 2011; Michaels and Rauch, 2018).
I exploit US military history to study both the origins of and persistence in county-
level population differentials across space. Between 1790 and 1890, the US experi-
enced an era of rapid westward expansion, increasing the settled land area by a factor
of eight and shifting the mean center of population over 500 miles west (Bazzi et
al., 2018). The US Army was tasked with protecting the new lands and the settlers
that flocked to them. The Army pushed the frontier of settlement westward and
established a series of forts along its route.3 By 1890, one hundred and sixty of the
Army forts dotted the US.4 Frontier fort locations offered shelter, protection, and
basic resources to Army personnel and local civilians in addition to serving as points
of trade between settlers and Native Americans. While some forts dissolved upon de-
commissioning, others continued to spawn thriving settlements whose origins appear
prima facie in the names of population centers (e.g. Fort Wayne, IN; Fort Smith,
AR; (Fort) Omaha, NE).
I link a rich dataset on the US Army and its frontier forts to county-level cen-
sus data to study place-based effects. While economists have documented factors
affecting population patterns in other parts of the world (Tapia et al., 2018; Michaels
and Rauch, 2018; Cuberes and Gonzalez-Val, 2017; Bosker and Buringh, 2017; Bleak-
ley and Lin, 2012; Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Eaton and Eckstein, 1997), little is
known of the factors driving spatial differences in parts of the US interior and the far
West.5 I exploit forts’ conditionally quasi-random assignment within a local vicin-
ity to study treatment effects of frontier fort locations. Pooled across all decennial
census years, fort counties have up to 85% more people and are up to 70% more
3Per the US Census and as stated in Bazzi et al. (2018), the frontier “line” was the (western)
line at which population density dropped below 2 people per square mile.
4In 1890, the US Census Bureau declared the frontier as “closed.”
5A paper by Bleakley and Lin (2012) studies population patterns across the Midwest and South-
east. Part of my study area intersects with that of Bleakley and Lin and I explain differences between
my work and theirs later in this section.
3
densely populated compared to surrounding counties without a fort. Causal random
forests model high-level interactions among pre-existing covariates to estimate fort
effects for a cross section in 1890. By this year, the frontier was declared “closed”
by the US Census Bureau, and fort counties were over 50% larger and 40% denser
than surrounding counties. While economically large, the effects of fort location were
relatively contained. Nonparametric distance measures indicate that cross-county
population spillovers were highly local, with population levels diminishing rapidly
within 25 miles of a fort.
An empirical challenge arises if fort and non-fort counties systematically differ
on unobservable characteristics. To address this concern, I adopt an event-study
approach. The event-study design allows me to compare fort counties to one another,
exploiting timing of fort arrival to trace dynamics of population over time. Because
all counties are treated by a fort, this approach does not suffer from a bias that
may occur due to selection on unobservables. Fort establishment leads to immediate
increases in population measures which I attribute to the a fort’s principal functions
combined with high transport costs during the 19th century. Both population and
population density continue to grow at fort locations, albeit at a lesser rate over
time. Frontier forts were critical in solving the initial spatial coordination problem of
where to settle on the frontier and are an important component in explaining spatial
patterns.
Using a subset of abandoned forts, I break the link between origins and persistence
in county-level population patterns. The frontier line of settlement was dynamic
– a function of continued movement westward. Forts, both large and small, were
systematically abandoned (decommissioned). By the close of the frontier, over 60%
of the forts in my dataset had already been abandoned. I link this subset of abandoned
forts to county-level outcomes in 2010 to study path dependence at forts. Indeed,
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over a century after fort abandonment, increased population measures persist. Cross-
sectional regressions and causal random forest estimates indicate that abandoned-fort
counties have, on average, between 40-70% more people and are 35-55% more densely
populated.
While there are strong average effects at fort locations, not all forts spurred
county-level agglomeration to the same extent. I digitize data on fort size and dura-
tion combined with changes to the national transportation network to examine po-
tential mechanisms affecting outcomes at frontier fort locations. Frontier forts varied
in size (the number of soldiers) and life-span (length of time in operation). I consider
fort size as a proxy for the magnitude of government investment and life-span to be
the duration of investment in a particular location. When exploiting heterogeneity
in both dimensions, I find no evidence that either measure mattered in explaining
significant differences in persistence outcomes across fort locations.
Instead, railroad access proved critical for continued growth at frontier fort lo-
cations. Forts preceded railroad construction and fort counties connected to the
expanding railroad network prior to 1860 experienced the largest gains in population
and population density. Counties connected later, or not at all, have lower levels
of total population and population density relative to those connected in 1860. My
results have two important implications. First, small, temporary place-based poli-
cies can have a lasting impact. Second, forts solve the point-in-space coordination
problem but transportation access provides the population flows necessary for con-
tinued growth at each point. In this sense, forts are necessary, but not sufficient, in
explaining overall spatial differences in population patterns.
Forts affected where people settled and who settled there, albeit only in the short
run. In a subsequent analysis, I study how the US Army’s presence on the frontier
shaped local demographic outcomes. The typical enlisted soldier in the 19th century
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Army was male, foreign-born, and often “of the lowest and most ignorant class”
(Coffman, 1986).6 Moreover, shortly after the Civil War, the US Army hired black
soldiers who served specifically at frontier garrisons. The Army’s unique institutional
characteristics had the potential to shape demographic differences at the county level
measured by total white share, total male share, and total foreign-born share. Raw
correlations show increased shares of men and foreign-born with differences largest
during the mid 19th century. By the frontier’s closure in 1890, fort counties had a
1 percentage point increase in share male and 3 percentage point increase in share
foreign-born relative to surrounding counties. Effects fade quickly, however, and by
1920, fort counties are indistinguishable from non-fort counties. I find no evidence
that fort location led to county-level differences in race. My results point to the
potential for institutions to shape places but, given forts’ temporary effects on local
demographic patterns, it is difficult to draw more broad conclusions.
This paper contributes to four strands of literature in economics. I first contribute
to the literature on economic geography. Following the seminal work of Krugman
(1991), there have been substantial contributions on both the origins of and persis-
tence in the spatial distribution of economic activity. On origins, economists have
linked “first-nature” factors – or the physical geography of a particular place – to
underlying variation (Fujita, 1996; Kim, 1999; Ellison and Glaeser, 1999; Beeson et
al., 2001; Rappaport and Sachs, 2003; Holmes and Lee, 2012; Bleakley and Lin, 2012).
Features of the physical geography including soil quality, climate, altitude were of crit-
ical importance for preindustrial economies (Tapia et al., 2018). Others document
the importance of “second-nature” factors, or man-made features, affecting popula-
tion patterns (Rosen, 1986; Redfearn, 2009; Atack et al., 2010a). Contributions along
both dimensions discuss the importance of initial conditions as “initial conditions...are
6This observation tracts well with prior literature documenting the negative selection of immi-
grants among the sending population of this period (Abramitzky et al., 2012; Connor, 2019).
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self-reinforcing, thereby emphasizing the role of history” in explaining overall spatial
patterns (Tapia et al., 2018). Initial conditions set in motion a process of circular
causation where certain places have distinct advantage during each subsequent stage
of locational competition (Krugman, 1991; Davis and Weinstein, 2002).7
I trace the spatial distribution of the US population back to its origins, ultimately
tying population patterns to the location of the US Army’s frontier forts. Data
availability issues often limit the extent to which we can isolate the true origins as
population movements precede formal census or demographic records in much of the
world. Among the few who study this phenomena are Bosker and Buringh (2017)
examining the seeds of European cities and Davis and Weinstein (2002) who study
density in Japan. Both use records dating back more than 1,000 years. Similarly,
Tapia et al. (2018) studies the evolution of agglomeration across Spain. All papers,
to some extent, must take population measures as given at some cutoff date.
The historical narrative of the United States creates an optimal setting for which
to isolate origins of local agglomeration. When the US obtained over 2.1 million
square miles of territory in the 19th century, much of the land was uninhabited by
European settlers and the US Army advanced the frontier as a matter of public
endeavor.8 Figure 1·1 shows that the movement of the US Army largely predated
7Krugman (1991) cites Myrdal (1957) and Arthur (1990) in his discussion of locational centers
of manufacturing production: “manufactures production will tend to concentrate where there is a
large market, but the market will be large where manufactures production is concentrated.” This
concentration arises with an industrialized “core” due an interaction between transportation costs
and economies of scale as well as the share of the population employed by the manufacturing sector.
Separately, Fujita et al. (1999) states, “the dramatic spatial unevenness of the real economy [...] is
surely the result not of inherent differences among locations but of some set of cumulative processes,
necessarily involving some form of increasing returns, whereby geographic concentration can be
self-reinforcing.”
8Native American tribes had inhabited the land for generations, yet the federal government
orchestrated their systematic, forced, and often violent removal from ancestral settlements to desig-
nated territory. In 1830, the Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, which gave the President the
power to grant “unsettled” lands west of the Mississippi in exchange for Indian lands. Some tribes
adhered to the legislation but many resisted – in particular, the Cherokees. Resistance led to the
forced removal of many Native Americans and, in the case of the Cherokees, the death of 4,000 on
the forced march known as the Trail of Tears (Library of Congress).
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Western settlement. I replicate images from Bazzi et al. (2018) that illustrate county-
level population densities from the decadal census (shaded regions) and the movement
of the frontier line which is delineated by the boundary at which density drops below
2 people per square mile (thick red line). I overlay each figure with the location of
the Army’s frontier forts by establishment year (circles) to show that fort location
preceded civilian population movement – creating a unique setting for which to study
the origins of settlement patterns.
Second, I contribute to work done on persistence in underlying spatial patterns.
Davis and Weinstein (2002) separate the origins in the variation of population density
from persistence in dispersion, citing path dependence as one theory in support of the
latter.9 According to David (2001), path dependence is best explained as “processes
that are ... unable to shake free of their history” (p. 5).10 Contributions at odds with
path dependence theory are Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2008). Both papers study the
recovery of Japanese cities following the Allied bombings during World War II and find
that locational fundamentals drive spatial patterns in Japan’s regional densities. In
contrast, Redding et al. (2011) finds empirical support for path dependent behavior at
sites of German airports following the division and reunification of Germany. Michaels
and Rauch (2018) show that urban networks in France exhibit path dependence while
those in Britain do not.11
Work on path dependence most closely related to mine is Bleakley and Lin (2012)
who relate historic portage sites to contemporary measures of population density.
The authors illustrate how portage, as a natural advantage, solved an initial coor-
9Davis and Weinstein (2002) also discuss random growth theory and locational fundamentals as
two alternative theories under which initial conditions persist in the long run.
10David (2001) also formalizes a positive definition of a path dependent process: “A path depen-
dent stochastic process is one whose asymptotic distribution evolves as a consequence (function of)
the process’s own history.”
11A working paper by Allen and Donaldson (2018) uses a theoretical framework to quantify how
much of spatial distribution in economic activity can be attributed to history vs. geography in
addition to quantifying history’s role in explaining the aggregate amount of economic activity.
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dination problem on where individuals chose to settle and increased density persists
at portage sites due to large, durable, sunk costs. This paper complements Bleakley
and Lin (2012) with key differences that I note here. First, while a portion of my
study area overlaps with that of Bleakley and Lin – namely parts of the Southeast
and Midwest – I pay particular attention to population patterns across the Great
Plains, Southwest, and Western states. A subset of my results focuses specifically on
counties located west of the Mississippi River where the geographic playground is ho-
mogeneous, potentially minimizing the role of natural advantages. Second, Bleakley
and Lin find that natural advantages can solve the initial problem of where individ-
uals co-locate. If natural advantages are not immediately obvious, what explains the
distribution of population across space? I find that forts – as second-nature factors –
are critical in solving individuals’ initial indifference on where to settle, particularly
in the flat, featureless plains of the US interior. Moreover, I build on the techniques
used by Bleakley and Lin by incorporating recent advances in machine learning tech-
niques which allow me to account for high-level interactions among fixed geographic
factors. I find that while it is still important to condition on natural advantages, by
considering an expanded study area – and focusing on man-made features – my work
supplements what we already know to be true of long run density differentials driven
by natural advantages.
Finally, I build on Bleakley and Lin by exploring underlying mechanisms affecting
long run outcomes at fort locations. Specifically, I develop measures of fort treatment
duration, treatment intensity, and, separately, developments in the national railroad
network to uncover mechanisms affecting outcomes at fort locations. Unlike Bleakley
and Lin who do not observe the timing of decline at each portage site, I explicitly
observe the year each fort was established and decommissioned. From this, I construct
a measure of treatment duration defined by the total number of years that a fort was in
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operation. I show that the duration of treatment does not significantly affect long run
population differentials, and that places that were exposed to a fort for a longer period
of time did not necessarily experience additional gains to total population or density.
To capture intensity of treatment, I manually collect data on the number of US Army
personnel staffed at each fort location but I find no significant relationship between
fort size and increased population measures. Instead, I find that railroad access
was critical for continued growth at fort locations. These findings have important
implications for place-based policies in that early, place-based shocks – even those
that are small or temporary – have the ability to establish a long run steady state.12
Third, I add to the economics literature on migration westward and the devel-
opment of the American frontier (Danhof, 1941; Murphy and Zellner, 1959; Steckel,
1982, 1989). A recent paper by Bazzi et al. (2018) revisits the evolution of the fron-
tier and links a county’s total frontier experience (TFE) to American individualism.13
The authors show that frontier experience – defined in part by isolationism and the
absence of population – altered demographics and measures of individualism in the
short run; in the long run, counties with a greater TFE retain a pervasive individual-
ism and exhibit opposition to redistribution. My paper, instead, focuses on pockets
of population density, or agglomeration, that developed on the frontier and can be
considered complementary to Bazzi et al. (2018).
Much work has been done on drivers of westward movement and demographics
of the migrant population during the 19th century (Curti, 1959; Kearl et al., 1980;
Schaefer, 1987; Gregson, 1996; Stewart, 2009). Galenson and Pope (1989) suggest that
12Standing in contrast to this are results in Redding et al. (2011). The authors study the location
of German airports during the division of Germany and its subsequent reunification over half a
century later. The authors find that in order to disrupt, or dislodge, an economic activity from an
existing steady state (in this case, locational choices for airports), shocks must be substantively large
and sufficiently persistent.
13The exact measure of Bazzi et al. (2018) total frontier experience (TFE) is the “number of
years spent within the frontier belt from 1790 to 1890” where the frontier line is the line at which
population density drops below 2 people per square mile (p.10).
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opportunities for land ownership and agricultural employment were pull factors of
frontier settlement. Westward migrants experienced greater than (national) average
wealth levels in 1860 and gains were directly associated with increased real estate
holdings. Both Steckel (1982) and Ferrie (2003) study characteristics of migrants to
the frontier. Ferrie (2003) finds that mainly urban, low-skilled civilians moved West
and Stewart (2006) shows that households were more likely to be poor, landless,
illiterate and with young children. Both discuss migrants’ substantial gains in wealth
of which Stewart (2006) attributes to the limited opportunity for wealth gains back
East. Salisbury (2014) studies internal migration in the 19th century, albeit at shorter
distances. She links shorter-distance movers to the potential for upward occupational
mobility, citing potential occupational gains as a driver of east-west migration.
I add to this literature by studying the unique characteristics of those enlisting in
the 19th century Army and how the Army’s institutional characteristics shaped local
demographic patterns. I show that fort locations had initial increased shares of men
and of foreign-born as a results of the Army’s presence. Over time, these patterns
dissipate – perhaps due to the large degree of geographic mobility during the second
half of the 19th century. My results suggest that the Army may have been a direct
mechanism facilitating westward migration but that demographic patterns change,
particularly with high levels of geographic mobility.
Finally, the impact of the US Army and institutional military policy on the frontier
engage a broader literature on the role of institutions in shaping a place. Much of the
work in economics relates institutions to economic development. While some focus on
the role of specific institutions, such as political (North and Weingast, 1989) or legal
(Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002), others remain agnostic as to which institutions matter
for differences in economic development (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001,
2002). A recent paper by Zou (2018) specifically studies the place-based effects of
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institutional military policy in the form of contractions to military personnel. I focus
on a specific branch of the military, the US Army, in a historical context and how
both its policies and characteristics impacted locations. I find that early military
policy, in the form of the US Army’s presence on the frontier, had short run effects
on local demographic patterns.14
1.2 Historical Significance of Frontier Forts
As the US Army moved west, it erected new forts and abandoned old ones. To
best understand how forts may have affected overall spatial patterns in settlement,
I search for guidance from the historical narrative. Military historians have written
extensively on this era and the Army’s role in nascent economic history (Wesley, 1935;
Goetzmann, 1959; Prucha, 1969; Coffman, 1986; Wooster, 2009). In this section, I
draw on previous contributions to document the historical importance the US Army’s
frontier forts and to develop hypotheses on the potential effects of fort locations in
both the short and long run.
1.2.1 Principal Fort Functions
Frontier forts served three main functions. They were sites of protection, trade and
goods supply, and critical resources and services. During the 19th century, “the
defense of the frontier was the chief consideration of the United States” (Wesley,
1935) (p. 65). The US Army was responsible for securing the American borders with
Canada (and later Mexico), commanding control over the North American fur trade,
and protecting civilian settlers against continued threats from the Native Americans.
The nascent Northern frontier (including present-day states lining the Great Lakes
and St. Lawrence River) was under immediate threat from the British stationed in
14Insofar as population density serves as a proxy for economic development, my results contribute
to the literature relating institutions to economic development.
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Canada. Due to its proximity to the eastern seaboard, the Northern frontier attracted
some of the first civilian settlers and, thus, required additional protection from the
Native Americans in the region. Turmoil in the Northern frontier continued as both
Native Americans and British fought against American expansion. Following the
War of 1812, however, the Northern Division of the Army – commanded by Major
General Jacob Brown and stationed at forts throughout the region – secured peace
with relative ease.15
Further expansion meant new frontiers and unfamiliar Native American tribes.
On the Mississippi-Missouri frontier, Native Americans were hostile and “scarcely a
week passed without one or two murders, and skirmishes were of frequent occurrence”
(Wesley, 1935). At a fort in Oklahoma, diary entries from Frances M. A. Roe –
an officer’s wife – highlight the real threat of local Native American tribes: it “is
certainly in an Indian country, for it is surrounded by Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas,
Cheyennes, and Arapahoes – each a hostile tribe, except the last. No one can go a rod
from the garrison without an escort, and our weekly mail is brought down in a wagon
and guarded by a corporal and several privates” (Roe, 1888). Tribes posed continued
threats to settlers pushing west. Amelia Stewart Knight, who traveled with her family
from Iowa to Oregon in the 1853, wrote of her fears somewhere on the northwestern
frontier: “It is here the Indians are so troublesome ... (I was very much frightened
while at this camp. I lay awake all night. I expected every minute we would be killed.
However, we all found our scalps on in the morning.) There are people killed at this
15The US Army’s chain of command was largely irregular and experienced many administrative
changes during the 19th century. Until 1821, it was (roughly) structured as follows: Secretary of War
(SOW) headed the War Department and was in charge of all military affairs; two Major Generals,
one commanding the Northern division, the other commanding the Southern division, reported to
the SOW; Department Commanders within each division reported to Major Generals (Northern
division had departments 1-5; Southern division had departments 6-9); within each department,
Commanding Officers were appointed at each post or garrison. Note that after 1821, the Northern
and Southern divisions expanded and subdivided to include Eastern and Western divisions (Wesley,
1935).
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place every year” (Stewart, 2006). Forts provided critical protection for frontiersmen
and women in the journey ever westward.16
Principal elements of defense at fort locations included fortified walls, bastions
with mounted cannons, and military personnel totaling anywhere from a handful to
more than 1,000 – depending on the fort and year. An average of 44 men were
stationed at Fort Winfield Scott, NV, for example, while an average of 761 men
were stationed at Fort Sheridan, IL, though each fluctuated over time.17 Often just
the presence of the Army’s soldiers was enough to ensure protection as their “very
presence served to convince the Indians that the United States government intended
to exert its jurisdiction and to enforce its decisions on the western frontier” (Prucha,
1969) (p. 179). A 1820 article in the Detroit Gazette expressed settlers’ hope for
no reduction in the size of the Army for the “force alone had any effect upon the
Indians.”
In addition to providing protection, forts served as points of trade and were critical
junctures in the westward supply chain. As population moved west, so did the demand
for goods. In response, the government instituted the “factory system” at frontier
fort locations. The factory system was a connected network of general stores run
by a factor who maintained a monopoly over local goods traded. Between 1795
and 1822, twenty-eight government factories were erected “so the red man would be
protected against extortion and fraud, and the trader might have safe storage for his
goods and furs” (Coman, 1911) (p. 373). Factors hired contractors to arrange the
16Forts played a role, too, in protecting the American fur trade. The fur trade refers to more than
just the trading of hides, skins, and buffalo robes but rather is a “catch-all” phrase used to describe
the trading of all products of the forest including, additionally, tallow, beeswax, maple sugar, and
other products. In the early 1800s, the fur trade was “one of the most important factors in the
development of the frontier” as it “it promoted exploration; it led to contact with the Indians...it
paved the way for settlers” (Wesley, 1935) (p. 55).
17Information on military personnel is digitized from the US Returns from Military Posts dataset.
Values reflect returns for the month of August during each year that the fort was in operation.
Averages are taken over all years for each for when information is available. See the subsequent
Data section which discusses the construction in more detail.
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transportation of goods – a process that was both expensive and time-consuming.18
If the Army advanced into unknown territory, “destitute of roads, and the contractor
found his task difficult, he could plead that there was no means of transporting
the supplies” (Wesley, 1935). Goods that were supplied included blankets, guns,
powder, lead, axes, knives, trinkets, coffee, food supplies, and alcohol.19 Contractors
were notorious for failing to fulfill their agreements and often failed to adequately
restock supplies during times of emergency (Wesley, 1935) (p. 81). To compensate
for shortages, factors also sourced supplies from the local civilian population. At Fort
Snelling, for example, though “the War Department ... wanted the garrisons to be
self-sufficient ... [but permitted] officers to buy hay from civilians in the neighborhood
of the posts” (Prucha, 1969) (p. 181). Whatever goods the factor managed to source,
however, were available for trade and purchase by soldiers, settlers, and the Native
American population.20
The factory system dissolved in 1822 and was replaced by the sutler system. Sut-
lers were appointed by the Secretary of War and were required to pay a small fee
in return for complete control over a post’s local market. Although sutlers received
military protection, they were civilians whose principal responsibility was merchan-
dising at military posts (Atherton, 1938). Because they were politically appointed,
sutlers were often ill-trained in business matters which led to relatively short tenures
– rarely more than a year or two. Sutlers provided goods, “simple luxuries and other
wants,” for purchase, supplementing the Army rations provided to soldiers from the
18High transport costs led to an elimination of the contract system in 1818 and required most
posts to be self-sustaining by creating gardens and raising livestock (Wesley, 1935).
19Whiskey sales were a chief source of income for frontier sutlers and it is estimated that 25% of
officers and enlisted men were alcoholics (Fields, 2005). Because alcohol had a “a very bad effect on
the health, morals, and discipline of enlisted troops,” the government attempted to discourage the
practice by imposing regulations on the quantity of liquor sold to each individual beginning in 1830
(Atherton, 1938).
20From 1809-1822, revenues generated from trade with the Native American population alone
totaled $290,000 (Wesley, 1935).
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Quartermaster Department (Atherton, 1938) (p. 140). Overall, the sutler system was
profitable and, in most cases, sutler stores carried a more varied stock of goods than
the average (private) western stores that followed (Atherton, 1938).
Lastly, forts offered basic services and amenities to those living on the frontier.
Prucha (1969) recounts the provisions that made the western posts “impressive in-
stallations” including sutlers’ stores, Indian agency buildings, laundresses’ quarters,
post hospitals, quartermaster and commissary storehouses, barns for grain and stables
for horses, gristmills, and workshops (p. 175). Such resources, including primitive
health care services in the form of fort hospitals, were often the only option for both
soldiers and settlers in the nearby vicinity. Enlisted men provided much of the man-
ual labor, but forts were also a source of local labor demand.21 Margo (2000) notes
that civilians were employed through government contracts across a wide range of
occupations including as nurses (or hospital matrons), carpenters, masons, painters,
cooks, clerks, inspectors, and other unskilled laborers. Fort locations were a source
of potential income for settlers on the frontier when employment opportunities were
otherwise scarce and, in return, civilians played an integral part in the general services
offered.22
1.2.2 Potential Effects of Fort Locations
Ex ante, the potential impact of fort locations on overall spatial settlement patterns
is unclear. Moreover, motivating hypotheses for short run effects differ from those of
the long run and, in this section, I discuss forts’ potential implications for both.
At the turn of the 19th century, transportation costs were high.23 When Ohio
21In fact, a soldier’s job often included gardening and otherwise growing fresh fruit and vegetables
at the fort location for consumption (Margo, 2000).
22Margo (2000) also shows that wages paid to civilian workers varied by fort location. More remote
forts often needed to pay a premium due to their undesirable locations, Fort Belle Fontaine in St.
Louis, for example, had higher wages than Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh) or Detroit.
23Redding and Turner (2015) show that the share of the US GDP attributed to transportation
was almost 9% at the turn of the 20th century. Costs varied by method of transport and by time.
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achieved statehood in 1803, settlers could only reach the region by sail, paddle, or
foot (Atack et al., 2010a). Wagon transport increased travel speeds – covering between
10 and 25 miles per day, depending on weather and terrain. Steam travel was even
faster, with boats moving up to 5 miles per hour, though this means of transportation
was limited by navigable river routes. Even east-of-the-Mississippi journeys were
treacherous during this period. A historical account from Mrs. Nathan Clark –
wife of a lieutenant in the Fifth Infantry – documents a travel time of two months
between Hartford, CT and Fort Crawford (present-day Prairie du Chien, WI) in 1819
(Coffman, 1986) (p. 120). The spread of the railroad network drastically altered
transport costs but, until 1860, routes did not reach west of the Mississippi. For
protective purposes and access to goods, services, and potential employment, settlers
had incentives to locate near fort locations. Moreover, in a world where individuals
prefer to co-locate, and are otherwise ambivalent as to where, forts solve the initial
coordination – directly resulting in short-run increases in population measures near
fort locations.
Do individuals prefer to co-locate? Thus far, I have taken preferences for co-
location as given, but previous work by Bazzi et al. (2018) suggests that much of the
frontier experience was characterized by isolation, low population density, and self-
reliance. If those moving west had preferences for isolation, we may not find evidence
of agglomeration in the vicinity of fort locations in the short run. Separately, the
urban economics literature elucidates clear reasons for agglomeration of both firms
and people in terms of transportation costs. Individuals are ultimately willing to ag-
glomerate, and pay high rents to do so, because the exchanging of goods, people, and
ideas is less costly (Glaeser, 2010). Agglomeration economies ultimately describe the
benefits that arise from such clustering (e.g. increased productivity, more amenities).
Original estimates by Fogel (1964) cite railroad transport costs at 0.63 cents per ton-mile, water
costs at 0.49 cents per ton-mile, and wagon travel at 23.1 cents per ton-mile.
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I pay careful attention to the historical narrative while ultimately showing that forts
were a source of local agglomeration.
I turn now to a discussion of potential long run effects. Taking as given initial
increases in population driven by fort location, it is unclear if – and how – increases
should persist over time. As the army pushed west, old forts were abandoned –
rendering their principal functions obsolete. By the close of the frontier in 1890,
more than 60% of the frontier forts had already been decommissioned. The Secretary
of War approved all fort decommissioning as part of national military policy and,
in fact, “the abandonment of a useless fort was as necessary as the establishment of
a new one, and the former step was sometimes necessary before the latter could be
taken” (Wesley, 1935) (p. 123). Once initial advantages of locating nearby a frontier
fort dissolved, nearby settlers may have chosen to relocate to other areas. Moreover,
certain economic models predict that long-run differences in density are driven by
natural advantages, not second-nature factors like forts, and thus resettlement may
be driven by underlying variation in natural advantages (Bleakley and Lin, 2012).
If forts locations differ from alternative sites with natural advantages, population
may be shifted away from abandoned fort locations. If this is the case, we may not
expect forts – in particular abandoned forts – to predict long-run spatial differences
in population.
Conversely, path dependence theory suggests that historical events play a critical
role in determining where density forms and persists. Forts gave certain locations
an early start. Fort locations, then, have a distinct advantage at every subsequent
stage of spatial competition (Davis and Weinstein, 2002). Thus it is not so much
the functions of the forts themselves that matter for long run outcomes but rather
the initial spatial problem that fort locations solve. Path dependence theory suggests
that forts create a sticky, spatial equilibrium, and even after abandonment, we should
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expect persistence. Historical anecdotes support the economic intuition. Wooster
(2009) discusses the importance of Fort Davis, TX, even after it was abandoned
in 1891: “The fort here spawned a thriving civilian settlement and served as the
economic nexus for regional development.” In subsequent sections, I study the extent
to which each hypothesis proves true empirically when I assess the place-based effects
of fort locations.
1.3 Characteristics of the Frontier Army
Forts were the center of Army life on the frontier and were staffed by officers, fam-
ilies, and enlisted men alike. In this section, I outline the unique characteristics
of the Army’s personnel and explore raw relationships between each trait and local
demographic patterns at fort locations.
During the 19th century, the peacetime Army was the subject of frequent con-
tentious debates. Congress claimed that a standing army was a fundamental threat to
liberty in the early American republic.24 The election of President James Monroe in
1817 resolved tensions surrounding the size and functions of the US Army as the US
entered an era of nationalism with an increased interest in military affairs. Monroe
was sympathetic to military issues and asserted the need for a standing army (1) due
to the vastness of the continent; (2) for continued protection as it was “unwise to
disband the army at a time when the nation was surrounding by enemies”; (3) as a
cohesive, reliable institution available in case of a national emergency (Wesley, 1935)
(p. 68).25
24See, also, Prucha (1969), Wesley (1935), and Ganoe (1942) for more on the discourse in Congress
on national military policy and tensions surrounding the idea of a peacetime army. “Timeworn
platitudes” opposing a standing army in peacetime included (1) an insufficient use for men – the only
acceptable use being at frontier garrisons; (2) financial concerns – by reducing (or even eradicating)
the army, “the consequent saving would raise the financial standing of the United States and would
secure more respect from other nations than a large army” (Wesley, 1935); and (3) standing armies
were a fundamental threat to liberty.
25The alternative was to rely on state militias which were run by “uncorrelated groups of untrained
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The peacetime Army was a modest institution. Enlisted soldiers were frequently
low-skilled, immigrant men hailing from northern cities. While immigrants never
made up more than 15 percent of the overall population, as much as two-thirds of
the Army were foreigners.26 Indeed fort locations reflect the Army’s attribute of
being predominantly foreign-born as shown in Figure 1·2a. The figure plots the share
of foreign-born individuals for fort counties and non-fort counties within a 100-mile
radius to capture local differences driven by fort location. While both groups share
similar trends over time, fort counties have a consistently higher share of foreign-born
across all years. Following 1830, there is a large increase in the share of foreign-born
– an observation that tracts well with the influx of immigrants arriving in the US
during this period (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). The immigrant share peaks in
1870 where 25% of the population living in fort counties is foreign-born – more than
10 percentage points higher than that of surrounding counties where the average is
closer to 15%.
Women were not permitted to serve in the military during this period and enlisted
men were required to be unwed.27 Commissioned officers were permitted to be mar-
ried, however, and often the few women living at fort locations were officers’ wives.
As Frances M. A. Roe – wife of Officer Fayette Washington Roe – recalls, “not one
woman have I seen here, but there are men – any number of dreadful-looking men
– each one armed with big pistols, and leather belts full of cartridges” (Roe, 1888).
Army wife Elizabeth Reynolds Burt indicates that social activity was limited to only
3 women at a remote post in eastern Montana (Handy-Marchello, n.d.). Enlisted men
citizens” – leaving the nation at risk “for being totally unprepared for emergencies that would leave
it a helpless supplicant before the states” (Wooster, 2009).
26Quoting Coffman (1986): “there had always been a sizable number of immigrants in the army.
From a fourth in the twenties and two-thirds of the strength three decades later, the number of
foreign-born recruits stayed at approximately 50 percent for the first ten years after the Civil War,
then dropped by 34.5 percent for the period 1880-97.
27Married men were permitted to serve only if they received approval form the General Headquar-
ters (Coffman, 1986).
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were consistently reminded of the dearth of women on the frontier and many wrote of
their interminable hope for romance. John Phelps writes about his repeated dreams
of Queen Victoria during his military service while James Engle, a graduate of West
Point, expresses a desire to rekindle an old romance back home. Engle writes from
Fort Towson in 1826: “I have not seen a young Lady since I left home...I wish you to
write every circumstance relative to Miss Dyckman how and where she is and every
thing else ... I am anxious to hear” (Coffman, 1986) (p. 106).
Though few in number, women on the frontier provided a prodigious amount of
information on military life. Army wives’ diaries and letters of correspondence provide
some of the richest, most intimate details – documenting treacherous journeys through
unknown territories, weather hardships, health epidemics, but also parties, picnics,
and holiday celebrations at frontier garrisons. Myres (1982) describes the women
and the nature of their contributions during this period: “Far from home, confined
to often inadequate and uncomfortable quarters in what seemed to some of them a
barren, inhospitable land, the ladies presented a picture of western life different from
that of the popular stereotypes [...] Although they shrewdly assessed the possibilities
and potential for economic and social development, they decried the lack of schools,
churches, ‘proper’ society, and the lack of ‘civilized amenities”’(p. 411). Perhaps due
to their relatively small numbers combined with difficulties of everyday life – women
who were on the frontier enjoyed an unparalleled sense of camaraderie. Older, more
seasoned frontiers-women provided insight and encouragement to those younger. In
an attempt to console a lieutenants new wife, Mary Moris writes in 1856: “it is dismal,
dismal to be alone. I never missed the Major more, nor felt more anxiety respecting
him, so do very sincerely sympathize with you ... in your being called on at such an
early period of your married life to encounter one of its heaviest trials” (Coffman,
1986) (p. 119).
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A dearth of women on the frontier meant that fort locations were disproportion-
ately male. While official records of personnel by gender at forts are rare, I link fort
locations to census records to show that fort counties have increased male shares.28
Figure 1·2b plots the differences in the share of men living in fort versus non-fort
counties over time. During the 19th century, fort locations have an increased male
share, though in most decades only by a small amount. Between 1860 and 1870, the
share peaks where 59% of the total population of fort counties are men. This spike
coincides with the decade during which the Army established the largest number of
new frontier forts.29 From 1930 onward, counties are indistinguishable along this
dimension.
Blacks were also present at frontier forts.30 During the War of 1812, black men
fought in two battalions and three companies in the US Army. Collectively known as
the “Free Men of Colour,” these units helped American forces conquer the British.31
Until the Civil War, however, Congress passed repeated measures to limit blacks’
ability to serve in branches of the US military. In 1866, Congress passed the Army
Reorganization Act which, alongside other restructuring measures, created 6 segre-
gated, all-black regiments – 2 cavalry and 4 infantry. Two of the regiments, the Ninth
and Tenth Cavalry, garnered the now-famous nickname “Buffalo Soldiers,” and for
next few decades, served across parts of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and the Dakota
28A (rare) 1894 census record for Fort McKavett, TX indicates that only 19% of those living at
the fort were women (117 women; 500 men).
29There were 27 new frontier forts erected between 1860 and 1870. This was an era of notoriously
hostile relations with Native American tribes.
30After the Civil War, all-black towns were established on the frontier. An add in a
bulletin in Kentucky promised membership in “The Largest Colored Colony in America.”
For a down payment of $5, “All Colored People that want to go to Kansas, on Septem-
ber 5th, 1877, Can do so.” The Kansas town that developed was called Nicodemus and
others that followed included Dearfield, CO; Langston City, OK and Allensworth, CA. See
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/a-list-of-well-known-black-towns/
2015/03/27/9f21ca42-cdc4-11e4-a2a7-9517a3a70506_story.html




Blacks were employed as both slaves and civilians at frontier forts. Dred Scott,
who infamously sued the United States for his freedom in 1857, spent 2 years enslaved
at Fort Snelling, owned by an Army doctor named John Emerson. Coffman (1986)
writes: “This was by no means unusual. Colonel Snelling and other officers had slaves.
The Vermonter Martin Scott purchased a slave named Jack in 1826 just before he
moved to Fort Snelling and he carried the slave with him as he went from one northern
post to another during the next few years” (p. 94). At forts in the South, blacks held
roles as artisans and common laborers but were not permitted to serve in white-collar
positions (Margo, 2000). Though blacks played key roles at frontier fort locations,
fort counties did not differ by race. In Figure 1·2c, I plot the share of whites in fort
and non-fort counties. Given the role of blacks on the frontier, we may have expected
fort locations to have lower shares of whites relative to non-fort counties though this
does not appear to be the case. While in select census years fort counties have slightly
lower white shares relative to non-fort counties, general trends between the county
groups are indistinguishable.33
Regardless of background, economic opportunity was the main driver behind an
individual’s decision to enlist: “Be they immigrants or natives, Blacks or Whites,
men enlisted for the same reasons as their predecessors had. They saw the army as
a job when other possibilities were lacking, as an opportunity to escape a difficult
and perhaps shameful situation or to gain passage to the inviting possibilities of the
West” (Coffman, 1986) (p. 334). Polish-born Eugene Bandel recounts his decision
32According to records at the National Archives Administration, the name was bestowed upon the
soldiers by Native Americans. The Ninth and Tenth Cavalries were stationed in Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, and Indian Territory. Visit https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2001/
spring/buffalo-soldiers.html for a brief discussion of by the National Archives and Records
Administration.
33After 1950, the share of whites diverges slightly between fort and non-fort counties but this is
likely driven by differences in population density and not the effects of the peacetime Army itself.
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to enlist in 1854: “By chance I saw a flag hanging from a house and under it a sign.
It was a notice that the United States wanted recruits for the Army. This was my
only resort if I did not wish to steal or beg. I went in. I was accepted soon enough
and sworn in. I was bound to remain a soldier for five years, for clothes, lodging, and
food and eleven dollars a month” (Bandel, 1932).
The Army provided a means of migrating west. Thousands of men passed through
the Army’s ranks during the 19th century with many serving for only the duration
of their contract – en route to becoming frontiersman themselves.34 Transportation
costs were high and migration West may have been prohibitively costly. For the
unskilled, destitute men serving in the ranks, the Army “provided shelter for those
who wanted to vanish from their homes but also transportation to points far from the
scene of their problems” (Coffman, 1986) (p.146). In other words, the Army funded a
soldier’s westward passage. Many who exploited this opportunity then remained on
the frontier – potentially shaping local demographic differences. While I document
correlations in Figure 1·2 between Army characteristics and demographic patterns, I
examine the extent to which differences matter statistically in subsequent sections.
1.4 Data Construction
To examine how the US Army and its frontier forts affected places, I construct a
dataset from newly digitized historical documents, archival data, US Census records,
and several publicly available data sources. I describe the sources and the methodol-
ogy for construction in detail below.
1.4.1 The US Army’s Frontier Forts
I start by identifying the set of US Army frontier forts. Broadly defined, a frontier
fort was a permanent military establishment erected on the frontier during America’s
34Contracts were 5 years in length for enlisted men, except between the years of 1833 to 1838
where they were only 3 years (Coffman, 1986) (p. 138).
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westward expansion. Using two secondary sources – The Sword of the Republic: The
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 by Francis Paul Prucha and The
Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 by Edward
M. Coffman – I assemble a complete list of the US Army’s permanently fortified
frontier forts.35 I then geo-locate each fort in space by obtaining latitude-longitude
coordinates from fortwiki.com and Google maps. In total, I identify and locate 160
frontier forts.
Frontier forts varied in their life span and size. Part of my empirical analysis
explores the heterogeneous treatment effect of forts along both the duration (life
span) and intensity (fort size) dimensions. To measure fort life span, I obtain each
fort’s year of establishment and year of decommissioning (or abandonment) from a
third source – The Encyclopedia of Historic Forts by Robert B. Roberts. I define fort
life span as the difference between the year each fort was decommissioned (abandoned)
and the year that the fort was established.36
To measure fort size, I manually digitize information on the number of Army
personnel stationed at each fort location. Data are available in microfilm form for 117
forts in my dataset through the US Returns from Military Posts, 1806-1913 (USRMP)
collection on ancestry.com. While each fort was in operation, the commanding officer
was responsible for sending a monthly post return to the Adjutant General’s Office in
Washington, DC. The post return contained information on fort activity during the
previous month and included the number of military and civilian personnel, counts
of cavalry, weapons, wagons, and other goods, remarks on the duties performed by
enlisted men, and a detailed record of events and official communications received.
Post returns, while available at a monthly frequency, were of varying detail and
35I do not include forts that were designed as temporary garrisons or trading posts erected by fur
trading companies unless such posts also served as US Army bases (e.g. Fort Pierre, SD).
36See Figure A·1 in the Appendix which plots the density of fort life duration using data from
Roberts (1964). Median fort life was 21 years.
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quality. Figure 1·3 outlines a typical example of a typical monthly return from De-
troit, MI, in August of 1815.37 As illustrated, information on the number of aggregate
personnel is coarsely separated by those present and absent from the fort location.
Individuals present were those physically present at the fort location at the time of
tally; those absent were individuals who were currently assigned to the fort but phys-
ically absent at the time of tally. Reasons for absence from a fort location included
on detached service, with leave, without leave, sick, and in arrest or confinement. I
manually collect data on the total present, total absent, and aggregate total number
stationed at each fort. Since no other information in my dataset is available at a
monthly frequency, I collect data from the month with the greatest uniform coverage
across all forts (August) to obtain a yearly snapshot of fort size.38
1.4.2 Outcomes
I rely on demographic information from the US Census tabulated at the county level
by Haines (2010) as outcomes of interest. Because county boundaries change with
each decadal census year, I first harmonize county boundaries to a base year of 1900
following the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) procedure outlined in Hornbeck
(2010). Perlman (2014) provides output files from the technique for public use. To
study settlement patterns, I rely on the measure of total population as reported by
the decennial census. I interpolate measures of population for intercensal years by
assuming a constant annual growth rate, a methodology used also by Bazzi et al.
(2018). Note that if population counts are missing for any year, interpolation cannot
be performed. This is an important feature to point out as there are missing data
for many counties that are not yet delineated for any census year and I discuss more
37See Figure A·2 for an example of a better quality return from Fort Apache, AZ, for the month
of August, 1888.
38I also collect data for the month of November, as it was a close second for the greatest uniform
coverage. In my analysis, I use data from August of each year but results are robust to using
November measures instead.
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on this nuance of the data in Section 1.6. I construct county-level population density
measures by taking total reported population divided by the county’s land area in
square miles in the year 1900. In all regressions, I consider total population and
population density transformed into natural logarithms so that coefficients can be
interpreted in percentage terms.39 For years in which a county has a true population
of zero, I replace this value with 0.1 in order to take log transformations.
To explore demographic differences, I rely on additional demographic information
from the decennial census. I construct measures of the total share of men living in a
county, total share of whites, and total share of foreign-born. Each share is simply
the fraction of men, whites, and foreign-born individuals in each year divided by the
total population. Data availability varies by decennial census year. The number of
men is available form 1820 onward, the number of whites is available for each census
year beginning in 1790, and the number of foreign-born is available census years 1820
onward (except for the year 1840). I utilize each measure to determine the extent to
which the US Army’s institutional characteristics affected county-level demographic
patterns.
1.4.3 Correlates of Fort Location and Population Patterns
My goal is to identify the causal, place-based impact of frontier fort locations. In
a cross sectional framework, let Wi be a binary treatment variable equal to one if
a county has a fort. County-level potential outcomes, Yi(1) and Yi(0), are popu-
lation measures observed under assignment to treatment and control groups and I
assume that observed outcomes follow Yi = Yi(Wi). I rely on the conditional in-
dependence assumption, or unconfoundedness, which implies that forts’ conditional
average treatment effect can be written as τ(x) = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Xi = x]. Under
39The distributions of total population and population density are also heavily right-skewed while
a log transformation of both closely approximates a normal. See Figure A·3 in the Appendix which
plots histograms of all four measures.
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unconfoundedness, I can identify forts’ average treatment effect if, conditional on
a vector of observable characteristics Xi, fort treatment is independent of potential
outcomes Yi(1) and Yi(0). This assumption forms the basis for my empirical strategy.
The conditional independence assumption has two important implications. First,
treatment assignment, or fort location, can still depend on unobservable characteris-
tics (Wooldridge, 2010). If Wi is some function, g(Xi, ai), and ai is an unobservable
random variable, estimates of the average treatment effect are still valid as long as ai
is not systematically correlated with potential outcomes with and without treatment.
In my framework, this poses an issue if, after conditioning on covariates, there re-
mains an underlying unobservable characteristic correlated with potential population
measures at a particular place with and without a fort. If this is the case, estimates of
the fort’s average treatment effect will be biased in a direction that would depend on
the correlation between ai, Wi, and Yi. While this issue is fundamentally untestable,
in later sections I explore the sensitivity of estimates to observable characteristics and
utilize a technique developed by Oster (forthcoming) to address selection on unob-
servables. Second, and what I devote most of this section to, is the importance of
selection on observables. I rely on archival documents and work by historians and
military scholars who discuss determinants of fort location to develop a rich set of
covariates.
I identify four broad, pre-existing factors affecting fort location and potential out-
comes which, ultimately, forms the basis for my identifications strategy. First, and
arguably most salient, is water availability. Rivers and lakes provided drinking water,
water for latrines, for washing, and for plants and livestock. Moreover, rivers facili-
tated transportation of goods, civilians, and troops to a region and were of particular
importance for national military policy. Anecdotal evidence points to rivers and river
intersections, or mouths, as important geographic features for fort location: “Even
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more pretentious than Fort Atkinson was Fort Snelling. The troops who arrived in
August, 1819, were set at once to construct quarters for the winter on the bottom
lands at the mouth of the Minnesota River” (p. 177) and “Fort Towson was estab-
lished in the Red River country near the mouth of the Kiamichi River” (Prucha, 1969)
(p. 253).
I address the importance of water sources using three datasets. I use the USGS
North American Atlas’ hydrography data to identify coastlines, shorelines of lakes,
and rivers and, separately, a digitized shapefile on steamboat-navigated rivers from
Atack (2015).40 I calculate minimum distance measures between each county’s cen-
troid and (a) the nearest body of water and (b) the nearest body of water capable
of steamboat travel to account for the importance of different water sources.41 Sepa-
rately, I use GIS techniques to identify the location of river intersections using USGS
hydrography data. The output of this exercise is a dummy for river mouth location
by county. Finally, I use information from Bleakley and Lin (2012) and Busey (2017)
to identify portage sites along rivers which has been documented to affect population
patterns. While historical evidence stresses the importance of water sources, fort
and non-fort counties are almost equidistant from the nearest water source, and fort
counties are sightly further from both portage sites and steam-navigable rivers as
outlined in Table 1.1 of descriptive statistics. However, consistent with the historical
narrative, forts are more likely to be positioned at a river mouth relative to non-fort
locations within a 100-mile radius. I include all measures described in the vector of
covariates.
Second, Native American tribes affected both fort locations and settlement pat-
40I exclude the category “intermittent streams” in the North American Atlas data from my analysis
as these bodies of water were likely too small to be navigable and unable to provide a sufficient source
of fresh drinking water.
41Minimum distance calculations take the location of a county’s centroid and measure the geodesic
distance between the centroid and the nearest body of water.
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terns. The site of Fort Armstrong, for example, “was a convenient one from which to
control the Indians” (Wesley, 1935) (p.10) while Fort Smith was established “on the
Arkansas River where the boundary of the Osage country crossed the river” (Prucha,
1969) (p. 251). Proximity to local tribes mattered for fort establishment and aban-
donment. The abandonment of Fort Des Moines was “only a question of time” due
to the “poor location of the post, both from the standpoint of health and of dis-
tance from the Indian country that needed patrolling” (Prucha, 1969) (p. 372). To
account for spatial variation in Native American settlement, I construct a distance
measure between each county and the nearest tribal boundary using shapefiles on
Native American territories from Dippel (2014) and Feir et al. (2017). Indeed, forts
were located closer to tribal boundaries relative to surrounding locations without a
fort as indicated in Table 1.1.
The third and fourth factors important for fort location jointly determine whether
a fort had the potential to survive in a given location: topography and suitability.
Topography was important in order to command a location militarily and remain free
from natural disaster. Fort Steuben was located on the Ohio River and “stood 120
yards from the river on a high bank of commanding ground” (Prucha, 1969) (p. 171).
Fort Harmar, located along the Muskingum River, “stood on an elevated bottom
land beyond the reach of the floods of the river” (Prucha, 1969) (p. 172). To capture
differences in terrain, I use a digital elevation model (DEM) from the Global 30 Arc-
Second Elevation dataset available through US Geological Survey (USGS). This DEM
divides the earth into cells that measure 1km x 1km and assigns a measure of elevation
to the center of each cell. From this data, I calculate three measures of topographical
variability: mean elevation, standard deviation of elevation, and standard deviation of
slope. According to Table 1.1, forts tend to be located in counties with higher ground,
as reflected in mean elevation measures, and on more rugged terrain, as reflected by
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standard deviation of both elevation and slope.
Suitability measures reflect how hospitable a certain location is, and was, for
humans, plants, and animals. First, I include latitude-longitude pairs to account for
a county’s global positioning.42 Table 1.1 shows that fort counties are located further
west (measured by distance between a lat-long pair and the international dateline)
but do not differ in latitude (distance to equator). Next, a large re-organization in
1818 required forts to have gardens and raise livestock (Wesley, 1935). In 1826, Army
Inspector General George Croghan stated, ”Look at Fort Atkinson and you will see
barn yards that would not disgrace a Pennsylvania farmer, herds of cattle that will do
credit to a Potomac grazier” (Prucha, 1969).43 Using data from IIASA/FAO (2012),
I compute county-level averages of annual temperature, rainfall, potential output
for three rain-fed crops (wheat, potatoes, and cotton), and the number of growing
days per year to account for suitability in raising both crops and livestock.44 I find
no real differences in annual temperatures but slightly lower rainfall amounts, less
growing days, and lower maximum attainable yields for three staple crops. Given
the ruggedness of the terrain of fort counties, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
topography is less suitable for the planting and raising of crops.
42Latitude is often intuitive associated with preferential climates but it is often the lati-
tude/longitude combination that matters most. San Diego, CA, for example, is the same latitude as
Yuma, AZ, but the locations vary in longitude – making San Diego a more hospitable, Mediterranean
climate relative to Yuma’s dry, desert climate.
43The role of Inspector General was to tour the posts. Generals arrived unannounced, observed
conduct of officers, men, and conditions of the fort. They were also responsible for filing inspection
reports with the Inspector General’s Office with conditions on fort mess, sanitation, health, hospital,
quarters, guardhouse, parade, arms, gun carriages, powder, instruction, discipline, records, and post
utility (Wesley, 1935).
44Though the IIASA/FAO (2012) data is based on records from 1961-1990, both Nunn and Qian
(2011) and Droller and Fiszbein (2019) suggest that the information are accurate indicators of
climactic conditions for historical periods. Nunn and Qian (2011) use the data in a study that spans
900 years, from 1000 to 1900.
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1.5 The Effect of Forts on the Spatial Distribution of Popu-
lation
Using the data described, I study the place based impact of the US Army and its
forts. I first explore the average effects of having a fort within a county using a binary
treatment. Specifications of this sort capture the treatment effects along the extensive
margin of fort location (e.g. fort vs. no fort). Second, conditional on fort location, I
explore population dynamics over time. Event-study specifications trace the evolution
of population measures at fort locations, thus capturing treatment effects along the
intensive margin. Finally, I focus on a subset of abandoned forts to determine whether
forts have a persistent impact. This framework allows me to identify path dependent
behavior at fort locations.
1.5.1 Fort Location and Population Patterns: Baseline Pooled-OLS
Forts had strong effects on local population patterns. To quantify their impact along
the extensive margin, I compare fort counties to non-fort counties by estimating an
equation of the following form:
Yist = α + βfortit +Xiγt + θst + εist (1.1)
where Yist is a population measure in county i in state s at time t, including log total
population and log population density.45 The treatment measure, fortit, is a dummy
equal to one if a fort is established in county i by time t. For example, Fort Hampton
was established in Limestone County, AL, in 1809 so in census years preceding 1809,
fortit = 0. In census year 1810, and thereafter, fortit = 1.
I include the vector of pre-determined exogenous characteristics in as discussed in
45Recall that as outlined in Section 1.4.2, for counties with true population measures of zero
during any census year, the value is replaced with 0.1 in order to take log transformations of both
population and population density.
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Section 1.4.3 interacted with year dummies.46 This flexibly controls for fixed charac-
teristics by allowing each to vary in importance over time. For example, while rivers
are fixed in space, the benefits of being located near a river may have changed during
the 19th century due to improvements sanitation, irrigation, as well as alternative
transportation methods (e.g. rail transport). I include state-by-year fixed effects, θst,
that account for shocks affecting all counties within a given state in a particular year.
For example, during the 19th century much of the western territory obtained by the
US was then subdivided. Subdivisions were granted statehood at different points in
time which subsequently granted the authority, under the US federal government,
to regulate issues of local concern. State-by-year fixed effects absorb concerns that
statehood, or differential policies thereafter, may affect population levels.47
Finally, the sample used in this estimating equation includes all counties with a
centroid within a 100-mile radius for a fort location where the unit of observation
is a county-year.48 Estimates of β reflect the comparison between a fort county and
surrounding non-fort counties within a given state s, in a given year t, conditional on
pre-existing geographic characteristics and are then averaged across all years. Stan-
dard errors in the pooled-OLS model are clustered at the level of treatment assignment
– in this case, the county (Abadie et al., 2017).
Fort counties are larger and denser. Estimates of the pooled-OLS model in Ta-
ble 1.2 show that forts predict higher total population and population density. In
panel A, the dependent variable is the log of total population while in panel B, the
dependent variable is log of population density. On average, fort counties have be-
46In regressions for log total population, I control for a measure of a county’s total land area in
the vector of covariates. However, for regressions on log population density, since area is implicitly
accounted for in a measure of the dependent variable, area is not added as a control variable.
47Regression results using census division-by-year fixed effects are similar and are reported in
Table A.2.
48Results also available for counties within a 75-mile radius (Table A.7) and 150-mile radius
(Table A.8) in the Appendix.
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tween (roughly) 70% and 85% more people (Panel A) and are between 30% and 70%
more densely populated (Panel B) than nearby non-fort counties. Column (1) shows
results of population measures on a fort dummy with no controls. When adding
state-by-year fixed effects in column (2), the coefficient decreases by more than 15%
in estimates of total population but actually results in an increase in the coefficient in
regressions on log population density. Moreover, the R-square measure increases sub-
stantially as a significant portion of variation in population measures is driven by both
location (state) and timing (year). In column (3) I add the full set of pre-determined
characteristics interacted with time dummies and, in doing so, the coefficient remains
largely stable in both regressions. This result should lend credibility to a somewhat
random assignment of forts across space, even conditional on fixed geographic factors
that might be expected to affect fort location and subsequent population.
Forts had spillover effects, though they were local, and I explore this in column
(4). Recall that my geographic unit of observation is a county. Space, however, is
continuous and county boundaries are simply a convenient means of invisibly dividing
space into individual units. To the extent that I expect forts to have cross-county
spillovers, results of β may be biased downward – understating the true effect of a fort
– as surrounding non-fort counties are “contaminated” by fort treatment. In column
(4), I exclude counties within a 100-mile radius of a fort that share an immediate
border with a fort county.49 By excluding immediate neighbors, I can minimize the
bias driven by cross-county spillovers. Indeed, when doing so, β increases relative
to column (3) by up to 15%. Relative to counties nearby – albeit ones that do not
share a border – fort counties have an average of 75% more people and are 70% more
densely populated.
To further investigate the nature of spillover effects across counties, I examine the
49See Figure A·5 in the Appendix which illustrates the sample used for estimation using Fort
Abercrombie, ND, as an example.
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relationship between distance to a fort and both population measures. Specifically, I
take the geodesic distance between a county’s centroid and the nearest fort location
which results in a continuous measure for all counties in my 100-mile sample – includ-
ing fort counties. Since there is no reason to believe distance should matter linearly
with respect to population outcomes, I follow Cage and Rueda (2016) and take a
nonparametric approach.50 Specifically, I use locally weighted scatter-plot smoothing
(LOWESS) in which county-level population outcomes are fitted with a low-degree
polynomial using a subset of nearby population-distance pairs. Pairs nearby are
given more weight than those further away and the result is a weighted, smoothing
relationship between fort distance and population outcomes.51
Fort spillover effects are nonlinear as shown in Figure 1·4a and 1·4b. Plotted
line reflect a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) estimation of pooled
population outcomes, conditional on distance to the nearest fort location.52 Results
for log total population in Figure 1·4a show a steep drop off of population within
the first 25 miles from a fort location. Among counties located between 25 and 100
miles of a fort, there is almost no change in total population. Population density in
Figure 1·4b follows a similar pattern where density drops sharply within the first 25
miles of a fort. Density continues to decline, but at a much slower rate for counties
located between 25 and 100 miles of a fort. Taken together, both figures indicate a
non-linear relationship between population outcomes and distance to fort location,
indicating cross-county spillovers are restricted to the nearest counties.
50The empirical setting in Cage and Rueda (2016) closely resembles mine. The authors investigate
the contemporary effects of historical investment in the printing press in sub-Saharan Africa.
51LOWESS estimation fits each data point with a flexibly polynomial using explanatory variables
near the point being estimated. Polynomials are fitted using weighted least squares, giving more
weight to nearby points and less to those further away. See the National Institute of Standards and
Technology for both a practical and intuitive explanation: https://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/
handbook/pmd/section1/pmd144.htm.
52To make interpretation as straightforward as possible, I limit pooled population outcomes to
those between 1890-2010 as all forts had been established by census year 1890.
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Overall, forts predict increased population measures and spillover effects are highly
local. Results imply that centers of population arose at specific fort locations and
that both increased population and density measures. Historical accounts confirm
that fort sites were the very roots of local agglomeration. A description of Fort Scott,
KS, states: “The fort [...] pushed settlement further westward across the plains [...]
Abandoned in 1853, the building at the post became a nucleus for the town of Fort
Scott” (Fields, 2005). Separately, Prucha (1969) documents Duke of Wurttemburg
Paul Wilhelm’s visit to Fort Atkinson: when he “traveled up the Missouri in 1823,
he visited the ‘good-looking, white washed buildings’ of the new fort. The post was,
he thought, a veritable town and, except for St. Charles and Franklin, the most
populous place on the Missouri” (p. 175). In other words, the historical narrative
fits well with the empirical evidence that forts themselves served as the very points
of local agglomeration.
1.5.2 Propensity Score Estimation and Matched County Pairs
While I control for pre-determined geographic measures in previous regressions, the
OLS framework imposes a linear relationship between covariates and parameters. In
this section, I use a propensity score matching technique to allow the parameter
of interest to depend non-linearly on pre-existing characteristics (Acemoglu, 2005).
Ultimately, this technique provides additional robustness since I am unaware of the
exact functional form with which the pre-determined variables enter a regression
model.
I begin by estimating a logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one for whether county i ever receives a frontier fort. The set of covariates include
pre-existing characteristics discussed in Section 1.4.3, and reported in Table 1.1, that
may have affected fort location. Using this estimation procedure, I recover an estimate
for each county that reflects its ex ante probability of being treated by a fort. This
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estimate is known as the propensity score. I use one-to-one matching to match each
treated county to a surrounding control county using the following procedure. First,
I restrict the universe of control counties whose centroid lies within 100 miles of a
fort. Given the geographic nature of my data, it is important that matched counties
are geographically feasible alternatives (e.g. it was never an option to establish Fort
Wayne, IN, in Maine and, thus, it should not be matched to a county in Maine – even
if the estimated propensity scores are similar).
Second, I drop any counties in a 100-mile radius that are also treated counties. For
example, Fort Recovery, located in Mercer county, OH, is positioned approximately
30 miles from Fort Greenville in Darke county, OH. Thus, Darke county would satisfy
the first condition of being within a 100-mile radius of Fort Recovery but since Darke
county is also treated, I exclude it as a potential match (and vice versa). Third, let pi
be the estimated propensity score of any treated county i and let pī be the estimated
propensity scores of the set of control counties ī that satisfy the first two conditions.
I then match each treated fort county i with a single control county from the set ī
that satisfies min |pi− pī|. Each treated county is matched to a single control county,
creating a unique treated-control county pair.
I plot raw means of total population and population density in Figure 1·5 for
matched treatment-control pairs. For each county pair, I normalize the timing of
fort arrival to time t = 0 in both the fort county and its matched control. For
example, (treated) Sebastian county, home of Fort Smith, is matched with (control)
Logan county. Fort Smith is established in Sebastian county in year 1817, making
the census year 1820 as t = 0 for both Sebastian and Logan. I do this for each pair
and trace both lags and leads of mean population measures relative to the normalized
year of fort arrival.
There are striking differential trends in average population measures. The figures
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depict a significant divergence in total population and population density immediately
following treatment. A century after a fort’s establishment, mean total population
was 190,000 in a fort county and less than 45,000 in matched control counties. Mean
densities are just as noteworthy with 344 people per square mile in fort counties and
55 people per square mile in matched pairs.
To estimate the extent to which the relationships displayed in Figure 1·5 hold
statistically, I estimate a form of equation 1.1 with slight modifications:
Yijst = α + βfortit + δj + θst + εijst (1.2)
I report results where the dependent variable is both log total population and log
population density in county i, matched pair j, state s at time t. I use a binary treat-
ment fortit that varies by county i and time t and I incorporate state-by-year fixed
effects. Because each treated-control matched pair is unique, I include a matched-pair
fixed effect (δj) which ensures that the variation in fort treatment stems from within
the matched county pair. The most saturated regression controls for the length of
railroad in operation in each county i in decade t. It is important to note that I do
not condition on pre-existing characteristics in regression 1.2 as these have already
been implicitly accounted for during the matching procedure. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level.
Estimates from the matched sample offer additional insight into the positive treat-
ment effect of a frontier fort and are included in Table 1.3. Coefficients vary in magni-
tude but are roughly similar to those using the baseline 100-mile sample. Conditional
on state-by-year-fixed effects and county-pair fixed effects in column (3), forts are over
60% larger and 57% more densely populated. Results are both statistically significant
and economically large across all specifications.
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1.5.3 Causal Random Forest Estimation of Forts’ Conditional Average
Treatment Effects
Recent contributions to the economics literature extend a traditional method of ma-
chine learning known as the random forest from a technique used for prediction to a
technique used for treatment effects estimation and causal inference (Athey and Wag-
ner, 2018; Athey et al., 2019; Athey and Wagner, 2019; Athey and Imbens, 2019).53
In this section, I utilize this method known as the causal random forest to provide
estimates of the forts’ conditional average treatment effects. I first discuss causal
random forests as a technique for estimating treatment effects then report estimates
and confidence intervals for inference.
Recall that the goal in my setting is to estimate the conditional average treat-
ment effects of the US Army’s frontier forts, or τ(x) as notated in Section 1.4.3. In
general, the difficulty in estimating τ(x) is twofold: (1) I only ever observe one of
the two potential outcomes, either Yi(1) or Yi(0), and (2) I typically cannot estimate
τ(x) without making additional assumptions about the data-generating process. Un-
der unconfoundedness, however, I assume the treatment Wi is independent of Yi,
conditional on Xi.
Motivation for unconfoundedness is the underlying implication that certain “nearby”
observations in x-space can be treated as having come from a randomize experiment
and, thus, provides a basis for matching techniques and other local methods (Athey
and Wagner, 2018). In OLS, this assumption implies that by controlling linearly for
Xi, I can recover unbiased estimates of τ(x); under propensity score matching, the
assumption suggests that if I know the propensity of receiving a treatment for all
Xi = x, then too can I estimate τ(x). As a researcher, however, I am unaware of
53Specifically, (Athey and Wagner, 2018) show that causal forests are pointwise consistent for true
treatment effects and have an asymptotically normal and centered sampling distribution – proving
valid for statistical inference. See Sexton and Laake (2009) for a discussion of standard errors in
random forest estimation.
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the exact functional form with which the pre-determined variables enter a model of
interest which may lead to a failure to satisfy the unconfoundedness assumption using
my earlier techniques.
Athey and Wagner (2018) show that causal random forests can flexibly employ the
unconfoundedness assumption by growing an ensemble of decision trees. A decision
tree is “grown” by recursively splitting a random subsample of my data where each
split in the tree is chosen to immediately, and most efficiently, improve the quality of
the tree’s fit (Athey et al., 2019). While there are different methods for splitting, a
typical tree may split by asking: “What variable and value maximizes the reduction in
the mean squared error if the tree is split along that variable and that value?” (White,
2018).54 Tree splitting continues until the random subsample has been completely
partitioned into a set of leaves L where each leaf contains N rows of observations.
Paramount to this method is the assumption that each leaf is small enough such that
the (Yi,Wi) pairs are as good as random.
For each leaf L in a single tree, the treatment effect can be written formally as:
τ̂(x) =
1










Intuitively, equation 1.3 is simply the difference in the fitted values of the outcome
variable between the treated and untreated observations in a single leaf. Estimates
of τ̂(x) from each leaf are then averaged across all leaves in a single tree. To produce
a causal forest, an ensemble of B individual trees are grown, each outputting τ̂b(x),
and the forest aggregates predictions by averaging across all trees to produce a single
54By default, the algorithm will seek a split that maximizes the difference in the treatment effect
between two “child” nodes (or the left node and the right nodes). See notes on the grf package in
R that I use for causal forest estimation which discuss details of the algorithm: https://github.
com/grf-labs/grf/blob/master/REFERENCE.md#causal-forests.
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55 Then, since estimates of τ̂(x) are
asymptotically normal, we can create confidence intervals and perform statistical
inference.
Consider the single tree illustrated in Figure 1·7. The “root” of this tree – or
the first split of the data – occurs along a county’s distance to the nearest portage
site being ≤ 754.64 miles.56 In the subset of 247 counties sampled, 232 counties are
≤ 754.64 miles and 15 counties are > 754.64 miles. For the 232 counties below the
threshold, there are no subsequent splits made in this single tree. For the 15 counties
above the threshold, a subsequent split occurs on distance to the nearest water source
≤ 14.12 miles. In this split, 10 counties are ≤ 14.12 miles and 5 counties are > 14.12
miles. There are no subsequent splits, resulting in a total of 3 leaves in the tree. A
τ̂(x) is computed for each leaf, then the τ̂(x) are averaged across the 3 leaves in the
tree, and subsequently, across all trees in the causal forest.57
Causal random forests have significant advantages and are gaining traction with
economists (see Davis and Heller (forthcoming); O’Neill and Weeks (2019); Bertrand
et al. (2017)). First, random forests have a unique advantage over propensity score
matching techniques in their ability to utilize the full data set.58 A matching approach
dispenses of large amounts of data in an effort to find the optimal treated-control
55As stated in Athey and Wagner (2018), “the advantage of a forest over a single tree is that
it is not always clear what the ’best’ causal tree is... it is often better to generate many different
decent-looking trees and average their predictions, instead of seeking a single highly-optimized tree.
In practice, this aggregation scheme helps reduce variance and smooths sharp decision boundaries”
(p. 1231). See Buhlmann and Yu (2002) for a formal exploration.
56Figure 1·7 is one of either 10,000 or 15,000 decision trees that are used in the procedure for
estimation. Separately, recall that a portage site is a set of rapids along a river and so captures the
importance of a county’s positioning along a river.
57As O’Neill and Weeks (2019) points out, number of trees in a forest are somewhat arbitrary but
recent work uses anywhere from 10,000 and 25,000 trees (Bertrand et al., 2017; Davis and Heller,
forthcoming).
58In my case, the number of counties used in the matching approach is one-eighth of the number
used in my baseline sample. The baseline sample used in Table 1.2 includes 1,956 counties. The
matching approach restricts the sample to a set of 248 counties and this is the sample used for
estimation in Table 1.3.
41
pair.59 Second, and perhaps more importantly in this setting, the covariates in my
data set may interact in a complex manner with one another in jointly determining
both treatment (e.g. fort location) and outcomes (e.g. population). For example,
what may matter jointly for both fort location and population measures may be
distance to the nearest water source only if the location has a certain temperature
and is above a given threshold in elevation. Evaluating all potential interactions
among covariates in a parametric setting may result in model overfitting and other
high-dimensional estimation issues. As stated in Athey and Imbens (2019), “random
forests are effective at picking up on the sparsity and ignoring the irrelevant features,
even if there are many of them” and do not “waste degrees of freedom on accounting
for these covariates” (p. 14). Not only do causal forests allow for flexible, high-level
interactions between covariates by they simultaneously learn which interactions are
relevant versus not.
Equipped with theory, intuition, and technical tools, I turn to causal random
forest estimation of the forts’ conditional average treatment effects. Because causal
random forest estimation is restricted to cross-sectional data, I take a cross section
of my data from 1890. The sample of counties includes fort counties and non-fort
counties within a 100-mile radius (e.g. the 1890 cross section from the sample used
for estimation in Table 1.2). This cross section contains 1,956 counties and can be
partitioned into the three parts: outcomes of log total population and log population
density: Yi, fort treatment which is a dummy equal to one if a county ever had a
frontier fort: Wi, and covariates: Xi (for a complete list of covariates used in tree-
splitting, see Table A.3). While I use the year 1890, estimates can hypothetically be
produced from causal random forest for any cross section. Using a cross-validation
59An improvement from matching is, instead, propensity score weighting which requires minimal,
if at all, disposal of data. In fact, an original focus of random forest estimation was in obtaining
nonparametric estimates of the propensity score to employ weighting techniques (Athey and Wagner,
2018).
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procedures, I build each forest by first separating the total sample of 1,956 counties
into a subset used for training (978 counties) and a subset used for estimation (978
counties). Each tree is built by splitting along the covariates using the training sample
and subsequent estimation occurs using the estimation sample. The number of trees
in each forest is set to either 10,000 or 15,000.
Causal random forest estimates indicate that fort counties are at least 40% larger
and 34% more densely populated in the year 1890, as reported in Table 1.4. Several
causal forests are built to obtain the estimates in Table 1.4 and I explain each one
here. In columns (1) and (2) – for both panel A and panel B – covariates used for
tree-splitting include pre-determined geographic characteristics and state dummies.
Doing so produces conditional average treatment effects estimates of over 55% for
log total population and between 40-48% for log population density. Causal forests
in columns (1) and (2) both use a forest of 10,000 trees. Column (1) reports con-
ditional average treatment effects for all counties used in estimation while column
(2) reports estimates for the overlap-weighted conditional average treatment effect.
This estimand is recommended by Li et al. (2017) in the case of poor overlap among
covariates – or when propensities for treatment may be very close to 0 or 1. In gen-
eral, results are smaller in magnitude than those previously reported using OLS and
one-to-one matching, suggestive that it is important to capture high-level interactions
among covariates.
If I introduce length of railroad in operation as a splitting covariate, estimates
decrease in magnitude but remain remarkably stable across subsequent causal forest
specifications. Columns (3) and (4) create a forest with similar parameters to the
forests used in column (1) and (2) – the only difference being that railroad access
variable is included in the matrix of covariates. In columns (5) and (6), I vary
the forest in two ways: first, I allow the causal forest algorithm to produce trees
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with empty leaves or leaves with no observations. If there is an empty leaf on a
tree, the entire tree is dropped from final calculations of the average treatment effect.
According to developers of the grf package in R, this option may improve performance
on small or marginally powered data but requires more trees for estimation which leads
me to variant two of the forest in columns (5) and (6): an increase in number of trees
from 10,000 to 15,000. Again, the difference between estimates in columns (5) and
(6) is that column (5) reports estimates for the full sample and column (6) reports
estimates for the overlap-weighted sample. Overall, results of forts’ average treatment
effect hover around 41% for log total population and 34% for log population density
and confidence intervals do not include zero for any estimate.
1.6 Population Dynamics at Fort Locations
Using three, increasingly robust methods, I show strong evidence of forts’ average
treatment effects along the extensive margin. Population patterns at fort counties,
however, are the realization of a dynamic process set in motion by fort establishment.
In this section, I adopt an event-study framework to explore the dynamics of total
population and population density among fort counties to capture the impact along
the intensive margin.
There are two main benefits to the event study framework in this context. First,
all counties are treated by a fort and variation stems from the staggered timing
of fort establishment. In short, in any given year, outcomes in treated counties
are compared to outcomes in other, not-yet-treated counties. Thus, this framework
directly addresses any concerns that fort and non-fort counties are systematically
different along an unobservable dimension. During this period, the frontier moved
westward and so counties furthest east have an increased probability of receiving a
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fort earlier in the time series.60 In the regressions, I control for degrees longitude, or a
county’s westward positioning, such that fort timing can be treated as a quasi-random
event.
Second, this framework allows me to trace population dynamics in decadal census
years up to and following fort establishment – painting a rich picture of how pop-
ulation patterns respond to fort treatment over time. However, though I observe
the exact year in which a fort is established, other variables in my dataset are only
reported every 10 years in the decadal census. This means that a fort’s establish-
ment within a county can occur in any year during a 10-year interval. For example,
while Fort Harrison was established in Marion county, IN in 1812 and Fort Smith
was established in Sebastian county, AK in 1817, both have an event year of 1820.
While this introduces some noise to event timing, on average, forts are established
roughly 4.7 years prior to a decadal census. In other words, the “event time” occurs
an average of 4.7 years following a fort’s establishment.
Fort timing is staggered and so I normalize event timing to time zero across all
fort locations. The estimating equation takes the following form:
Yidt = α +
8∑
k=−3
βk1(years since fort establishment = k) +Xiγ + θdt + εidt (1.4)
Because equation 1.4 uses only fort counties, I lose a significant number of observations
relative to the baseline 100-mile sample used for earlier estimation. As such, there are
important elements to equation 1.4 that I note here. First, outcomes, Yidt, are log total
population and log population density in county i, census division d, in census year
t. I index observations by census divisions because they are larger in land area and
when including census division-by-year fixed effects, I retain the necessary variation
60See Figure A·4 in the Appendix which plots fort establishment year and degrees longitude. The
figure illustrates that the further west a county lay, the later the fort establishment date.
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in fort timing within any given census division d and any given census year t.61 The
coefficients, βk, in the regression capture the average outcome k censuses prior to and
following fort establishment. I include a vector of geographic controls, which include
longitudinal positioning discussed earlier and, as stated, census division-by-year fixed
effects.
Yet another nuance of census data in early US history is that not all counties
“exist” – or are delineated – during each census year. For these county-years, no
census information is available. Moreover, forts in my dataset were established early
on in US history and so there is a maximum number of census years prior to fort
establishment for which data could possibly be available. For example, Fort Adams
was established in 1798 in Mississippi so, at most, I can observe one data point prior
to fort arrival (1790). Put simply, I do not have a balanced panel and there is a
limit to the number of potential observations prior to a fort’s establishment within a
county.
To work around this issue, I take two different approaches. First, I restrict the
sample to fort counties for which I observe potential census measures for a certain
window of time around the year of a fort’s establishment. The baseline event window
includes 3 decennial censuses prior to a fort arrival and 8 decennial censuses following.
This amounts to 101 forts and I use these forts to estimate equation 1.4 and report
point estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals in Figure 1·6.62 In the figure, the
omitted category is the census year immediately preceding fort establishment. All
estimates of βk >0 should be interpreted as increased measures of population in fort
counties relative to the census year immediately preceding fort establishment.
There are immediate and sustained increases in total population and population
61Including state-by-year fixed effects is a much more demanding requirement as I require variation
in fort timing within any given state in any given census year.
62In total, there are 160 forts so my estimation of equation 1.4 includes roughly 63% of the total
sample.
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density at fort locations. Increases are statistically significant fort population density
in the census year immediately following fort establishment and within 2 decennial
censuses for total population. Dynamics of log total population closely approximate
a logarithmic curve, leveling off around 50 years after fort establishment. Log popu-
lation density continues to increase over time, though at a slower pace. Additionally,
I find no evidence of a significant pre-trend prior to fort arrival as confidence intervals
include zero for pre-treatment periods. Overall, fort locations experience initial gains
to population measures that continue to increase, albeit at a slower rate, over time.
Figure 1·6 mechanically restricts the sample to fort counties for which a fort
appears no earlier than 1810. In other words, it restricts the sample to fort counties
for which it is possible to observe data for three leading censuses. Moreover, the
estimation procedures allows forts to drop out of the regression on account of missing
data. Consider the case of Fort Mitchell in Russell county, AL, established in 1813.
While three census years precede Fort Mitchell’s establishment (1790, 1800, and 1810),
the first year for which there is recorded data for Russell county is 1840. In other
words, while I include Fort Mitchell in the sample, pre-treatment years are dropped
from estimation due to missing data.
To address this issue, I take a second approach. I assume a value of zero for the
population counts in census years for which there is missing data for a particular
county. In the running example of Russell county, I impute a value of zero – or 0.1
to be precise – for the measure of total population living in Russell county for census
years 1790 through 1830. Since I am interested in the movement and settlement of the
non-Native-American population, this approach assumes that the population count
of civilian settlers is zero for any census year for which there is missing population
data. Results from using this methodology are similar to those in Figure 1·6 and
can be found in Figure A·6. There are immediate increases in both total population
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and population density – although confidence intervals include zero for gains in both
measures until 30 years after fort arrival. Overall, utilizing this approach yields
estimates that paint the same picture: short-run increases are followed by a sustained,
but leveling off, of both total population and population density.
Both approaches are imperfect solutions for a data issue and it is important to
determine how estimates in each approach may be biased. The first methodology
allows counties with missing information to drop out of the estimating procedure. If
there truly are population counts that are non-zero for these locations, estimates will
be biased upward as the early census years with small population counts are dropped
from the regression. If, instead, I utilize the second methodology and impute a value
of zero in missing cells when the true population is non-zero, regressions using imputed
estimates with be biased downward. Thus, I can assume the true effect of fort location
using a dynamic time series is likely bounded by estimates using both methods.
1.7 Path Dependence at Fort Locations
Population dynamics show short-run increases in population measures that level off
in the long run, conditional on a county having a frontier fort. But do increases
in population measures persist between fort and non-fort counties in the long run?
In previous sections, I exploit the location and timing of fort arrival to estimate
effects at fort locations. In this section, I document how long run outcomes can be
attributed to historic, sunk costs of a fort being located in a particular point in space.
Specifically, I leverage fort abandonment to break the link between a fort’s short-run
effects from long-run persistence.
1.7.1 Fort Location and Persistence: Cross-Sectional Evidence in 2010
My empirical framework for analyzing persistence mimics Bleakley and Lin (2012)
who relate portage sites to contemporary measures of population density. In their
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study, Bleakley and Lin rely on the obsolescence of historically-valued portage sites
to show path dependence. In a similar spirit, I use a subset of abandoned fort coun-
ties and nearby non-fort counties to quantify long-run persistence. When forts were
abandoned, their principal functions were rendered obsolete. I focus on the subset
of 102 frontier forts that had been abandoned by the close of the frontier in 1890. I
restrict the set of non-fort counties to those with a centroid within 100 miles of an
abandoned fort. I then estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
Yi = α + βabandonedforti +Xiγ + θs + εi (1.5)
Outcomes include log total population and population density measured in 2010. The
treatment is a dummy for whether or not a county had a fort abandoned by 1890.
Regressions include all pre-determined characteristics in Xi and state dummies in
θs. Following Abadie et al. (2017), I report robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Estimates of β capture the conditional average treatment effect of an abandoned fort
on long-run outcomes.
Abandoned fort counties have more people and are more densely populated over
a century later. Results are included in Table 1.5 and the interpretation of the co-
efficients are analogous to those reported in Bleakley and Lin (2012). In 2010, fort
counties have, on average, 70% more people and are over 55% more densely popu-
lated conditional only on state fixed effects. Estimates slightly decrease in magnitude
when controlling for pre-determined geographic characteristics at the county level.
However, when adding in controls for county-level railroad access, measured by the
63According to Abadie et al. (2017), in a cross-sectional framework, clustering should be at the
level of treatment assignment. In this case, treatment is assigned at the county level – the smallest
unit of observation and, thus, clustering is not appropriate in this framework. In general, Abadie et
al. (2017) addresses the issue of when to cluster and at what level to cluster, claiming that there is
harm in clustering at too aggregate a level (e.g. to few clusters). According to the authors, when
deciding whether and at what level to cluster, the researcher must decide whether the sampling
process is clusters (it is not) and if the assignment mechanism (e.g. fort assignment) is clustered (it
is at the county level which is the level of the treatment). In general, this suggests that I cluster at
the county level in pooled OLS settings to adjust for serial correlation but do not cluster in cross
sectional settings given the level of the treatment assignment mechanism.
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length of railroad within a county, the coefficient on abandoned fort is almost halved
in the regression on log total population and cut by one-fourth in regressions on log
population density. Overall, in the most saturated regression in column (3), aban-
doned fort counties have an average of 34% more people and an increased population
density of 42%.
Overall, my estimates are smaller in magnitude than what Bleakley and Lin find
to be true at portage sites. Using population outcomes at the county level in 2000,
Bleakley and Lin find increased densities between 75 and 110%. However, regres-
sions do not account for for measures of railroad access which have been shown to
significantly affect population differences. In other words, their estimates should be
directly compared with my specifications in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.5. In
these specifications, estimates are within smaller than what Bleakley and Lin find for
portage. Results suggest that forts have strong persistent effects though magnitudes
are not as large as those driven by portage sites.
1.7.2 Causal Random Forest Estimates of Forts’ Persistent Effects in 2010
To probe the robustness of my results on forts’ persistent effects, I revisit the causal
random forest. I build several new causal forests using the sample of abandoned forts
and surrounding counties outlined in the previous section. Recall that population
outcomes are measured in 2010, the treatment is a dummy equal to one if a county
has an abandoned fort, and tree-splitting is done on the same matrix of covariates
used in Section 1.5.3.64 The sample includes a total of 1,633 counties and and I
divide the sample into a subset used for training (805 counties) and a subset used for
estimation (806 counties) to cross-validate each random forest.
Causal random forest estimates show strong evidence of persistence at fort counties
and are not substantively different from OLS. Results of forts’ persistent conditional
64See, again, Table A.3 in the Appendix for a full list.
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average treatment effect are reported in Table 1.6. The parameters for each causal
random forest across the columns in Table 1.6 are the same as in Table 1.4. Columns
(1) and (2) use 10,000 and do not split on a measure of railroad access; columns (3)
and (4) add railroad access and maintain the same number of trees; and columns (5)
and (6) use railroad access, 15,000 trees, and set the pruning of empty leaves option
to false.
Without splitting on railroad access, abandoned fort counties are, on average,
roughly 75% larger in total population (Panel A, columns 1-2) and over 50% more
densely populated than surrounding counties without a fort (Panel B, columns 1-2).
These estimates are in line with OLS measures, although a bit larger in magnitude
in regressions on log total population. When I introduce a county’s length of railroad
in operation as a splitting variables, estimates are almost cut in half, consistent
with previous OLS results. Magnitudes hover between 43-56% for increases in total
population and between 36-39% for increases in population density – both depending
on whether I report estimates for the full sample (columns 3 and 5) or for the overlap-
weighted group (columns 2 and 4).
My results imply that the Army’s temporary place-based policies have long run
implications. On average, frontier fort counties remain more populated and more
densely populated relative to surrounding counties even a century after fort aban-
donment. Michaels and Rauch (2018) point out that historical events have the ability
to “trap” towns in otherwise unfavorable locations. Studying urbanization in France
and Britain, the authors conclude that historical events trapped towns in France in
locations that were otherwise suboptimal.
While the extent to which forts were optimally allocated across space lies beyond
the scope of this paper, anecdotal evidence offers critiques of certain fort locations.
Wesley (1935) discusses Fort Crawford – abandoned in 1856 but site of present-day
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Prairie Du Chien, WI: “the location of Fort Crawford as unsuitable for several reasons.
It was too low; it did not command the river; and stagnant water endangered the
health of the garrison. Its location had been determined by general geographic facts
... [and] after careful examination ... no site in the vicinity was more desirable.”
(p. 137-138). In a separate discussion, Army explorer and topographical engineer
Stephen H. Long talks of Fort Edwards, IL: “Fort Edwards [was] useless because it
did not command the river, because a ravine enabled an enemy to approach within
range unobserved, and because a height to the northeast made its defense difficult or
impossible.” (p. 138). Abandoned in 1824, Fort Edwards is the site of present-day
Warsaw, IL. In short, this exercise illustrates the strength of path dependence at fort
locations that long after principal fort functions have been rendered obsolete, average
spatial patterns persist.
1.8 Potential Mechanisms: Size, Duration, and Railroad Con-
nectivity
Forts prompted initial increases in population that persisted long after fort decommis-
sioning. Not all forts spurred local agglomeration effects to the same extent, however.
In this section, I explore three mechanisms that may have affected differential out-
comes across fort locations.
1.8.1 Fort Size and Duration
Frontier forts varied in both size, measured by the number of men occupying each
post, and duration, measured by the length of time in operation. I define fort size as
the magnitude, or intensity, of forts’ place-based treatment and fort duration to be the
length of treatment in a particular place. Previous research that heterogeneity along
both dimensions to differences in outcomes. For example, Duranton and Venables
(2018) study the size of place-based policies. The authors conclude that such policies
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must be substantially large to have significant effects and cite the US government’s
massive investment in the Tennessee Valley Authority as a policy that led to long-run
change. Separately, Bazzi et al. (2018) focus on treatment duration in their measure
of a county’s total frontier experience (TFE). TFE is a direct function of the length of
time that each county was exposed to frontier conditions and show that counties with
higher TFE exhibit higher levels of individualism and opposition to redistribution.
Forts were a form of government investment in a particular location and, ex ante,
I may expect size of the investment to matter differentially for outcomes. Fort size is
measured by the number of men staffed at a particular fort using manually collected
data from the US Returns from Military Posts dataset. Across all forts, mean size
was 239 men and median was 182 men. Size fluctuated yearly – monthly, even – with
changing orders from the Secretary of War, acquisition of new territory, fluctuations
in military spending, and skirmishes with local Native Americans. Some monthly
returns showed forts as occupied by a minimum of 1 soldier up to a maximum of 4,200
soldiers. More men at forts meant larger barracks, more families, increased demand
for goods, services, and amenities. However, as Colonel Trueman Cross writes in
an 1837 report to Congress, “the auxiliary stations ... would be posts of refuge for
the inhabitants in times of alarm, and for that reason should be constructed on a
large scale” (Cross, November 7, 1837). In other words, the larger posts were almost
of secondary importance. Using data on fort size, I have information on the total
number of military personnel divided into groups of those present at the post and
those absent from the post. In Figure A·7, I show that the larger garrisons actually
had an increased share of men absent from the fort at the time of enumeration.
Men could be absent with leave, without leave, due to sickness, arrest, or detached
services to be performed elsewhere. This figure provides empirical evidence that the
larger forts tended to be depot garrisons. Linking fort size to possible persistence,
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I find a raw correlation between average fort size and population density in 2010 of
-0.24, indicating that counties with larger forts actually were relatively less densely
populated in the long run.
Forts also varied in the length of time in operation. Recall that at the close of
the frontier in 1890, over 60% of the frontier forts had already been decommissioned.
Using this subset of 102 forts, the average duration of a fort’s life was 18.5 years with
a median duration was 15 years. With insight from Bazzi et al. (2018), we may expect
counties with longer-lived forts to have higher total population levels and increased
density. Moreover, the longer a fort was in operation, the longer nearby settlers were
exposed to the direct effects of a fort – resources, services, trade, and local labor
demand for civilian settlers were available for a more extended period. On the other
hand, a short fort life sent a military signal that locations were safe for continued
settlement and that a garrison was no longer required. As discussed in Wesley (1935),
“The rapid settlement of the northern and western frontiers facilitated the military
occupation of more remote regions ... the carrying out of the government policy thus
necessitated the establishment of a military frontier in advance of settlement” (p.
144). Empirically, the correlation coefficient between fort life and population density
in 2010 is 0.17, suggestive that longer lived forts may have mattered for increased
population.
In a regression framework, I explore the extent to which size and duration mattered
differentially for persistence. First, I focus on the sample of 102 forts that had been
abandoned by 1890 and surrounding non-fort counties within a 100-mile radius.65
For each of these forts, I create z-scores for mean fort size, median fort size, and
fort duration. This standard metric allows coefficients to be interpreted in terms
of standard deviations away from the mean of each variable. I then re-run cross-
sectional regressions similar to equation 1.5 where outcomes are county-level log total
65This is the same sample used in Section 1.7 on path dependence.
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population and log population density measured in 2010. I include a dummy for
abandoned fort location to capture average fort effects and separately interact the
fort dummy with the z-score of median fort size, mean fort size, and the duration of
a fort’s life, allowing for a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients.
Raw correlations do not necessarily hold up in cross-sectional regressions as re-
ported in Table 1.7. Without geographic controls, I find weak evidence that larger
fort locations actually have lower total population and population density in 2010.
Coefficients on the z-score for median fort size (columns 1 and 2) and mean fort size
(columns 3 and 4) are substantially large but are imprecisely estimated. When condi-
tioning on state dummies and geographic characteristics, mean fort size only matters
for population density outcomes but only at the 10-percent level. A one standard
deviation increase in fort size lowers population density by 0.44 log points – signif-
icantly reversing the average effects of a fort itself. Coefficients on the z-score for
fort life suggest that counties with longer-lived forts experience additional gains to
population and density but confidence intervals include zero. Based on the results in
Table 1.7, I cannot take a firm stance that fort size or duration mattered differentially
for long-run outcomes.
1.8.2 Forts and Railroad Connectivity
If long run differences in population measures are not driven by fort size or fort life,
what is the underlying mechanism(s) driving these differentials? Here, I focus on
the link between fort location and changes in the national transportation network. I
argue that rail connectivity, particularly early connectivity, was critical for continued
growth at fort locations.
Economists have long been interested in the link between transportation and eco-
nomic development (see Fogel (1964); Fishlow (1965); Atack et al. (2010a); Donaldson
and Hornbeck (2016); Jaworski and Kitchens (2016); Donaldson (2018); Asher and
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Novosad (2019) and others). Fishlow (1965) pioneered work on the railroad. He
links railroad access to Midwest settlement patterns and asks whether railroad lines
were built ahead of or in response to demand. Fishlow (1965) notes, “If population
migrations had already extended the agricultural frontier, if urban agglomerations
had already become prominent, transportation improvements may have justified and
reinforced such development rather than initiated them” (p. 163-164). In follow up
work, using GIS, Atack et al. (2010a), links railroad access to urbanization in the
American Midwest. The authors find that measures of density and urban growth
predict future railroad access at the county level. Subsequently, there are increases
in population density and fraction of the population living in urban areas across 278
counties between 1850 and 1860.
Frontier forts preceded railroad expansion.66 While previous work shows a rela-
tionship between agglomeration and rail access, what remains unanswered is what
spurred local agglomeration in the first place. I argue that forts were the original
catalyst for local agglomeration, solving the point-in-space coordination problem of
where individuals settle. Subsequently, transportation proved critical for military
purposes and for continued growth at each point. From a military perspective, trans-
portation was critical for the movement of the US Army. In an 1837 report, Assistant
Quartermaster General Trueman Cross stressed the importance of transportation for
both frontier defense and distribution of supplies:
As the posts forming the exterior line of defence are all situated on naviga-
ble rivers, these, of course, will be the proper channels of communication
from those posts to the great sources of supply in the interior ... It is
the supply of the posts on the inner line which will occasion the chief
difficulty, in consequence of the land transportation it will necessarily in-
volve. ... The garrisons of those posts would be habitually small, and
the country around them being partially settled would furnish forage for
the trains and a portion of the subsistence for the troops, which would
66See Figure A·8 which plots the timing between fort arrival and railroad access for fort counties.
For all but 2 forts, railroad access followed fort arrival by as many as 100 years.
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lighten the operations by diminishing the transportation from the depots”
(Cross, November 7, 1837).
Not long after Cross’ report, General Gaines who commanded the Western Division
out of St. Louis submitted a report to Congress which included a full analysis of de-
fense needs, the Army’s system of forts, and lines of communication. Prucha (1969)
recalls Gaines’ report: “Forts in the Indian country, however, were only one part of
Gaines’s defense system. The second was a system of railroads, radiating from the
protected interior states of Kentucky and Tennessee to what he called the five grand
divisions of the national frontier, by which an army and supplies could be moved
quickly and cheaply to any point of attack... The railroads were to be constructed
primarily by the labor of the troops” (p. 349).67 While Gaines’ plan was ultimately
never adopted, it provided evidence of the military’s concern for transportation in-
frastructure.
The transcontinental railroad network was constructed across all 48 contiguous
states over a (mostly) 80-year period. Initially, railroads were largely laid from east
to west, designed to “link the seaboard with the interior” (Atack et al., 2010a). By
1860, construction had begun in California and, by this same year, the US had more
railroad miles than the rest of the world combined (Mitchell (2003), p. 673-674 cited
in Atack et al. (2010a)) (p. 172). By 1869, progress in the West was connected with
that in the East in Promontory Summit, Utah. However, even counties at roughly
the same longitude received rail access at different points. Consider the following
example of Ford county in Kansas, home of Fort Atkinson, and Stanley county in
South Dakota, home of Fort Pierre. Though both counties lie at roughly the same
longitude, Ford county lies further south. This geographic positioning translated to
much earlier railroad access: Fort Atkinson was connected to the network by 1880
while Fort Pierre was not connected until 1910. By 2010, the population density of
67See House Document No. 311, 25 Congress, 2 session, serial 329 for a complete outline of
Gaines’s original plan.
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Ford county, and Fort Atkinson, was over 29 people per square mile while Stanley
county’s density was less than 2 people per square mile.
Going beyond this simple two-case example, I investigate the systematic relation-
ship between railroad access and differences in population outcomes across all fort
locations. To do so, I estimate the following regression equation:
Yist = α + β11(RRi = 1840) + β21(RRi = 1850) + β31(RRi = 1870)
+β41(RRi = 1880) + β51(RRi = 1890) + β61(RRi = 1900)
+β71(RRi = 1910) + β81(RRi = None) +Xiγ + θst + εist
(1.6)
The sample used for estimation includes all fort counties so variation stems from the
year of railroad connection which is defined as the decennial census year in which
the county was intersected by railroad construction. For example, if a county was
intersected by railroad construction in the year 1837, the indicator for RRi = 1840
will be equal to one and all others are zero.68 The omitted category in the regression is
counties that were connected to the network between 1850 and 1860 so the β’s capture
the (relative) effect of being connected to the network earlier, later, or never at all.
Outcomes are log total population and log population density, Xi are pre-determined
characteristics, θst are state-by-year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered
by county. Each regression controls for a county’s latitude-longitude positioning in
Xi to account for the mechanical relationship between counties to the east and an
increased probability of railroad construction early on.
Fort counties connected to the railroad network prior to 1860 experience the largest
gains in both total population and population density as indicated in Figure 1·8.
Counties connected in 1840 and 1850 experience gains to population relative to the
base year of 1860. Those connected between 1870 and 1900 do not have total pop-
68There are no fort counties that were connected to the railroad network by 1830.
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ulation or density measures different from those connected in 1860. Interestingly,
however are the fort counties never connected to railroad service and counties con-
nected in 1910 – both of which have significantly lower population measures relative
to counties connected in 1860. The main takeaway from the figure is that connection
to the railroad network, particularly early on, mattered most for increased population
measures.
Results in Figure 1·8 illustrate the importance of early railroad connectivity con-
ditional on fort location, pooling all observations. I turn now to separating the effects
of fort location from railroad access and the interaction between the two on persis-
tence. I exploiting county-level differences in fort location and timing of railroad
connection. I use outcomes measured in 2010 and limit the sample of forts, again, to
those that had been abandoned by 1890. Doing so ensures any long-run differences
are not driven by the direct effects of a fort’s functions but rather the sunk costs of a
fort’s location in space. I then run cross-sectional regressions of the following form:
Yi = α+β1abandonedforti+β2abandonedforti×RRyeari+β3RRyeari+Xiγ+θs+εi
(1.7)
In each regression, abandonedforti is a dummy equal to one if county i had a fort and
the fort was abandoned by 1890, RRyeari is a dummy equal to one for the census
year that the county was intersected by the railroad network and the interaction term
captures the effect of both. I focus on abandoned forts and surrounding counties who
had rail access by 1890. Thus, β1 captures the effect of an abandoned fort only, β2
captures the effect of rail access by time t, and β3 captures the interaction between
fort location and rail access by time t.
Results in Table 1.8 tell a similar story though in a different way. Each column
in Table 1.8 is from a separate cross sectional regression where the outcomes is log
population density in 2010.69 In each case, the omitted category is “No Fort × No
69I include results for the same regression where the dependent variable is log total population in
Table A.4 of the Appendix.
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Railroad Connection” and all coefficients can be interpreted relative to this baseline.
The mean of the dependent variable in each case is 3.80 which translates to a mean of
45 people per square mile. In column (1), I find that population density in abandoned
fort counties with railroad access by 1840 was 2.71 log points higher than surrounding
counties with no fort and no railroad connection. In column (2), the interaction term
is even larger for abandoned fort counties connected in 1850. Moreover, in both
years, the coefficient on abandonedforti × RRyeari is statistically different from the
coefficient on RRyeari – meaning additional gains to population density resulted from
both forts and railroad access.
There are two main takeaways from Table 1.8. First, the largest gains to popu-
lation density in the long run are at abandoned fort locations that were connected
to the railroad network early on. The coefficient on abandonedforti × RRyeari is
largest for those connected by 1840 and 1850 and decreases almost monotonically for
each subsequent decade of connection – though spikes for those connected between
1870 and 1880. In all regressions, the coefficient on the interaction term is both eco-
nomically large and statistically significant. The second takeaway from Table 1.8 is
that the coefficient on abandonedforti is always positive but not significant. This
could be due to a lack of power in estimation as the sample size is relatively small
across all regressions, resulting in large confidence intervals and imprecise estimates.
However, the fact that the abandonedforti in itself is not significant could also be
the result of a more complex story: forts that were not eventually connected to the
railroad network, and were subsequently abandoned, died off. I revisit the running
example of forts in central Texas touched on in the beginning of this section. Menard
county, home of Fort McKavett, was never connected to the railroad network and
had a density of 2.45 people per square mile in 2010. Compare this to its two neigh-
boring counties of Tom Green and Runnels, TX. Tom Green, home of Fort Concho,
60
was connected to rail service in 1889 and had a density of more than 40 people per
square mile and Runnels, which had no fort but was connected to the network by
the same year, had a density of 9.9 people per square mile. This simple three-county
case embodies the importance of both fort location and railroad service for increased
population measures in the long run. Overall, the results in Figure 1·8 and Table 1.8
illustrate the importance of fort location and early railroad access in explaining the
largest increases in population and population density.
Results in this section illustrate how forts were necessary, but not sufficient, in
determining long-run spatial patterns. This is an important point because while forts
proved critical in solving the point-in-space problem, transportation networks – in
this case, the spread of the railroad – are critical for continued growth and long-run
stickiness. This tracks well with literature on economic geography and overall spatial
patterns. As Redding and Turner (2015) point out, “the organization of economic
activity in geographic space depends crucially on the transportation of goods and
people. Most production involves the movement of inputs such as raw materials, labor
and fuel from different locations. Most consumption requires either the conveyance
of finished goods or the transfer of people to the points at which goods and services
are supplied” (p. 1). My results indicate that transportation networks are important
for spatial flows while forts determine where the flows go.
1.9 The US Army and Local Demographic Patterns
Forts impacted where people settled and I show this empirically. This section asks
whether forts locations affected who settled in certain locations. Specifically, I explore
whether fort locations are statistically different demographically as a result of the US
Army’s presence on the frontier.
Recall that soldiers on the frontier were men and often immigrants. Moreover, the
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Army employed blacks as slaves and civilian laborers and later hired full regiments
of black soldiers. Enlisted men often served for the duration of their contract and
remained on the frontier following military service. Figure 1·2 plots demographics
at fort counties and non-fort counties over time, revealing that fort counties had
increased shares of men and of foreign-born but did not differ in terms of race.
I explore local demographic patterns in a regression framework, estimating an
equation similar to equation 1.1 where the dependent variable is a demographic mea-
sure. I use county level outcomes found in Figure 1·2: total white share, total male
share, and total foreign-born share. Results from this pooled OLS approach are in
Table 1.9. In columns (1), (3), and (5), I run regressions without accounting for con-
temporaneous measures of population density in order to separate the effects driven
by the US Army at fort locations from the effects driven by density.
Without controlling for density, fort counties have lower white shares, lower male
shares and higher shares of foreign-born. Interpretation of these estimates invite cau-
tion as forts affect density and density also affects demographic patterns.70 When
controlling for density, I still find lower white shares and higher shares of foreign-
born, though in each case, the magnitude of the coefficient is halved. Conditional on
log population density, forts predict a decrease in the white share by 1 percentage
point and an increase in foreign-born share of 1 percentage point. Fort counties have
increased male shares when controlling for density, albeit by a very small amount.
Results in Table 1.9 are largely with raw correlations shown in Figure 1·2, though,
regressions suggest small average differences in race when accounting for contempo-
raneous measures of population density.
Pooling all observations together, the effect of fort location on demographic differ-
ences is small. To tease out the differential effects of fort location at points in time,
70See work done by the Pew Research Center which documents substantial changes in demographic
patterns in urban versus rural areas. For example: https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/
22/demographic-and-economic-trends-in-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/.
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I estimate the following cross-sectional regression:
Yi = α + βforti + γlogpopdeni +Xiγ + θs + εi (1.8)
Here, Yi is a demographic measure at the county level that may have been impacted
by the Army’s presence at fort locations. I run separate regressions for each census
year following 1890 where outcomes are total white share, total male share, and total
foreign-born share. All regressions include state dummies and a full set of exogenous
county-level observable characteristics. The sample used for estimation includes fort
counties and surrounding non-fort counties within a 100-mile radius. Consistent with
previous cross sectional regressions, robust standard errors are reported. Regressions
of this sort help parse out how demographic levels at fort locations varied over time
with a particular focus on long-run effects after the frontier closed in 1890.
Figure 1·9 plots estimates from the coefficient on forti for the three demographic
outcomes mentioned. Beginning with Figure 1·9a, I find no statistical relationship
between fort counties and racial differences as measured by total white share. Point
estimates are small and all confidence intervals include zero. The peacetime Army was
a modest establishment. The number of enlisted soldiers totaled only 7,300 soldiers
in 1845 and, shortly after frontier closure in 1890, only 25,000 troops.71 While the
Army did hire full regiments of black soldiers, blacks never made up more than 10
percent of the total force on the frontier – making their potential impact in any one
location unlikely. Indeed, I find this to be the case.
In 1890, there are small differences in the total male share between fort and non-
fort counties. Fort counties have a 1 percentage point increase in the male share. On
average, non-fort counties in my sample are 52.6% male so the effect driven by fort
71Military historian Richard W. Stewart contrasts the size of the mid-19th century US Army to
others. In 1845, the US Army totaled 7,300 men ordered to protect 20 million people spanning 1.8
million square miles of territory. Contrast this with Belgium who had a standing army of 30,000
men protecting 4 million people spanning 12,000 square miles. See https://history.army.mil/
html/books/075/75-1/CMH_Pub_75-1.pdf for more.
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location is relatively small. Interestingly, drawing on previous results in Table 1.9,
there is a negative relationship between county-level population density and male
share. This suggests that more densely populated areas have a slightly lower male
share, all else equal. From Bazzi et al. (2018), we know that frontier counties – those
that are otherwise isolated and sparsely populated – have an increased share of men.
While there may have been small temporary spikes in the number of men at fort
counties, as these places continue to increase in population, differences disappear.
I turn now to the effects of fort location on the foreign-born population. Fig-
ure 1·9c shows an increased share in the foreign-born population driven by fort loca-
tion. Effects are particularly strong following frontier closure in 1890 through 1910
where fort counties have an increased share of between 1 and 3 percentages points.
In 1890, foreign-born individuals were, on average, 10.5% of the population in non-
fort counties in my sample. Forts were responsible for almost a 30% increase in
the foreign-born population. By 1910, foreign-born totaled only 7.5% at non-fort
locations, making fort location responsible for an increase of roughly 14%.
The historical narrative corroborates this empirical relationship. Bandel (1932)
writes that “since most of the army was stationed on the frontier, these men, when
discharged, settled in the West and became valued citizens” (Bandel, 1932) – sugges-
tive evidence that even after serving, immigrants remained on the frontier, shaping
characteristics at fort locations. Moreover, previous literature reveals that immi-
grant settlement patterns are highly non-random, often involving immigrant net-
works (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). By 1920, however, any significant effects
of increased foreign-born shares in fort counties diminish. While the coefficient re-
mains positive, estimates are imprecise and include zero for the rest of the time series.
The year 1920 is the census year that that scholars argue concludes the Age of Mass
Migration – the era during which the United States absorbed more than 30 million
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European immigrants. A decline in immigrant flows, taken with the leveling off of the
forts’ effect on immigrant settlement patterns, suggests an overall spatial reshuffling
of the immigrant population.
My results indicate that the US Army’s institutional characteristics shaped demo-
graphic patterns but only in the short run. This phenomena tracks well with the high
level of geographic mobility during this period (Curti, 1959; Kearl et al., 1980; Ma-
lin, 1984; Galenson and Pope, 1989). Economic historians studying frontier counties
document persistence rates – or the population of a county in one census year who
can be found in the same place in the subsequent census year – as low as 26 percent
(Malin, 1984). As forts were decommissioned and the migration westward continued,
demographic patterns reshuffled. Reasons for mobility were myriad and complex and
mobility signaled neither prosperity nor failure in a particular place (Malin, 1984).
Combining these results with those on population outcomes, I show that while fort
locations are sticky in terms of where individuals settled, the same cannot be said
about who settles there.
1.10 Robustness Exercises
Fort effects are robust to samples used in estimation and to endogeneity concerns
regarding selections on unobservables. I discuss robustness exercises in the sections
below.
1.10.1 Samples Used in Estimation
Different samples provide similar estimates while offering different implications. In
each of the following subsections, I explore the robustness of frontier forts’ average
treatment effects to alternative samples used in estimation. First, I use fort and
non-fort counties are intersected by one of the 13 rivers that comprise the Mississippi
River System such that all counties experience equal benefits of river access. Second, I
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limit the sample to the set of fort and non-fort counties located west of the Mississippi
River to hone in on forts of the Great Plains and far West. Third, I take the full
set of forts but vary the distance bandwidth for neighboring surrounding counties.
Specifically, I will compare fort counties to surrounding non-fort counties within a
75-mile and, separately, a 150-mile radius.
The Mississippi River System
I first explore the treatment effects of forts in counties along the Mississippi River
System. Qualitative discussion surrounding fort location highlights the importance of
rivers when locating the frontier forts.72 Early explorers into remote frontier territory
often followed pre-historic river routes because of the advantages they offered in the
form of clean drinking water, sanitation and hygiene, and low transportation costs
(Omer, 1957). The Mississippi River System was the very backbone of frontier life
with the Mississippi itself serving as a natural delineation of the military frontier line
in 1837 (Beers, 1975). The System allowed people to reach a location, provided a
means of survival, and continued to be of great importance militarily (Moore, 2001).
Previously, I construct controls for distance to the nearest water source and dis-
tance to steam-navigable rivers and include each measures in my estimation. Still, it
is unclear if distance measures alone capture the historical benefits of being located
along a river, particularly a steam-navigable river. To explicitly address river impor-
tance, I consider a sample of 467 counties, all of which are intersected by one or more
of the 13 major rivers in the Mississippi River System: Arkansas, Canadian, Cum-
berland, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, North Platte, Ohio, Platte, Red, Tennessee,
Wisconsin, and/or Yellowstone rivers (hereafter, the Mississippi sample). The vari-
ation in treatment – or fort location – then becomes where the fort is located along
72See Section 1.4.3 for a discussion. While Table 1.1 does not give rise to a statistical concern
regarding fort location and proximity to rivers, the descriptive statistics are based on a local sample
and vary depending on the sample used in estimation.
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the river. Figure A·9 illustrates the counties used in this sample (“the Mississippi
sample”). The lightly-shaded counties are those intersected by one of the thirteen
major rivers that do not contain a fort (control counties). The darkly-shaded counties
are those intersected by a river with a fort (treated counties). Rivers are depicted by
the dark line segments.
Results from a pooled OLS approach using the Mississippi sample retell the same
story although estimates smaller in magnitude using the most saturated model. Co-
efficients are reported in Table A.5. Across all specifications, I find that forts consis-
tently predict increases in total population (Panel A) and population density (Panel
B). The final column includes state-by-year fixed effects and geographic controls. In
this specification, forts predict an increase in total population of 60% and density of
53%. Compared to the baseline sample, estimates are slightly smaller in magnitude
– indicating that simply controlling for distance to the nearest river may not ade-
quately capture the positive effects of river positioning for both forts and population
measures.
Forts of the Far West
There are 160 forts included in my baseline sample. All 160 forts lie to the West of the
1790 frontier line – or the original “frontier” – which is depicted in Figure 1·1 which
overlays westward movement of both forts and population. However, as stated in the
previous section, the Mississippi River was a critical juncture in movement westward
and even formed the edge of the frontier itself. Of particular importance was the shift
in river flow at the juncture of the Mississippi. Rivers to the east, like the Ohio and
Tennessee Rivers, flow westward – greatly facilitation westward migration. Migration
to states east of the Mississippi occurred much earlier in US history. The number
of states west of the Appalachians grew from 2 to 8 between 1800 and 1820 and
the population from 386,000 to over 2.2 million. West of the Mississippi remained
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more remote for a longer period of time due, in part, to the fact that west of the
Mississippi, however, rivers like the Missouri and the Arkansas, flow eastward. This
means traversing westward is equivalent to movement upstream – more difficult in
the absence of steamboat travel.
The Mississippi River provides both a convenient and practical means of parti-
tioning the US into two halves. I focus on those forts to the West of the Mississippi
(“Western forts”) to determine whether or not fort effects are simply driven by early
settlement patterns in the East. Of the 160 forts in my data set, 61% or 98 forts, lie
west of the Mississippi River. Revisiting a pooled-OLS approach, I compare Western
fort counties to surrounding non-fort counties with a 100-mile radius. Census out-
comes are first available for some counties in 1810 and thereafter. I re-run regressions
similar to equation 1.1 using this sample and report results in Table A.6.
Across the Great Plains and far West, forts maintain a significant impact along
the extensive margin. Pooled across all available years, Western fort counties are 60%
larger and 40% more densely populated that nearby counties without a fort. In the
most saturated of regressions, I account for state-by-year fixed effects and flexible
geographic controls. Estimates in this table show that forts’ significant effects are
not simply driven by differences in migration and settlement patterns in the East
versus the West. A comparison of estimates reported in Table A.6 and those using
the full sample (Table 1.2) indicate that Western forts had similar effects on total
population but a smaller impact on population density. This may be a direct result
of differences in population patterns in eastern half versus western half of the US. In
general, however, the implications of fort location in the West are not substantively
different from those using the full sample.
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Distance Thresholds in Baseline Sample
Here, I revisit the original baseline sample used in estimation but vary the distance
threshold for counties included in “control” group. Recall that the baseline sample
includes fort counties and surrounding counties within a 100-mile radius. This cut-off
is relatively arbitrary, however, and I show that my results are robust to using different
specifications for the distance threshold. Specifically, I re-estimate the impact of fort
location using fort counties and those within a 75-mile and, separately, 150-mile
radius.
When re-estimating equation 1.1 comparing fort counties to non-fort counties at
different distance thresholds, results to not substantively change. Table A.7 show
results from using counties within a 75-mile radius and Table A.8 show results from
those within a 150-mile radius. Estimates of a binary fort treatment are slightly larger
in magnitude when limiting the surrounding counties to a 75-mile radius and, for
population density, slightly smaller when expanding the set of surrounding counties
to 150 miles. Overall, the place-based effects of forts are robust and remain stable,
regardless of the sample used in estimation.
1.10.2 Coefficient Stability and Selection on Unobservables
I show that selection on unobservable characteristics is not a significant concern and
that estimates of the fort treatment effect are remarkably stable when sequentially
controlling for covariates. The key identifying assumption in my framework is that
conditional on a set of covariates, and any high-order interactions among them, fort
treatment is orthogonal to the error term. As discussed, this unconfoundedness as-
sumption highlights the importance of conditioning on the proper covariates. The
main threat to identification in the potential outcomes framework, however, is that
there remains an unobservable characteristic non-arbitrarily correlated with both fort
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location and potential outcomes. While this concern is not fully testable, I rely on
previous work by Oster (forthcoming) in this section to assess potential biases in my
estimates driven by unobservable characteristics.
Previous contributions in the economics literature evaluate the robustness of treat-
ment effects to unobservable characteristics by examining coefficient movements when
including a set of controls (see Oster (forthcoming), Appendix C for a full list of re-
cent contributions that utilize this technique). I first follow suit and then explore the
robustness to selection on unobservables using a recent theoretical and implementable
contribution from Oster (forthcoming). In Table A.9, I gradually introduce additional
covariates interacted with year dummies into the estimation of equation 1.1 where
outcomes are both log total population and is log population density. I begin by
including only state-by-year fixed effects in column (1) and estimates of the fort co-
efficient are 0.715 for log total population and 0.565 for log population density while
the R-squared is 0.656 and 0.680, respectively. As I introduce additional covariates
discussed in previous sections, the coefficient remains remarkably stable – leveling off
at 0.694 for total population and 0.606 for population density. In the most saturated
model (column 7) with the full set of pre-determined characteristics, the R-squared
value rises to a level of 0.731 and 0.767.
Results in Table A.9 illustrate changes in the coefficient estimate when additional
controls are added to the regression – a technique that may provide information about
potential sources of omitted variable bias (Altonji et al., 2008). Sequential controls for
observable characteristics do not address fundamental concerns about unobservables,
however. Oster (forthcoming) notes that a simple exploration of coefficient stability
with respect to the inclusion of certain controls alone is not sufficient to evaluate
bias. To address this issue, Oster (forthcoming) develops an estimate that measures
the importance of omitted, unobservable characteristics. In Oster’s standard linear
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regression model, the outcome variable is a function of a treatment variable, a vector
of observable characteristics, and a vector of unobservable characteristics. In this
framework, she provides a statistic known as the coefficient of proportionality, δ,
that measures the degree to which selection on unobservables is equal to, or greater
than, the selection on observables that would be required to produce a null treat-
ment effect.73 In an empirical setting, a reasonable cutoff for estimates of δ ≥ 1,
implying that selection on unobservables must be at least as important as selection
on unobservables to invalidate the treatment effects of fort location. Moreover, Oster
provides a way of estimating the treatment effect if we were to assume that omitted
unobservables are of equal importance as the observables included as covariates in
each regression. I include estimates of both Oster’s β and δ as an additional row in
Table A.9.
I find that δ are greater than one in all specifications. Whether looking at log
total population or log population density, the coefficient of proportionality required
to completely render a fort effect equal to zero is greater than one. In other words,
selection on unobservables would have to be of greater importance to eliminate the
fort effect. Next, I find that if we were to refute the previous result and instead assume
that unobservable characteristics at the county level are of equal importance (with
respect to observables), we look to estimates of Oster’s β. Across all specifications,
the estimate of Oster’s β is of similar magnitude to estimates from a pooled OLS
framework. In all cases, the estimate of Oster’s β lies within the 95% confidence
interval of the OLS coefficient. All evidence provided suggests that a systematic
selection on unobservables related to both fort location and population measures is
not of substantial concern.73See Oster (forthcoming) for a full technical discussion or Ferrara (2019) for an intuitive discussion
and practical implementation of Oster’s test in an empirical setting.
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1.11 Conclusion
This paper documents how US Army’s place-based policies, in the form of frontier
fort locations, are a critical component in explaining spatial differences in population
patterns. Forts erected during the US Army’s exploration and protection of the
American frontier were important in determining initial conditions of where to co-
locate. The principal functions of a frontier fort – providing points of protection,
trade, and a source of local labor demand – led to immediate increases in population
measures. At a time when transportation costs were particularly high, civilian settlers
had incentives to locate near fort locations and population dynamics illustrate that
average population measures increased, though at a lower rate, over time. Forts
have a strong impact along the extensive margin as well. Relative to surrounding
counties, fort counties have an increased total population of up to 85%, on average,
with increased densities as large as 70%. Estimates obtained using new causal random
forest estimation provide flexible evidence that forts had significantly large conditional
conditional average treatment effects. Moreover, nonparametric distance measures
show that any cross-county spillovers diminish rapidly within the first 25 miles of a
fort.
Contemporary county-level differentials in population outcomes can, in many
cases, be traced back to a frontier fort in a particular location. Long after forts were
abandoned, and their original functions rendered obsolete, increased population mea-
sures persist. In 2010, cross-section regressions and causal random forest estimates
indicate that abandoned fort counties had between 40-70% more people and were up
to 35-55% more densely populated than non-fort counterparts. Persistent effects are
not driven by fort size or length of time in operation but rather connection to the
transcontinental railroad network. Fort counties that were connected to rail service
early on experience additional gains to population in the long run. Counties con-
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nected by 1860 experience the largest gains. Relative to counties connected in 1860,
those connected after 1900 – or never at all – experience relative declines in popula-
tion and density measures. Overall, results indicate that forts are critical in solving
where individuals agglomerate and are necessary, but not sufficient, for persistence.
Transportation connectivity, in the form of the national railroad network, is critical
for explaining long-run differences at fort locations and general spatial patterns.
I marry the place-based impact of forts with institutional effects of those inhabiting
them. In particular, I show that the US Army’s institutional characteristics shaped
short-run demographic patterns on the frontier. Fort counties have increased shares
of men through 1900 and foreign-born through 1920 but due, in part, to high levels
of geographic mobility on the frontier, demographic differences do not persist. While
previous work documents the importance of institutions in shaping a place, my results
indicate that institutional characteristics may only leave a short-run impact.
I engage with the literature on economic geography, development of the American
frontier, and the role of institutions in shaping a place. Results point to the impor-
tance of historical episodes in determining long-run outcomes and that, in particular,
temporary place-based policies need not be large in order to determine a sticky spa-
tial equilibrium in the long run. While I provide evidence that forts, as man-made
features, help explain the spatial distribution of the population in a previously unex-
plored setting, it would be worthwhile to consider other outcome measures in future
work. Forts were part of the general military institution and, as such, may have
affected local institutional structure (e.g. county seats) or the industrial composi-
tion. Moreover, forts may serve as a potential instrument for second order questions
related to the impact of county-level population differentials on any number of out-
comes. There remain substantial avenues additional work in understanding the first
order effects of forts on local measures.
73





Notes: Each figure is a replicated image from Bazzi et al. (2018) in the corresponding
decennial census year. Shaded regions depict county-level population densities from
select decennial census years between 1790 and 1900. Each shade corresponds with
a threshold of population density calculated as a county’s total population divided
by its area in square miles. The frontier line is delineated by the thick red line along
county boundaries for which population drops below 2 people per square mile. Each
figure is overlaid with the location of the US Army’s frontier forts by establishment
year, depicted by green circles.
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(c) Share of Whites
Notes: Each figure plots a separate county-level demographic measures for decennial
census years in which data are available. Figures plot means of each measure for
fort counties (teal line, circle markers) and for surrounding non-fort counties within
a 100-mile radius (red line, triangle markers). Figure 1·2a plots the share of foreign-
born for fort and non-fort counties. Figure 1·2b plots the share of males for fort and
non-fort counties. Figure 1·2c plots the share of whites for fort and non for counties.
Counties are harmonized to boundaries in the year 1900 following Hornbeck (2010).
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Figure 1·3: US Military Post Return for Detroit Arsenal, MI – August,
1815
Notes: The figure shows a post return for Detroit Arsenal, MI in August of 1815.
Each post return contains information on fort size measured by the aggregate num-
ber of Army personnel staffed at a fort. Post returns are availlable at a monthly
frequency for select years for 117 forts (see Table A.1 for a list of forts for which
information is available and corresponding years of coverage). Returns are available
as microfilm images as part of the US Returns from Military Posts dataset avilable
on ancestry.com.
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(b) Population Density
Notes: Each figure plots locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) results
of the the distance to nearest fort location on pooled population outcomes. Fig-
ure 1·4a plots LOWESS distance measures on log total population pooled across
census years. Figure 1·4b plots LOWESS distance measures on log population den-
sity pooled across census years.
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(b) Population Density
Notes: Each figure plots population measures for fort counties and matched non-
fort counties for decennial census years prior to and following fort establishment.
Timing of fort establishment is normalized to year “0” for all fort counties and
for corresponding matched pairs. Figure 1·5a plots mean total population for fort
counties (teal line, circle markers) and matched non-fort counties (red line, square
markers). Figure 1·5b plots mean population density for fort counties (teal line,
circle markers) and matched non-fort counties (red line, square markers).
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(b) Log Population Density
Notes: Each figure plots coefficients from the event study regressions in equation 1.4
for log of total population in figure 1·6a and log of population density in figure 1·6b.
Point estimates (blue line) are for decennial census years prior to and following the
establishment of a frontier fort within a county along with 95 percent confidence
intervals (dotted red lines). The reference category is the decennial census year
immediately preceding fort establishment. The sample mechanically restricts the
sample to fort counties for which 3 decennial censuses can be observed prior to
fort arrival but includes an imbalaned panel because counties with missing data
are dropped from the regression. Regressions include census division-by-year fixed
effects, geographic controls, and standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Figure 1·7: Causal Random Forest Estimation: Example of a Single
Tree
Notes: The figure displays a single decision tree in the causal random forest formed
from a bootstrap sample of cross-sectional data from 1890. The sample is parti-
tioned into total population as the outcome (Y ), a fort dummy as the treatment
(W ), and matrix of splitting covariates (X) as listed in Table A.3. This single
tree is formed by splitting along values of covariates that improve the prediction
of Y . When splitting stops, N number of observations lie in each leaf. Within
each leaf, the fort’s conditional average treatment effect is computed. A single mea-
sure of frontier forts’ conditional average treatment effect is computed by averaging
treatment effects across all leaves in a tree and all trees in the forest.
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Year Connected to Railroad Network
(b) Log Population Density
Notes: Each figure plots point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for
population measures of fort counties by timing of railroad access. Figure 1·8a plots
log total population levels and figure 1·8b plots log population density levels as a
results of estimating equation 1.6. The omitted category in each figure is fort coun-
ties that were connected to the national railroad network between 1850 and 1860.
Regressions include state-by-year fixed effects, geographic controls, and standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
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(c) Share Foreign-Born
Notes: Each figure plots point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from
equation 1.8 for cross sections of the data across different decennial census years
after the close of the frontier in 1890. Figure 1·9a plots estimates where the outcome
is share white, figure 1·9b plots estimates where the outcome is share male, and
figure 1·9c plots estimates where the outcome is share of foreign-born. Regressions
include state fixed effects, geographic controls, and a contemporaneous measure of
county-level population density.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Fort Location
Fort No Fort
Distance to Nearest Water Source 9.82 9.79
(10.73) (8.02)
Distance to Steam-Navigable River 86.78 62.29
(108.94) (81.37)
Distance to Portage Site 439.62 317.00
(363.70) (300.90)
=1 if river mouth/source 0.10 0.01
(0.30) (0.11)
Mean elevation 532.31 363.92
(601.33) (389.58)
SD elevation 95.62 49.95
(142.05) (113.79)
SD slope 0.94 0.42
(2.28) (1.57)
Distance to Tribal Boundary 21.76 26.14
(19.30) (22.07)
Distance to the Equator 2,508.78 2,506.38
(382.31) (323.64)
Distance to the International Dateline 3,598.06 3,733.97
(498.94) (426.61)
Mean yearly rainfall 836.36 982.36
(387.37) (331.95)
Mean yearly temperature 12.48 12.55
(5.14) (4.33)
% of Max Attainable Yield, Wheat 0.59 0.72
(0.29) (0.23)
% of Max Attainable Yield, Cotton 0.32 0.39
(0.32) (0.31)
% of Max Attainable Yield, Potato 0.55 0.67
(0.26) (0.20)
% Annual Growing Days 0.51 0.61
(0.27) (0.24)
Railroad Length in Operation, 1890 112.81 75.85
(95.63) (65.36)
Area in Sq. Miles 2,558.72 887.56
(3,717.96) (1244.16)
Observations 141 1816
Note: The table reflects summary statistics for a baseline sample
which includes fort counties and for non-fort counties whose centroid
lies within a 100-mile radius of a fort.
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Table 1.2: Frontier Forts and Population Patterns: Evidence
from a Pooled OLS Approach, 100-Mile Sample, 1790-2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.864*** 0.715*** 0.694*** 0.755***
(0.110) (0.102) (0.092) (0.104)
N County-Years 70,230 70,222 70,222 50,685
R-squared 0.016 0.656 0.728 0.742
State X Year FE X X X
Geo X Year Controls X X
Excluding Neighbors X
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.301** 0.565*** 0.606*** 0.691***
(0.150) (0.118) (0.099) (0.112)
N County-Years 70,230 70,222 70,222 50,685
R-squared 0.002 0.663 0.759 0.766
State X Year FE X X X
Geo X Year Controls X X
Excluding Neighbors X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-OLS regression
of equation 1.1 where the unit of observation is a county-year. The
treatment variable in each regression is a dummy equal to one if a fron-
tier fort is located within county i by census year t. The dependent
variable in Panel A is log total population and in Panel B is log popula-
tion density in county i in census year t. The sample used for estimation
includes fort counties and non-fort counties that lie within a 100-mile
radius of a fort. Geographic controls are those found in Table 1.1 and
are interacted with census-year dummies. Geographic controls are the
same in Panel A and Panel B with the exception that regressions on
log total population in Panel A control for a county’s area in square
miles as an independent variable while those on log population density
in Panel B do not. Regressions excluding neighbors (column 4) omit
counties from the baseline sample that share an immediate border with
fort counties. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *p
<0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table 1.3: Frontier Forts and Population Patterns:
Evidence from a Matched Sample, 1790-2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Fort 0.452*** 0.865*** 0.613***
(0.111) (0.082) (0.087)
N County-Years 8,463 8,552 8,463
R-squared 0.745 0.285 0.834
State X Year FE X X
County-Pair FE X X
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Fort 0.480*** 0.782*** 0.570***
(0.147) (0.086) (0.107)
N County-Years 8,463 8,552 8,463
R-squared 0.715 0.461 0.856
State X Year FE X X
County-Pair FE X X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-
OLS regression of equation 1.2 where the unit of obser-
vation is a county-year. The treatment variable in each
regression is a dummy equal to one if a frontier fort is
located within county i by census year t. The dependent
variable in Panel A is log total population and in Panel
B is log population density in county i in census year t.
The sample used in each regression consists of 129 treated
counties and 129 matched control counties. Each treated
fort county is matched to a unique control county based
on estimated propensity scores from a logit model where
covariates are those listed in Table 1.1. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05
***p <0.01
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Table 1.4: Causal Random Forest Estimation of Forts’ Treatment Effects:
Evidence from a Cross Section in 1890
Panel A: Log Total Population, 1890
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditional Fort ATE 0.592*** 0.559*** 0.390*** 0.410*** 0.415*** 0.427***
(0.088) (0.087) (0.076) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Panel B: Log Population Density, 1890
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditional Fort ATE 0.482*** 0.397*** 0.335*** 0.340*** 0.344*** 0.333***
(0.099) (0.104) (0.097) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099)
N Counties 1,956 1,956 1,956 1,956 1,956 1,956
Overlap-Weighted No Yes No Yes No Yes
Prune Empty Leaves True True True True False False
B Trees 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 15,000 15,000
Railroad as Covariate No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Estimates of the conditional average treatment effect are reported from separate
random forests. Random forests in panel A are built where log total population is the
outcome and forests in panel B are built where log population density is the outcome,
both measured in 1890. The treatment variable is a dummy equal to one if county i ever
had a frontier fort. Covariates are the same in both forests except area is not used in
forest B. Columns (1) and (2) build a forest without the railroad access covariate using
a forest of 10,000 trees. Column (1) reports estimates for the full sample; column (2)
reports estimates for the overlap-weighted conditional average treatment effect which
is recommended by Li et al. (2017) in the case of poor over lap (or when propensities
for treatment may be very close to 0 or 1). The forest built in columns (3) and (4) is
identical to that in (1) and (2) except it includes railroad access as a splitting variable.
Railroad access is defined as the total length of railroad access in operation within a
county during 1890 using files from Atack (2016). Column (3) reports estimates of the
full sample and column (4) for overlap-weighted. In columns (5) and (6), I increase
the number of trees in the forest to 15,000 but tell the algorithm to skip trees with
empty leaves which may improve performance on small or marginally powered data
but requires more trees. Column (5) includes the full sample and column (6) reports
estimates of a overlap-weighted conditional average treatment effect. The standard
error of each estimate is the square-root of the variance.
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Table 1.5: Frontier Forts and Persistence: Evidence from
a Cross Section in 2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.697*** 0.655*** 0.337***
(0.170) (0.162) (0.127)
N Counties 1,633 1,633 1,633
R-squared 0.258 0.371 0.520
State FE X X X
Geographic Controls X X
Railroad Access X
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.575*** 0.568*** 0.416***
(0.163) (0.154) (0.132)
N Counties 1,633 1,633 1,633
R-squared 0.339 0.474 0.563
State FE X X X
Geographic Controls X X
Railroad Access X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a cross-sectional
OLS regression of equation 1.5 where the unit of observation is
a county. The treatment variable in each regression is a dummy
equal to one if county i ever had a frontier fort and if the fron-
tier fort was abandoned by the close of the frontier in 1890. The
dependent variable in Panel A is log total population in Panel
B is log population density, both measured in 2010. The sample
used in each regression consists of the abandoned fort counties
and surrounding counties within a 100-mile radius of an aban-
doned fort. Geographic controls are those found in Table 1.1
and are the same in Panel A and Panel B with the exception
that regressions on log total population in Panel A control for a
county’s area in square miles as an independent variable while
those on log population density in Panel B do not. Railroad ac-
cess is defined as the total length of railroad access in operation
within a county by 1910 using files from Atack (2016). Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p
<0.01.
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Table 1.6: Causal Random Forest Estimation of Forts’ Persistence: Evi-
dence from a Cross Section in 2010
Panel A: Log Total Population, 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditional Fort ATE 0.719*** 0.731*** 0.452*** 0.569*** 0.425*** 0.531***
(0.166) (0.149) (0.130) (0.138) (0.128) (0.136)
Panel B: Log Population Density, 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conditional Fort ATE 0.553*** 0.511*** 0.341*** 0.339*** 0.345*** 0.337***
(0.146) (0.139) (0.125) (0.142) (0.123) (0.137)
N Counties 1,633 1,633 1,633 1,633 1,633 1,633
Overlap-Weighted No Yes No Yes No Yes
Prune Empty Leaves True True True True False False
B Trees 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 15,000 15,000
Railroad as Covariate No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Estimates of the conditional average treatment effect are reported from separate
random forests. Random forests in panel A are built where log total population is the
outcome and forests in panel B are built where log population density is the outcome,
both measured in 2010. The treatment variable is a dummy =1 if a county had a fort
and the fort was abandoned by 1890. Covariates are the same in both forests except
area is not used in forest B. Columns (1) and (2) build a forest without the railroad
access covariate using a forest of 10,000 trees. Column (1) reports estimates for the
full sample; column (2) reports estimates for the overlap-weighted conditional average
treatment effect which is recommended by Li et al. (2017) in the case of poor over lap
(or when propensities for treatment may be very close to 0 or 1). The forest built in
columns (3) and (4) is identical to that in (1) and (2) except it includes railroad access
as a splitting variable. Railroad access is defined as the total length of railroad access
in operation within a county by 1910 using files from Atack (2016). Column (3) reports
estimates of the full sample and column (4) for overlap-weighted. In columns (5) and
(6), I increase the number of trees in the forest to 15,000 but tell the algorithm to
skip trees with empty leaves which may improve performance on small or marginally
powered data but requires more trees. Column (5) includes the full sample and column
(6) reports estimates of a overlap-weighted conditional average treatment effect. The
standard error of each estimate is the square-root of the variance.
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Table 1.7: Frontier Forts and Persistence: Heterogeneous Effects by Fort
Size and Duration
Panel A: Log Total Population, 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.524** 0.550** 0.532** 0.550** 0.796*** 0.683***
(0.232) (0.235) (0.225) (0.223) (0.254) (0.236)
Fort X Z-Score Median Size -0.463* -0.269
(0.273) (0.271)
Fort X Z-Score Mean Size -0.413* -0.252
(0.246) (0.232)
Fort X Z-Score Life 0.189 0.020
(0.329) (0.308)
N Counties 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,611 1,611
R-squared 0.261 0.376 0.261 0.376 0.265 0.376
State FE X X X X X X
Geographic Controls X X X
Panel B: Log Population Density, 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.517** 0.521** 0.516** 0.511** 0.893*** 0.750***
(0.228) (0.231) (0.222) (0.218) (0.252) (0.230)
Fort X Z-Score Median Size -0.661** -0.441
(0.276) (0.271)
Fort X Z-Score Mean Size -0.622** -0.442*
(0.245) (0.229)
Fort X Z-Score Life 0.329 0.123
(0.322) (0.296)
N Counties 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,575 1,611 1,611
R-squared 0.358 0.487 0.359 0.487 0.359 0.485
State FE X X X X X X
Geographic Controls X X X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a cross-sectional OLS regression where
the unit of observation is a county. All regressions include a dummy variable equal to
one if county i ever had a frontier fort and if the frontier fort was abandoned by the close
of the frontier in 1890. Columns (1) and (2) include an interaction between abandoned
fort and a z-score of a fort’s median size where median size is the median number
of personnel stationed at each frontier fort over to course of its lifetime. Columns
(3) and (4) include an interaction between abandoned fort and a z-score of a fort’s
mean size where mean size for is the mean number of personnel stationed at a fort
over the course of its lifetime. Column (5) and (6) include an interaction between
abandoned fort and a z-score for fort life where fort life is the length of time a fort
was in operation (year of abandonment minus year of establishment). The dependent
variable in Panel A is log total population in Panel B is log population density, both
measured in 2010. The sample used in each regression consists of the abandoned
fort counties and surrounding counties within a 100-mile radius of an abandoned fort.
Geographic controls are those found in Table 1.1 with the exception that regressions
in Panel A on log total population control for a county’s area in square miles as an
independent variable while those on log population density in Panel B do not. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table 1.8: Frontier Forts and Persistence: Railroad Access, Fort Location, and
Population Density in 2010
Log Population Density, 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RR=1840 1.120***
(0.384)
=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.543
(0.676)




=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.701
(0.564)




=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.433
(0.394)




=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.564
(0.476)




=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.430
(0.444)




=1 for Abandoned Fort 0.001
(0.488)
=1 for Abandoned Fort × RR=1890 1.258***
(0.262)
Mean Dependent Variable 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80
N Counties 159 206 445 276 516 493
R-squared 0.794 0.778 0.648 0.696 0.552 0.610
State FE X X X X X X
Geographic Controls X X X X X X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a cross-sectional OLS regression of equation 1.7
where the unit of observation is a county. All regressions include a dummy variable equal to
one if county i ever had a frontier fort and if the frontier fort was abandoned by the close of
the frontier in 1890 (abandoned fort). RR is a dummy equal to one for the year in which a
county was connected to the railroad network and the interaction Abandonedfort × RR is a
dummy equal to one if county i had an abandoned fort and was connected to the railroad in
year t. The sample used in each regression is a subset of the the abandoned fort counties and
surrounding counties within a 100-mile radius of an abandoned fort such that the comparison
group for each regression in columns (1) through (6) are counties without a frontier fort that
were never connected to the railroad network. Geographic controls are those found in Table 1.1.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table 1.9: Frontier Forts and Local Demographic Patterns: Evidence
from a Pooled OLS Approach, 100-Mile Sample, 1790-2010
White Share Male Share Foreign-Born Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
=1 for Fort -0.020*** -0.012* -0.002** 0.003** 0.021*** 0.013***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004)
Log population density -0.011*** -0.008*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
N County-Years 70,203 70,203 67,487 67,487 57,807 57,807
R-squared 0.798 0.800 0.747 0.771 0.739 0.749
State X Year FE X X X X X X
Geo X Year Controls X X X X X X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-OLS regression where the
unit of observation is a county-year. The treatment variable in each regression
is a dummy equal to one if a frontier fort is located within county i by census
year t. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the fraction of the total
population in each county that is white, in columns (3) and (4), the dependent
variable is the fraction of the total population that is male, and in columns (5) and
(6), the dependent variable is the fraction of the total population that is foreign-
born. White share is available for each census year from 1790 onward, male share
is available from census years 1820 onward, and foreign-born is available from 1820
onward (except for the year 1840). Log population density is a contemporaneous
measure of log population density within county i in census year t. The sample used
for estimation includes fort counties and non-fort counties that lie within a 100-mile
radius of a fort. Geographic controls are those found in Table 1.1 and are interacted
with census-year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *p
<0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Chapter 2
The Road to the Urban Interstates: A
Case Study from Detroit
2.1 Introduction
In June 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act
– landmark legislation that authorized federal funding for the construction of the US
Interstate Highway System (IHS). The most expensive public works project to date,
the IHS is a 48,000-mile network of limited-access, multi-lane, high-speed highways.1
Sixteen percent of the network’s original mileage was constructed in more than one
hundred densely-populated metropolitan areas.2 Planners designed the urban routes
to connect cities’ central business districts (CBDs) to the national network, to facili-
tate national defense, and to alleviate acute, post-War transportation problems along
deteriorating roads (Schwartz, 1976). Yet site selection for the urban segments of the
system and evaluation of potential effects proved complex and involved the federal
government, state politicians, highway engineers, and local officials. Construction
imposed tremendous financial and social costs on American cities and their residents.
By the time the system was completed in 1991, the urban interstates had displaced 1
million people, destroyed over 330,000 housing units, and permanently altered urban
1The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 authorized funding for an original network totaling 41,000
miles. By 2016, the total mileage stood at 48,191.
2According to a 1944 plan, there was to be 4,470 miles of urban routes (Weingroff, 2015). In 1964,
the mileage was amended to include a total of 6,700 miles of radial arteries, beltways, downtown
loops, and bypasses located within urban areas (Hyde, 2006).
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space (Hirsch and Mohl, 1992).
This paper deepens our understanding of factors that influenced interstate location
and how construction affected urban neighborhoods. I use the city of Detroit to pro-
vide a quantitative response to two questions. First, how did policymakers determine
the location of interstate routes within an urban area? I show that property values
drove site selection for interstates routes in Detroit. Unlike the inter -city segments
of the IHS – which were determined by members of the federal government – intra-
city routes were mapped by state highway departments and local officials. Previous
literature in the social sciences explores the interstate planning process and identifies
racial biases (Ayers, 1967; Seley, 1983; Mohl, 2002; DiMento and Ellis, 2013), post-
War slum clearance and urban renewal (Schwartz, 1976; Mohl, 2002), and concerns
over property values (US Department of Transportation, 1977; Duranton et al, 2014)
as factors affecting urban interstate placement. Using tract-level data from the US
Census, I demonstrate that even when conditioning on competing motivating fac-
tors – including race and slum housing characteristics – property values are the most
robust correlate of future interstate location. Furthermore, I find that constructed
routes deviated from both planned routes and a simulated network of topographically
optimal routes specifically through neighborhoods with low property value. In other
words, decision-makers targeted areas – on the margin – where property was cheap
in order to minimize (1) the costs of acquiring land for construction (eminent domain
costs) and (2) future losses to the city’s tax base.
Second, how did interstate construction affect urban neighborhoods? I build a
geographically-consistent dataset for census tracts in Detroit to study the extent to
which urban interstate construction affected property values, population density, the
percentage of Black residents. I show that census tracts with an interstate experi-
enced short-run declines across all measures. Depressed property values in interstate
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tracts indicate a decreased demand for housing in neighborhoods with an interstate.
Declines in population density and the percentage of Black residents indicate that in-
dividuals displaced by interstate construction (1) were disproportionately Black and
(2) relocated outside of interstate tracts. While the interstates had been praised
by local officials as “the single greatest element in the cure of city ills” (Cohn, 1978)
during the planning process, construction quickly led to otherwise negative outcomes.
In the long run, I find further decreases in local property values and tracts closest
to interstate construction experienced the largest (relative) declines. Since property
values reflect the expected value of the flow of both amenities and disamenities, a
negative interstate effect is consistent with the disamenity value of living in close
proximity to an urban interstate. In fact, clippings from the Detroit Free Press reveal
homeowners’ concern ex-ante that residential properties bordering “so-called walled
highways” were likely to lose more in value (Sievert, 1958). Separately, I find mixed
evidence that census tracts bisected by an interstate differed in population density
and their percentage of Black residents compared to tracts without an interstate.
Distance measures show, however, that tracts closest to construction experienced
declines in both measures relative to tracts further from construction.
Detroit is an excellent setting in which to study the urban interstates for three
reasons. First, because I am interested in the political economy surrounding the
urban interstates and their local effects, it is to my advantage to examine a city for
which there is a substantial qualitative literature to draw from. The poster-child of
urban rise and decline, Detroit continues to be of interest to scholars across several
branches of literature. Moreover, Detroit’s history interacts well with the mid-century
macro events characteristic of the post-War era – massive Southern outmigration
of Blacks to its center; increased suburbanization rates, particularly among Whites
(Boustan, 2010); and a decaying, urban core replete with overcrowded slums, blighted
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neighborhoods, and Depression-era housing shortages (Sugrue, 1996). I rely on the
breadth of information from historical accounts, news articles, legal opinions, and
essays to contextualize the case of the urban interstates in Detroit.
Second, data availability issues restrict the number of cities for which a study like
mine is feasible. The unit of observation in my analysis is the census tract, and much
of the US was not delineated into census tracts by mid-century. In 1950 – the census
year immediately preceding large-scale construction – only 70 US counties have tract
boundary information with the number of cities an even smaller subset.3 Not only was
Detroit delineated into tracts but digitized tract boundary information is available
for a subset of tracts through National Historical Geographic Information Systems
(NHGIS). Third, the second half of my analysis focuses on the disruptive effects of
urban interstate construction; I am not interested in urban sprawl or suburbanization.
First incorporated as a city in 1815, Detroit was founded as a “walking city” with
a set of defining characteristics: a highly compact downtown area with mixed land
use and an intermingling of residences and workplaces (Melosi, 2010). Detroit’s early
spatial development lends itself appropriately to quantifying the disruptive effects of
interstate construction.
I both draw from and contribute to three strands of literature. I first add to
the literature on the political economy of infrastructure placement and investment.
Decisions on where to locate interstate highway routes were not unlike decisions on
where to locate other forms of transportation infrastructure. Atack et al. (2010b)
discusses locational choices for railroads in the nineteenth century and Altshuler and
Luberoff (2003) discuss the complexities of locating interstate routes due to the spe-
cific engineering features unique to highways.4 Glaeser and Ponzetto (2018) provide a
3City boundaries may span more than one county. Detroit’s 1950 boundaries, for example,
spanned Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties.
4The authors compare site selection of highways to that of other forms of transportation infras-
tructure to illustrate how highway building is intrinsically disruptive. Airports, for example, are
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framework for thinking about the decline in urban mega-projects since the 1960s and
1970s, indicating that the nuisances of local construction – including land taking via
powers of eminent domain – lead to an under-investment in transportation projects.
Constitutional powers of eminent domain proved critical when locating urban
interstate routes. Lamoreaux (2011) discuss how eminent domain powers can (poten-
tially) solve collective action problems that inhibit welfare-enhancing changes, though
it is often difficult to gauge whether a change is welfare-enhancing to society as a whole
or if powerful interests stand to gain or marginalized populations stand to lose.5 In
the case of the interstates, there is substantial belief that urban Blacks bore a dis-
proportionate cost while suburban Whites reaped the benefits and, moreover, that
policymakers played a role in orchestrating the outcome. The first exercise in this
paper tests a theory that site-selection for the urban interstates was determined by
race, connecting closely to work done by Been (1994) who relates locational choices
for locally undesirable land uses to racism and classism. My findings do not support
the hypothesis that racist attitudes dominated interstate route location in Detroit
and, instead, corroborate Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) who recount that officials
often sought low-cost rights-of-way. However, though Black neighborhoods were not
systematically targeted ex ante, Detroit’s Black residents appear to have been dis-
proportionately affected ex-post.
The second half of my analysis quantifies the effects of interstate construction and
contributes to the literature on the economic impact of the IHS. Since much of the pre-
vious work relies on cross-city or cross-county variations, economists know little about
the extent to which the IHS affected outcomes within cities. It is well-documented
that the IHS increased trade activity and employment across cities (Duranton and
unique in their locational flexibility (as a point in space) while rail lines are less disruptive than new
highways.
5Allen and Arkolakis (2014) calculate that the construction of the interstate highway system did,
in fact, increase overall welfare by a magnitude of 1.1 to 1.4 percent.
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Turner, 2012; Duranton et al., 2014) and counties (Michaels, 2008; Frye, 2015). The
IHS also affected the spatial distribution of people and led to increased suburbaniza-
tion rates across US cities (Baum-Snow, 2007). Perhaps most related to this paper
is the work done in Brinkman and Lin (2018). This working paper begins to shed
light on both the political economy of interstate location and the subsequent effects of
construction across cities. The authors find that the location of constructed segments
of the IHS changed over time, due in part to national opposition and the freeway
revolts. They also show that interstates caused a decline in both center-city popula-
tion and income between 1950 and 2010 and that the decline in population cannot
be explained by firms relocating to urban areas and displacing residents.6
The analysis in this paper shares similarities with Brinkman and Lin (2018) with
some fundamental differences. First, I use tract-level data in a case study framework
to study determinants of interstate location and to quantify the impact that con-
struction had on neighborhoods within a city. Brinkman and Lin’s analysis relies on
cross-city variation and, as such, their estimates of the interstates’ treatment effect
are averaged across all cities in their sample. It may well be the case that determi-
nants of interstate location and their subsequent effects on urban neighborhoods vary
heterogeneously across cities. The case study framework allows me to pay careful at-
tention to local detail to understand how Detroit neighborhoods were affected during
the interstate era. In fact, the subtle features of the urban interstates’ political econ-
omy reveal the importance of understanding the planning and construction process
at a very local level, and while this analysis is done in the context of one city, it offers
important insights to complement Brinkman and Lin.
Second, to estimate the causal effects of the IHS, Brinkman and Lin adopt an
instrumental variables (IV) approach. The case study framework poses unique chal-
6Their paper seeks to also examine channels through which construction affected cities using a
calibrated model of city structure though its conclusions remain in flux.
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lenges to finding an IV and IVs that have been previously exploited in the literature
are ill-suited for my analysis.7 Instead, to understand the effects of urban interstate
construction, I report OLS estimates across differing specifications and implement
a propensity score matching technique for added robustness. While I cannot assign
a strict causal interpretation to the results, I show that estimates are largely con-
sistent across methodologies. Finally, I supplement Brinkman and Lin’s analysis by
examining additional outcomes of interest. I study the effect of urban interstate
construction on neighborhood property values, population density, the percentage of
Black residents. By exploring additional outcomes, I provide further insight into the
local effects of interstate construction and how interstate placement altered Detroit’s
urban landscape.
Lastly, I contribute to previous work done by historians, urban policy specialists,
and legal professionals. Scholars in these fields have long discussed the politics of
urban interstate placement and the perceived impact of construction on American
cities (see Cohn (1978) and DiMento (2009) for in-depth discussion on the city of
Syracuse, NY). Mohl (2002) discusses the relationship between slum clearance and
interstate construction, and, in later work, documents the freeway revolts movement
and how local opposition halted the construction of urban segments in several US
cities (Mohl, 2004). Given the interstates’ perceived negative effects, Schwartz (1976)
contests the need for routes within the bounds of the central city, citing England’s
highways and Germany’s autobahn as examples of networks that purposefully cir-
cumvent metropolitan areas.8 While still others have written at length on the urban
interstates (Altshuler, 1965; House, 1970; Swift, 2011; Aman, 1970; Moynihan, 1960;
Seley, 1983), discussions have been largely qualitative. This paper provides empirical
evidence of determinants of urban interstate location and quantifies the impact of
7A separate and more detailed discussion on this point appears in the Appendix.
8According to Schwartz (1976), eliminating the intra-city freeways would have prevented any
disamenity effects and would have reduced costs by more than 55 percent.
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construction within Detroit.
2.2 Transportation Planning and the Motor City
Prior to the interstate era, Detroit policymakers attempted to construct an integrated
transportation system that would best serve the city and its residents. In 1919, Mayor
James Couzens created the Detroit Rapid Transit Commission (DRTC) – a group
whose main purpose was to develop a proposal for a regional transportation system.
The DRTC outlined plans that included mass-transit improvements, high-speed rail
lines, and a system of “superhighways” (Hyde, 2006) – eight-lane highways, elevated
at points, and designed to carry large volumes of through-traffic. Ironically, home-
owners opposed mass-transit improvements, arguing that new subway routes would
tear through Detroit’s expanding suburbs, but expressed overwhelming support for
the superhighways. DRTC president, Sidney Waldon, traveled the US giving speeches
on the concept and thrust Detroit to the forefront of national transportation planning
and highway innovation. Road-building, however, was a state-financed activity and
Waldon’s regional transportation plan for Detroit failed to obtain support from the
state legislature. At the onset of World War II, no improvements had been made to
the city’s transportation system (Hyde, 2006).
Wartime transportation needs provided the necessary catalyst for highway con-
struction. When the Department of Defense issued $636.8 million in military contracts
to manufacturing firms in Michigan, Detroit’s automobile plants rapidly transitioned
to defense production – putting more pressure on the existing road system (Martelle,
2014). To better facilitate defense transport, the Michigan State Highway Depart-
ment created a “wish list” of 12 defense highway projects in and around Detroit.
Three of the projects were constructed during the War and later became models for
the future interstate system: the Willow Run Expressway, the Detroit Industrial De-
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fense Expressway (later I-94), and the Davison Limited Highway. The Willow Run
Expressway opened in 1942 and served as an access road to Ford Motor Company’s
Willow Run Bomber plant in Ypsilanti, MI while the Detroit Industrial Expressway
extended east toward downtown (Hyde, 2006). Much of the Willow Run and the De-
troit Industrial Expressways’ construction took place outside of Detroit’s city limits
and did little to disrupt urban life. The Davison Limited Highway, however, was a
1.3-mile recessed, limited-access, divided highway that extended through Detroit’s
densely-populated Highland Park neighborhood and most closely resembled the ur-
ban interstates to come. The Wayne County Road Commission spent $1.45 million
in land acquisition costs; the rights-of-way measured 205 feet wide and construction
demolished 132 buildings.9 This freeway opened to traffic in 1942 and was the first
urban route of its kind, “meant to connect one part of a metro area with another
with as little interruption as possible” (Lee, 2016).
Detroit entered the interstate era as a pioneer in road-building, but the future of its
transportation network required planning and financing from the federal government.
National plans for an interstate network emerged when Congress passed the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1944. The 1944 Plan, shown in Figure 2·1, detailed the national
network but did not include interstate routes within metropolitan areas.10 Inter-city
highway planning differed drastically from intra-city planning – if only for the sheer
physical challenge of building highways in new locations within densely-populated
areas (Weingroff, 2015). In a city where there is demand for land in every location,
decisions on where to build new infrastructure are jointly determined by topography,
projected demand, land prices, and both social and political attitudes of the decision-
makers. In Detroit, decision-makers included individuals at the Bureau of Public
Roads, the Michigan State Highway Department, Wayne County Road Commission,
9See the following for a more extensive overview of the Davison Limited Highway:
http://www.dailydetroit.com/2016/08/03/detroit-home-americas-first-urban-freeway.
10A subsequent plan was released in 1947 with minor changes but neither included urban routes.
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and city officials. The Bureau of Public Roads solicited the latter groups for collective
help in developing recommendations for route locations within the city.
The cooperative efforts resulted in a 1955 benchmark study titled the Detroit
Metropolitan Area Traffic (DMAT) Study.11 Methodologically advanced for its time,
the DMAT outlined a system of “desire lines” depicting the rough location of 218
miles of highway to be built at an estimated cost of $1.55 billion. Rough route
locations were incorporated into the Bureau of Public Roads’ document titled General
Location of National System of Interstate Highways Including All Additional Routes
at Urban Areas Designated in September 1955 or “The Yellow Book.” The Yellow
Book supplemented the 1947 national plan and was the first federal document to
detail the location of interstate highways within more than 100 metropolitan areas.
Figure 2·2 depicts the Yellow Book’s plans for Detroit. A year after the release of the
Yellow Book, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1956. This Act secured federal funding for the construction of the IHS at a rate of
90 percent and was the final piece of legislation preceding large-scale construction of
the network.
2.3 Determinants of Interstate Placement
While the DMAT study provided a foundation for route direction and rough place-
ment, route location was subject to final review by state and local officials. In fact,
before the Detroit City Council approved a contract with the Michigan State High-
way Department and Wayne County, Councilman Del Smith raised the issue as to
whether the city was constrained by the routes indicated on the map (Mowitz and
Wright, 1962). The State responded that the maps were not, in fact, part of the legal
contract, therefore the routes were not binding – leaving room for auxiliary factors to
11The total budget for Detroit’s Metropolitan Area Traffic Study was $750,000 and partial funding
was provided by the federal government.
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affect final route location. Previous qualitative literature identifies three motivating
factors affecting final interstate location in urban areas: total costs – specifically in
the form of property value, slum clearance (or urban renewal), and race. In this sec-
tion, I discuss each motivating factor in depth before empirically documenting how,
on the margin, property values mattered most in Detroit.
Historical accounts of Detroit describe costs as a particular concern for the lo-
cation of interstate routes. While the federal government pledged funding at a rate
of 90 percent, the State of Michigan, the city of Detroit, and Wayne County were
responsible for the remaining 10 percent at rates of 75 percent, 12.5 percent, and 12.5
percent, respectively (Mowitz and Wright, 1962). The total cost of the IHS was the
sum of two components: construction costs and land-acquisition costs. Minimizing
costs required a particular cognizance of the latter which explicitly manifested itself
in city property values. Figure 2·3 illustrates that, indeed, places with low property
value prior to construction tend to be closer to subsequent interstate routes. There
are two reasons for this relationship: explicit costs of acquiring land for construc-
tion and implicit costs of future reductions to the city’s tax base. Regarding land
acquisition costs – the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution grants the govern-
ment the authority to seize private property for public use (eminent domain) but
requires the government to compensate property owners in the process. Compensa-
tion amounts to the “market value” of a commercial or residential property, or the
price that a property would evoke in a fair sale on the open market reflecting both the
land value, the value of the structure, and the local real estate conditions. Eminent
domain allowed state highway departments to condemn land in the right-of-way of
future interstates.12 With the estimated total cost of Detroit’s interstates exceeding
$1.5 billion in 1955 – with land acquisition costs accounting for almost one-third –
12Seizing the land, however, was often easier said than done. According to a 1960 article in the
Detroit Free Press, “The State Highway Department has discovered that it deals far better with
things than people. It often is easier to build a bridge than to get the land on which to build it!”
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officials had clear incentive to minimize expenditures by routing interstates through
neighborhoods with low property value.13
The second reason stems from the idea that property values are positively corre-
lated with property taxes. Property taxes fund public services including education,
emergency services, transportation, libraries, and parks. Condemning private prop-
erty for interstate construction meant (potentially) eliminating a large share of De-
troit’s tax base – a particular cause of concern for city officials. A 1952 Detroit Free
Press article titled “Leveling Off of Population Hits City Tax Base” foreshadows the
issue: ”There are [...] factors contributing to the shrinking of the tax base. Principal
among them are land clearance for expressways and slum redevelopment...” The same
article claims that the total assessed valuation of properties intended for removal from
the tax roll was $100 million (Burdick, 1952). James H. Lincoln, a member of the
Detroit Common Council, was particularly vocal about the issue, stating that he was
“not for tearing out a large number of homes and businesses and taking much-needed
assessed valuation from the tax rolls primarily so that the people of Oakland County
can save two or three minutes getting to work or home again” (Mowitz and Wright,
1962). Minimizing losses in future tax revenue made for a clear policy implication to
seek out areas with low property value as sites for future interstate routes.14
It is possible that policymakers targeted neighborhoods in Detroit for interstate
13Percentages reflect national averages as reported in the 1955 House Document No. 120 titled
Needs of the Highway System, 1955-1984. Compare this to railroad construction where, according
to the 1880 census, only 1 or 2 percent of total costs represented the costs of acquiring land (Atack
et al., 2010b).
14A concern is that property values were not a choice variable but rather an outcome of Detroit’s
pre-existing road network. As a counter point, pre-interstate “highways” were accessible to through
traffic, meaning that there were benefits to homeowners of being in close proximity to them, which
may have even been in the form of increased property values (see a subsequent section where I talk
about the case of I-275). As stated in Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950, “Street opening and
widening, [Americans] argued, was very disruptive, especially to abutting businesses. It was also
very expensive. It was prohibitively so in the central business district where the streets that had
the heaviest traffic also had the most valuable real estate, a point that even some advocates of street
improvements conceded.” In other words, pre-existing roads had a much different relationship with
surrounding housing values than the future interstates.
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construction on the basis of property characteristics, not property value. Interstate
planning and construction coincided with the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 – two
pieces of legislation aimed at clearing center-city slums and improving the physical
living environment for the poor (Collins and Shester, 2013). In many cities, interstates
were considered a natural step in slum clearance and urban renewal. Mohl (2002)
cites cases where highway officials and urban real-estate developers cooperated to
divide property that had been seized via eminent domain. Schwartz (1976) states
that policymakers targeted “blighted” neighborhoods with the idea that slums were
a problem of deteriorating buildings and not necessarily of property value or low-
income inhabitants. Consider the famous case of the Lower Manhattan Expressway
(LOMEX) – a 10-lane elevated highway designed to link Manhattan’s Holland Tunnel
on the west side with the Williamsburg Bridge on the east side. Had it not been for
urban activist Jane Jacobs and a grassroots campaign that ultimately blocked the
project, construction would have demolished old, run-down, slum housing units in the
neighborhoods of Greenwich Village, SoHo, and the Lower East Side. Extrapolating
from this specific case, it is possible that the mid-century “slum clearance” agenda
affected interstate route placement in Detroit.
A final factor that may have affected route location is race. The interstate era
coincided with massive Southern outmigration of Blacks to Northern cities. In a
30-year period, the share of Blacks living in Northern cities increased by a factor
of four, and Black migrants often concentrated in minority neighborhoods close to
decaying business districts (Boustan, 2010). Seley (1983) documents the case of I-40
in Nashville, TN. Federal plans routed I-40 through a majority White neighborhood.
By 1957, the route was “mysteriously” changed to run directly through the Black
business district of North Nashville, creating an unnecessary kink in the route. A
hearing was held in May of 1957 to reveal the new plan and solicit public comment but
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the meeting’s announcement was posted in White neighborhoods only. Black residents
of North Nashville were unaware that the new plan targeted their neighborhood until
the State started acquiring land for the right-of-way. In a separate case in Miami,
local officials opted for I-95’s route to pass through Overtown – the commercial and
cultural heart of Black Miami – over an alternate route through an abandoned railroad
corridor (Mohl, 2002). The Miami Herald printed an article titled: “What about the
Negroes Uprooted by Expressway?” – a question that remained unanswered after
displacing 10,000 people (Mohl, 2002).
It is impossible to recount Detroit’s history without discussing race. The city is
a textbook case of Black-White segregation and racial violence. Interstate planning
closely followed the city’s 1943 race riot – a crisis that lasted 3 days, left more than
30 dead, hundreds injured, and required 6,000 Army troops to quell. Construction of
the interstate routes coincided with the 12th Street riot of 1967 – an even bloodier
event than its 1943 predecessor. Poor Black residents were a particularly vulnera-
ble population and it appeared to be the case that the interstates were designed to
disproportionately benefit White suburbanites at the expense of low-income inner-
city residents (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). Given the city’s racial tensions and
the imbalance of power between (predominantly) White policymakers and inner-city
Black residents, it is reasonable to expect that highway planning and construction
was shaped by the spatial distribution of Blacks in Detroit.
Slum clearance and racial biases may well have been shrouded by policymakers’
explicit concerns about costs. It could have been the case in Detroit that areas fit for
interstate location, due to their low property values, were also center-city slums with
a large percentage of Black residents. Moreover, since the interstates were designed to
penetrate the CBD, there may have been no way to systematically circumvent these
neighborhoods. In Detroit, however, there appears to be variation in the spatial
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distribution of property values, slums housing, and Blacks. A correlation coefficient
between census tract median property values and percent Black in 1950 is -0.30;
between median property values and a measure of slum housing stock is -0.49.15 I
explain in subsequent sections how I exploit such variation at the census tract level
to distinguish between motivating factors of urban interstate location.
2.4 Data
To study both the causes and consequences of intra-city interstate placement in De-
troit, I need information on neighborhood characteristics both prior to and following
construction, spatial data on the location of Detroit’s interstates, and timing of route
construction. I rely on data from the National Historical Geographical Information
System (NHGIS), the US Census, the State of Michigan, and several primary sources.
I describe the data construction in detail below.
2.4.1 Census Tracts
To conduct an empirical analysis at the neighborhood level, I first define a neighbor-
hood and locate its boundaries in space. A neighborhood is a census tract within the
city of Detroit in 1950 boundaries.16 Because tract boundaries depend on the distri-
bution of of the population, they are redrawn with each census. I fix tract boundaries
in the year 1950 as it is the census year immediately preceding the passage of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 which initiated large-scale interstate construction.
I then use digitized shapefiles from NHGIS to locate tract boundaries. While there
15As a measure of slum housing stock, I use the percentage of units with no indoor plumbing.
See Collins and Shester (2013) and Shester (2013) for a discussion. Regressions using alternative
measures – percentage of units with no private bath and, separately, crowded units – yield similar
results for predictive power of the log median housing value.
16According to the 1994 Geographic Areas Reference Manual from the US Census, “tracts have
between 2,500 and 8,000 residents and boundaries that follow visible features. When first estab-
lished, census tracts are to be as homogeneous as possible with respect to population characteristics,
economic status, and living conditions.”
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are 961 tracts in the Detroit census area in 1950, only a subset of tract boundaries
have been digitized into shapefiles by NHGIS. In total, my sample consists of 511
census tracts within Detroit’s standard metropolitan area (SMA) in the year 1950.
Boundary changes are a serious issue for neighborhood-level analyses over time,
and because census tract boundaries “generally follow permanent, visible features,
such as streets, roads, highways, rivers, canals, railroads, and high-tension power-
lines,” changes may be endogenous to interstate placement.17 Ignoring boundary
changes may blur the extent to which interstates disrupted existing neighborhoods.
In order to construct the 1950 census tract’s counterpart in later years, I use a smaller
unit of observation: the census block. Census blocks are the smallest geographic en-
tity for which the US Census tabulates decennial data. NHGIS digitizes shapefiles
on census blocks beginning in the year 1990 and I use these shapefiles to reconstruct
the 1950 census tract boundary. For census years before 1990, digitized block infor-
mation is not available. As such, I manually digitize paper maps outlining census
block boundaries for an intermediate year – 1970.18 I then calculate the geographic
centroid of each census block and assign the block to a 1950 census tract if the cen-
troid falls within the tract boundary.19 Figure 2·4 illustrates this procedure. The
thick outline represents a 1950 census tract boundary and the interior gray polygons
17More than 80 percent of 1950 tracts experienced boundary revisions or further delineations by
the year 1990. This estimate reflects my calculations for boundary changes within the city of Detroit
only.
18In 1970, there are 364 tracts that maintain consistent 1950 boundaries (or are further delineated
within and can be aggregated back to 1950 tracts). For the remaining 147 census tracts that
experience significant boundary changes, I digitize census block boundaries from maps available
from the US Census of Housing. See Table B.3 in the Appendix which reports results found in
subsequent sections for only the subset of 364 tracts whose boundaries did not change.
19A paper by Lee and Lin (2018) tackles tract boundary changes in a different way using an
approach similar to the Hornbeck (2010) approach for normalizing county boundaries. A poten-
tial drawback of this approach is that the weights assume uniform distribution of the covariates
throughout each census tract. My approach, instead, builds from the ground up and uses a much
smaller census unit (the census block) to construct each census tract and does not rely on distribu-
tion uniformity. More exploration is needed to determine any differences in estimation and resulting
best-practices.
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are 1990 census blocks with centroids that fall within the tract boundary. This pro-
cess aggregates census blocks in 1970 and 1990 to the tract level in 1950 to create a
consistent geographic unit over time.
I use characteristics from the US Census reported at both the census tract level
and the block level in my analysis. Characteristics reported at the census tract level
in 1950 are used to examine determinants of interstate placement and, subsequently,
to control for a wide-range of pre-existing differences across tracts when estimating
the effects of interstate construction.20 Tract information includes demographic, eco-
nomic, and housing stock characteristics and I describe the specific variables in sub-
sequent sections. To examine the effects of interstate construction on local outcomes,
I use information reported at the block level, aggregated to 1950 tract boundaries.
Because the block is a finer geographic unit, the information reported by the US
Census is less detailed to protect individual respondents’ confidentiality. As such,
the outcome measures of interest include (and are limited to) population density, the
percentage of Black residents, and median owner-occupied property value.
I supplement census tract characteristics with additional information affecting
within city outcomes. Collins and Margo (2004) and Collins and Smith (2006) docu-
ment the relationship between race riots and local property values. Detroit was the
epicenter of racial tensions mid-century and experienced two race-riots, one in 1943
and another in 1967. I calculate the distance between each census tract and the epi-
center of both riots and show that results are robust to controlling for proximity to
both.21 Second, recent working papers by Aaronson et al. (2019) and Krimmel (2018)
documents the effects of “redlining” on long-run outcomes, including housing supply
and population density. Redlining emerged from a New Deal initiative aimed at
20Summary statistics are included in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
21The race riots occurred close in proximity to Detroit’s CBD so in baseline results, I include only
distance to the CBD as an independent variable. Results are robust to including, instead, distance
to riot epicenter and are included in Table B.4 in the Appendix.
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minimizing foreclosures in American cities. This led to the Home Owner’s Loan Cor-
poration surveying 239 American cities, rating each neighborhood’s perceived credit
risk, and, ultimately, restricting loan access to many, predominantly Black, Ameri-
cans (Krimmel, 2018). Because redlined neighborhoods may have otherwise been in
decay – affecting both interstate placement and subsequent outcomes – I control for
the percentage of each 1950 census tract that was “redlined.” I do this using a newly
digitized map of Detroit from 1939 available from Nelson (1955).
2.4.2 Interstates
I use spatial data to identify the location of constructed interstate routes, planned
interstate routes, and a simulated network of topographically optimal routes. For
constructed route location, I use a digitized map of roads available from the State
of Michigan.22 I match spatial information with data from Baum-Snow (2007) to
identify the completion decade of each interstate segment.23 I restrict my focus to
interstate highways for two reasons.24 First, construction largely began after the pas-
sage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, allowing me to identify the completion
timeline for each segment. Second, the interstates were, by definition, “limited-access,
multi-lane, high-speed routes” and were therefore not meant to necessarily facilitate
intra-city transit (Moynihan, 1960). Infrequent points of entry and exit would allow
through-traffic to travel uninterruptedly at high speeds. Moreover, urban express-
ways, as depicted in a Congressional report titled Interregional Highways, were often
designed as elevated or depressed – making the roads all but inaccessible to adjacent
neighborhoods. The engineering features of the urban interstates are important to
22Shapefile on Michigan road system available at https://www.michigan.gov/gis.
23Data on completion dates is derived from federal documents known as PR-511 data and was
shared by Nate Baum-Snow. According to Baum-Snow (2007), “each state reported the comple-
tion month of each federally funded interstate highway segment within its borders” and this is the
information I use to isolate decade of completion.
24Both US highways and state highways outside of the interstate highway system are excluded
from my analysis.
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understanding their potential effects on local outcomes as census tracts bisected by
interstate construction are not likely to have experienced the benefits often associ-
ated with extensions made to transportation networks (for example, increased market
access or improved connectivity). Figure 2·5a illustrates the constructed routes sur-
rounding Detroit’s CBD.
I compare constructed route location to both planned routes and simulated, topo-
graphically optimal routes to examine if, and how, constructed interstates deviated
from possible alternative route location. To obtain planned routes, I manually digitize
the plan for Detroit’s interstates included in the 1955 Yellow Book. Recall that the
plans outlined in the Yellow Book included intra-city routes that were subsequently
approved for construction in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. Ex ante, it is not
clear whether constructed routes deviated from locally- and Congressionally-approved
plans as the planned routes were non-binding, giving engineers and local officials the
final say in constructed route location. Deviations are easily observed in Figure 2·5b
where I overlay the planned routes (hatched lines) with the constructed routes (solid
lines).
Topographical conditions were a primary concern for interstate routes. Cohn
(1978) notes that “geographic ... conditions determined the general alignments” of
the highways because they were often the “line of least resistance.” With this in mind,
I use GIS software to construct a simulated network of interstate routes that favor the
surrounding topography. To do so, I start by identifying the set of cities that provide
a direct interstate route to Detroit. I follow the Baum-Snow (2007) methodology
of identifying a city’s CBD by taking the union of census tracts comprising a city’s
CBD as outlined in the 1982 Economic Census’ Geographic Reference Manual and
calculating the geographic centroid.
I then divide the US into a set of grid cells measuring 1/3-arc seconds on each side
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(approximately 10 meters). For each grid cell, I have information on (1) whether the
cell is over land or over water using data from the US Geological Survey’s (USGS)
National Hydrography Data and (2) the topographic nature (elevation) measured in
meters above sea-level from the USGS’s National Elevation Data. I use this infor-
mation to impose a cost of navigating from the source cell (Detroit’s CBD) to any
one of eight adjacent cells. I assign the cost of crossing each cell equal to the slope
of that cell so that costs lie in the range (0, 90].25 A cost of (nearly) 0 represents
traveling from one cell to another of the same elevation (in other words, the surface
is perfectly flat) while a cost of 90 means traveling from one cell up a vertical cliff to
reach any neighboring cell. I impose an additional fixed cost to traverse any cell that
is identified as a water cell. Intuitively, this cost structure forces the simulated route
between Detroit and any destination to take the shortest, flattest (slope of nearly
0), driest (crossing the minimum number of water cells) trajectory.26 The simulated
highway network that results from this exercise reflects the topographically optimal
connections between Detroit and other cities. Figure 2·5c illustrates the simulated
routes (dashed lines) compared to the constructed routes (solid lines).27 I use both
the simulated network and planned routes to examine the systematic deviations taken
by the constructed network.
25The slope is calculated as the maximum rate of change between an origin cell and its immediate
neighbors (in a 3x3 grid-cell window). As a technical note: ArcGIS cannot process a cost of 0 so
the true assigned cost is 0.1.
26Dijkstra’s algorithm is used to compute the single, shortest route connecting Detroit and any
one of the five surrounding cities. See Pascali (2017) for a similar discussion on the methodology
using GIS to simulate optimal sailing routes.
27Previous work on the IHS has relied on simulation and planned routes in an instrumental
variables framework. In a subsequent section, I explicitly show that both alternative routes do not
satisfy the conditions necessary for an IV.
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2.5 Predicting Interstate Placement
In my first empirical exercise, I distinguish among motivating factors affecting ur-
ban interstate placement to show that pre-interstate property values robustly predict
future interstate placement in Detroit. I separate census tracts into those whose
boundaries were intersected by an urban interstate (“interstate tracts”) and those
that were not (“non-interstate tracts”). Then, I identify three tract-level character-
istics in 1950 to assess how each affected interstate route location. I use a census
tract’s median owner-occupied property value to determine whether land acquisition
costs and concerns over a reduction in the city’s tax base best determine urban in-
terstate location; the percentage of units with no indoor plumbing as a measure of
the slum housing stock to assess whether the post-War slum clearance best predict
urban interstate location; and the percentage of Black residents living in a tract to
determine whether policymakers’ racial biases affected urban interstate location.28
Using within-city variation at the census tract level, I fit a regression of the fol-
lowing form:
1[UI]ij = α +X
′
ij,1950β + γj + εij (2.1)
The dependent variable, 1[UI]ij, is an indicator that takes a value of one if census
tract i in county j is ever bisected by an interstate and Xij,1950 is a vector of observable
characteristics at the census tract level in 1950. The set of coefficients, β, indicate the
extent to which each pre-interstate observable characteristic predicts future interstate
placement in a tract. If costs affect urban interstate location, I expect the coefficient
on log median property values to be negative (and significant). If, instead, urban
interstates were used as a method of slum clearance, then I expect the coefficient on
the percentage of units with no indoor plumbing to be positive and, finally, if race
28As stated in Collins and Smith (2006), the median property value variable from the US Census
is the median of owner-occupied single-family housing units and includes the value of both the land
and structure.
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was an important factor and Black neighborhoods were disproportionately targeted
for interstate construction, I expect the coefficient on percent Black to be positive.
I do not assume that motivating factors are mutually exclusive and, in fact, allow
each characteristics to jointly retain predictive power. I drop census tracts from the
analysis for which a highway was already constructed in 1950 and later incorporated
into the interstate system.29 All regressions include controls for land area, distance
from each census tract to Detroit’s CBD, and county dummies (γj) to absorb time-
invariant unobservable differences across counties.
2.5.1 Results and Discussion
Pre-interstate property value drove strategic site selection for interstate routes in
Detroit as documented in Table 2.1. In column (1), I regress a dummy for urban
interstate location on a census tract’s log median property value. Conditional only
on land area and county fixed effects, a 10 percent increase in median property value
corresponds with an 1.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of future inter-
state placement within a tract. These preliminary results in column (1) are in line
with the qualitative evidence suggesting that policymakers’ in Detroit had incentives
to consider areas with low property values as sites for future interstate placement to
minimize both land-acquisition costs and future losses to the city’s tax base.
In columns (2) and (3), I regress a dummy for interstate location on the percentage
of units with no indoor plumbing and, separately, on percent Black in a tract. When
included separately, neither factor appears to have significant predictive power. In
column (4), I add all three covariates in a “horse race” to address the three motivating
factors simultaneously. The coefficient on percent Black has the predicted sign but is
not significant and the coefficient on the percentage of units with no indoor plumbing
29According to data in the PR-511 documents, much of the Edsel Ford (future I-94) was open to
traffic by 1950. Within the boundaries of my Detroit sample, 87 percent of the total mileage was
open to traffic and these segments are excluded from this portion of the analysis.
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is large but negative.30 The coefficient on log median property value is stable and
and is significant at the one percent level.
In a final regression predicting true interstate location (column 5), I add additional
controls for housing stock and demographic characteristics measured in 1950 that were
observable to (or inferred by) interstate planners and policymakers. Housing stock
characteristics include the percentage of owner-occupied units, percentage of units
built before 1920 (30+ year old structures), percentage of vacant housing units, and
log median contract rent. Demographic characteristics include log population density
and the percentage of households with an annual income less than $2,000 – a proxy
for poverty as discussed in Collins and Shester (2013). When I include additional
characteristics, the coefficient on log median property value remains negative and
increases in magnitude such that a 10 percent increase in median property values
decreases the probability of interstate placement by 2.4 percentage points. Overall,
my results suggest that – among competing factors – property values matter most for
constructed interstate location.31
Thus far, the empirical evidence does not necessary indicate a strategic routing
of interstates through neighborhoods with low property values. Consider the general
case of a monocentric city where there is a systematic relationship between property
(land) values and distance to the CBD. If interstate highways were specifically de-
signed to penetrate the CBD, it may not have been possible to circumvent areas with
low property values – meaning estimates of the coefficient from equation (1) may sim-
ply reflect the spatial distribution of property values with respect to Detroit’s center.
To investigate this issue, I re-estimate equation (1) where the dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one if census tract i is bisected by a planned route or, separately, a
30While property values and measures of slum housing stock are not perfectly correlated, there
may be a concern of potential collinearity between the two variables – causing the coefficient on
slum housing stock to assume an “incorrect” sign.
31Estimates are robust using both logit and probit and are included in Appendix Table B.2.
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simulated route and then compare results to those of true interstate location. If there
is a particular spatial relationship between property values and Detroit’s CBD driving
the results in columns (1) through (5), then I may expect to find a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between property values and both planned and simulated route
location. If, instead, policymakers strategically targeted specific neighborhoods for
constructed routes, property values may not have significant explanatory power.
Column (6) includes results from a regression of planned interstate placement
dummy on 1950 observable characteristics. While property value has no significant
predictive power, the coefficient is positive and large. While not significant in a sta-
tistical sense, there is a suggested positive relationship between property values and
planned interstate routes. This could very likely be noise and could be attributed to
the imprecision of the “desire lines” outlined in the 1955 Yellow Book. The DMAT
Study includes a discussion on the admitted imprecision of proposed route location:
“...While routes were laid down with some precision, the final locations would have
to be determined by detailed studies of property values, property lines, soil condi-
tions, utility locations and the like.” Moreover, the Bureau of Public Roads required
planned routes only as “approximate corridors in the interest of refining ... mileage
calculations” – an indication that the federal government was not necessarily inter-
ested in precisely pinning down route location (Swift, 2011).
Comparing the coefficient on log median housing value across columns (5) and (6)
illustrates how true interstate location systematically deviated from planned location
through tracts of low property value. Consider the following historical account that
corroborates this empirical relationship. I-275, a north-south beltway, was originally
planned to run through Detroit’s west side and was designed as a widening of Detroit’s
Southfield Highway connecting the northwestern suburb of Southfield with the Ford
manufacturing plant to the south of the city. The Bureau of Public Roads would only
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approve one highway due north within Detroit’s limits as part of the interstate system
and including I-275 would require excluding I-75, a main artery running north from
Detroit’s CBD, from the interstate system. Michigan State Highway Commissioner
John Mackie petitioned the Bureau to shift I-275 a few miles to the west and outside
of Detroit’s boundary for two reasons. One, it allowed I-75 to be included in the
interstate system and thus receive federal funding. Two, it prevented officials from
condemning houses along the originally planned route that directly penetrated a
residential section of Detroit with high property values as city officials were “concerned
with the loss of tax revenue resulting from the removal of property from the tax roles
and lowering of property values in the area” (Mowitz and Wright, 1962).
I turn now to column (7) which includes results from re-estimating equation (1)
where the dependent variable is a dummy for a simulated interstate within a tract.
Recall that the simulated routes connect Detroit with a set of cities, accounting
only for geographic characteristics. As shown in Figure 2·5c, however, constructed
routes appear to deviate substantially from simulated routes. When re-estimating
equation (1), none of the motivating factors predict simulated interstate placement.
Moreover, the comparison, again, of the coefficient on log median property value
between columns (5) and (7) shows constructed routes’ deviation through tracts of
low property value. The comparison also illustrates how areas of Detroit considered
optimal for interstate location from a topographical standpoint were not also the
same areas of low property value. In other words, flat, dry areas of Detroit were not
also neighborhoods of disproportionately low property value – further illustrating the
strategic placement on behalf of policymakers who were explicitly concerned about
minimizing overall costs.
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2.6 Effects of Urban Interstate Construction on Neighbor-
hood Outcomes in Detroit
Given interstate location, how did construction affect local outcomes? In this sec-
tion, I examine the short- and long-run impact of interstate construction on tract-level
property values, population density, the percentage Black residents. I find that inter-
state construction leads to short-run declines across all measures – with the largest
effects felt in tracts closest to construction. In the long run, property values continue
to decline relative to non-interstate tracts, and there is suggestive (albeit mixed)
evidence that population density and percent Black remain depressed. Overall, the
impact of construction is most acute in census tracts within close proximity to the
interstates.
To quantify the effects of interstate construction, I estimate a regression of the
following form:
Yijt = α + β1[UI]ijt +X
′
ij,1950δ + γj + εijt (2.2)
The dependent variable, Yijt, is an outcome variable – log median property value, log
population density, and percent Black – in census tract i, in county j, in decade t.
Log median property value captures differences in the relative desirability of living in
a particular tract (Collins and Smith, 2006) while log population density and percent
Black capture demographic differences driven by interstate location.32
The treatment variable, 1[UI]ijt, is an indicator that takes a value equal to one
when an interstate is completed and open to traffic in census tract i in county j by
decade t. The vector of 1950 controls, Xij,1950, accounts for observable differences
across census tracts prior to interstate construction. Demographic controls include
32See the Appendix for a detailed discussion on how I construct a measure of log median property
value in 1970 and 1990, holding fixed 1950 census tract boundaries.
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includes log population density and percent Black. Housing stock controls include the
percentage of owner occupied units, percentage of units built before 1920 (30+ year
old structures), percentage of units with no indoor plumbing, percentage of vacant
units, log median property value and log median contract rent. It should be noted
that Xij,1950 includes a measure of the dependent variable in 1950. Lastly, I control
for tract land area, distance from each census tract to the CBD, the percentage
of a 1950 census tract that was redlined in 1939, and county fixed effects (γj).
33
Because some tracts are sparsely populated – and others densely populated – each
tract is weighted by its total population in 1950.34 The key identifying assumption
is that conditional on a wide range of pre-interstate observable characteristics and
geographic factors, assignment to the treatment – or interstate location – is random.
If the identifying assumption holds, the coefficient β is identified from within-county
variation in interstate placement at the census tract level and captures the causal
effect of having an interstate constructed through a census tract.
2.6.1 Interstate Effects using a Binary Treatment Measure
Baseline OLS results indicate the overall negative impact of interstate construction on
census tracts in Detroit. Table 2.2 displays estimates of β from regression (2) where
outcomes in Panel A are measured in 1970 and outcomes in Panel B are measured
in 1990. Following the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, states rushed to complete
interstate construction – particularly urban routes whose costs were 3.5 times that of
rural routes (per mile) – for fear that federal funding would be terminated in 1969.
Therefore, estimates in Panel A should be interpreted as short-run effects while those
in Panel B should be interpreted as long-run effects. Columns (1), (3), and (5) include
33The econometric specification and control variables uses are similar to Collins and Shester (2013)
and Shester (2013). Consistent with this approach, I do not control for changes in X as changes are
likely endogenous to the location of urban interstates.
34Results from unweighted regressions using a binary interstate treatment measure are included
in Table B.5 of the Appendix.
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geographic controls and observable characteristics measured in 1950 discussed above.
The vector of 1950 observable characteristics does not necessarily control for dif-
ferential trends over time between interstate tracts and non-interstate tracts – giving
rise to the concern that interstate tracts were already declining in 1950. This does
not appear to be the case, however, as both interstate and non-interstate tracts expe-
rienced growth between 1940 and 1950 across all outcome measures (see Table B.1 for
a complete list of descriptive statistics). Growth in median housing value was greater
in interstate tracts; growth in population density and percent Black was smaller in
magnitude in interstate tracts but was only statistically different for the latter.35
Positive growth measures alleviate concerns that any negative effects from interstate
construction only exacerbated already declining neighborhoods. However, to fully
assuage any concerns about differential trends affecting route location, I include a
pre-trend measure of the dependent variable equal to the percent change between
1940 and 1950 in columns (2), (4), and (6).36
Panel A shows short run declines across all measures driven by interstate location.
Specifically, an interstate within a tract is associated with decreased median property
values of roughly 3.7 percent, a 12 percent decline in population density, and a 10 per-
centage point decrease in percent Black in 1970. The effect on housing values is small
but non-trivial – evidence that the housing supply not seized via eminent domain, but
still within interstate tracts, was immediately affected by construction. This result is
consistent with the idea that housing values may respond by a small amount in the
35Growth measures, or pre-trends, can only be calculated for 477 census tracts whose boundaries
do not change between 1940 and 1950, and only a subset for which certain information is available.
For example, there are only 346 census tract with information on Black residents (that is non-zero),
thus, including this growth measure restricts the sample size used for estimation. There is a small
difference in the growth of percent Black: 6.5 percent in non-interstate tracts and 3.1 percent in
interstate tracts and I control for this in regressions.
36I include only the percentage change in the dependent variable of interest in Table 2.2. Results
using the all pre-trends further restricts the sample size but can be found in Table B.6 in the
Appendix.
117
short run but may take time to fully reflect the changes in infrastructure.
A short-run decline in population density is partly mechanical given the land
required to construct the highways through densely-populated areas of Detroit. Ac-
cording to federal design requirements, a four-lane interstate required a right-of-way
no less than 224 feet wide (68 meters). However, this result also indicates that in-
dividuals who were displaced by interstate construction did not resettle within their
same tract nor did they disproportionately resettle in other interstate tracts.37 If this
were the case, I would find no significant effect as residents simply reshuffled within
the boundaries of their home tract (or other interstate tracts). This result does point
to the importance of studying the general equilibrium effects of interstate construc-
tion. While beyond the scope of this paper, understanding how individuals resorted
following construction based on urban disruption and changes in commuting costs is
an important avenue for future work. Finally, equally important is understanding
how construction affected race. I find a negative interstate effect on percent Black –
indicating that Blacks were disproportionately affected by construction.
In the long run, interstate tracts appear to recover along some dimensions but not
others. By 1990, all interstate segments in Detroit had been open to traffic for over
a decade. In Panel B, I show that construction exacerbated the decline in median
housing values. Interstate tracts have median property values that are 15 percent
lower than non-interstate tracts. Upon completion of each segment of interstate,
traffic flows increased leading to more noise, pollution, and congestion over time.
By this point, housing prices have had sufficient time to respond to the negative
externalities associated with interstate highway construction – leading to a larger
negative coefficient in 1990 than in 1970. Moreover, while population density levels
appear to recover in this specification, the interstate coefficient is negative. This
37See Table B.7 in the Appendix which shows results where the dependent variable is total pop-
ulation instead of population density.
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suggest that interstate tracts remained less dense, though I cannot reject that the
difference is null. Taken together, there is a decreased demand for owning homes
and residing closest to interstates. Finally, the effect on percent Black diminishes
in magnitude in the long run but there remains a difference in percent Black of 1.8
percentage points between interstate and non-interstate tracts.
2.6.2 Interstate Effects using a Binned Distance Measure
Results in Tables 2.2 report the effect of a binary treatment – whether or not a census
tract is bisected by an interstate – on a set of outcomes. This approach provides for
a straightforward interpretation of the interstate effect within a tract but may mask
heterogeneous effects across space. Interstate construction may have negative effects
in non-interstate census tracts close in proximity to interstates but these effects may
diminish – or even reverse – in tracts further away. To shed light on this issue, I re-
estimate an equation similar to that of (2) where the treatment is a binned distance
measure between each census tract i and the nearest interstate. This measure is
calculated using the distance between the geographic centroid of each census tract
and the nearest interstate open to traffic in time t. I obtain a continuous distance
variable for all tracts – including those bisected by an interstate – and assign each
tract to a bin of 500-meter increments. This method allows all tracts to be “treated”
by interstate construction.
Tracts closest to interstates see large, relative declines in housing values, popula-
tion density, and percent Black in the short run. Figure 2·6 plots the coefficients for
the binned-distance regressions where the omitted category is tracts furthest (>2,500
meters) from interstate construction. This allows for easy interpretation with respect
to interstate distance as demolition, and otherwise negative externalities of being
adjacent to construction, may result in a negative impact that would dissipate with
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distance.38 Results in each figure reaffirm the general message conveyed in Table 2.2.
Relative to tracts furthest from construction, tracts within 500 meters experience a
4.7 percent decrease in median housing value, a 10 percent reduction in density, and
9 percentage point decrease in percent Black. The negative impact across all mea-
sures extends to tracts up to 1,000 meters before varying heterogeneously by outcome
measure.
Figure 2·7 plots binned distance coefficients for long-run outcomes and raises in-
teresting points for discussion. Housing values experience large declines in tracts
closet to interstate construction with median property values up to 31 percent lower
than in tracts furthest away (Figure 2·7a). Results, again, are consistent with the dis-
amenity effects of living close to interstate construction. Recall that these highways
were limited-access, not designed for within-city travel, and were often inaccessible
to city residents and negative spillovers of interstate construction are most acute in
tracts within the closest proximity.
Interstate effects on percent Black are largely negative but – consistent with results
in Table 2.2 – are smaller in magnitude and are indistinguishable from zero in certain
tracts. Tracts closest to construction experience a decreased share of Blacks between
4 and 7 percentage points. Combined with the result on property values, this effect
remains puzzling – and an open question for future study. Previous contributions in
the economics literature study trends in Black homeownership during the post-War
period. In particular, Boustan and Margo (2013) explore the rise in Black homeown-
ership between 1940 and 1980 and show that as Whites flocked to the suburbs, Blacks
infiltrated central cities. The authors cite Detroit as a city in which more than 10,000
Blacks became new homeowners between 1960 and 1970. With Blacks, on average,
being of lower income and wealth levels (see Collins and Margo (2008) for a discus-
38The minimum distance from a census tract’s centroid to the nearest interstate is 1.3 meters
while the max distance is 9,000 meters. In Figures B·1 and B·2 in the Appendix, I omit the
median-distance bin for an alternative interpretation.
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sion), one might expect Blacks to disproportionately migrate towards neighborhoods
with low property values – i.e. tracts closest to interstate construction. What my
results show, however, is that this does not appear to be the case within Detroit – at
least with respect to interstate location.
Population density results plotted in Figure 2·7b illustrate a subtlety that is
masked in previous estimates using a binary treatment. Detroit’s population peaked
at 1.8 million residents in the year 1950. By 1990, the city had lost over 40 percent
of its population. Results in Figure 2·7b show that tracts closest to interstate con-
struction remained less dense than those between 500-2000 meters, but the closest
tracts still maintained a higher density than those furthest away. Again, this result
sheds light on where re-sorting might be taking place and on which neighborhoods
experienced a more rapid loss in population. It appears as if population declines were
largest in tracts within the city but furthest from an interstate (this may be more
clearly illustrated in Figure B·2 in the Appendix which omits the median-distance cat-
egory). While Detroit lost residents during this time period – and interstates played
some role in this – IHS construction is only one component of a complete story.
2.7 Robustness Check – Propensity Score Matching
In this section, I explore the sensitivity of previously reported OLS results to a propen-
sity score matching procedure. Recall that the identifying assumption under which
I can assign a strict causal interpretation to the interstate effect is that conditional
on a set of covariates, assignment to interstate treatment is random. In other words,
conditional on Xij,1950, UIijt be independent from εijt. While I control for a wide
range of observable characteristics, there remains concern that policymakers selected
neighborhoods for interstate routes based on characteristics unknown to me as the
researcher. For example, if tracts were chosen based on anticipated opposition or the
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political clout of local residents – and these characteristics are correlated with my
outcome variables – previous results may be biased.39
While I cannot completely rule out selection on unobservables, I use propensity
score matching (PSM) as added robustness.40 The PSM technique has several advan-
tages. First, it is a more flexible approach than OLS. Acemoglu (2005) best describes
the relationship between the two: “What distinguishes the OLS and matching strate-
gies is the way in which they control for [the] observables. OLS regression ... imposes
linearity, whereas the matching estimators allow for non-linear effects of observables.
With matching estimators, the parameters of interest are estimated conditional on
a set of observables, and then the average effect is obtained by averaging these con-
ditional parameter estimates. The advantage of this estimator is that it allows the
parameter of interest to depend flexibly on the characteristics used for matching.”
While PSM still requires that UIijt and εijt be orthogonal, it relaxes the linearity
assumption between covariates and parameters. Second, the PSM approach has an
intuitive appeal. As stated in Collins and Smith (2006), the “the idea is to compare
each ... census tract (‘treated’ observations) with tracts that had similar likelihoods
(based on their observable characteristics) of [receiving an interstate] but that ex post
did not (‘control’ observations) [and] its main goal is to narrow the scope for bias
by comparing treatment and control tracts that are observationally similar to one
another.”
Again I partition Detroit census tracts into interstate tracts (treated tracts) and
39If, say, political clout is negatively correlated with interstate location and, also, with subsequent
measures of percent Black, I may be overstating (in magnitude) the effect of interstates on percent
Black. If clout is negatively correlated with interstate location but positively correlated with housing
values, I may be understating the true effect.
40Previous literature relies on an instrumental variables (IV) approach to identify the causal
impact of the inter -city routes of the IHS. However, a case study framework poses unique challenges
for employing a suitable IV strategy. See Collins and Smith (2006) for an in-depth discussion on
finding a suitable IV for the race riots in Cleveland when examining within-city outcomes and a
section of my Appendix that discusses this issue in the context of my study.
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non-interstate tracts (control tracts). I then use a probit regression of a binary inter-
state variable on a vector of census tract characteristics predictive of the interstate
treatment. In this setting, the set of characteristics observable to highway officials and
policymakers when making decisions on interstate location – and that subsequently
matter for placement – include: log median property value in 1950, a pre-trend in
property value prior to 1950, distance from a census tract to the CBD, and the size
of the census tract, and a categorical variable for which county the census tract is
located in. The regression results in an estimate of the probability of being treated
known as the propensity score. I use this measure to match tracts and compare the
interstates’ average treatment effect (ATT) on outcome measures in 1970 and 1990.
Results are robust to using a PSM approach with few differences that I note
here. Table A.3 includes estimates of the interstate’s ATT with outcomes in Panel
A measured in 1970 and outcomes in Panel B measured in 1990. Columns (1),
(3), and (5) impose the common support restriction which omits observations whose
propensity score lies outside of the intersection of both the treatment and control
groups’ supports. This procedure may improve the quality of matches but may also
reduce the sample size and drop (potentially) high quality matches (Becker and Ichino,
2002). In columns (2), (4), and (6), I do not impose the common support restriction.
Bootstrapped standard errors are included in parentheses.
In the short run, I find a negative and significant interstate ATT on population
density and percent Black. Estimates are similar in magnitude to those in OLS,
though slightly larger for population density. While I find a negative ATT on short-
run housing values, I cannot reject that the effect is different from zero. In the long
run, I find consistent evidence that property values continued to decline in interstate
tracts relative to non-interstate tracts and the effects are indistinguishable from OLS
estimates. However, I find mixed evidence for the long run treatment effects on
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population density and percent Black. PSM results suggest that interstate tracts
remained less dense in the long run but did not necessarily differ statistically with
respect to percent Black. The ATT is larger in both cases than in OLS – albeit
only significant for population density – suggesting a bias towards zero using OLS.
In general, however, the results presented in Table A.3 offer reassurance of a true
negative interstate effect on Detroit neighborhoods in both the short and long run.
2.8 Conclusion
Segments of the US Interstate Highway System in Detroit “grafted massive chasms
into the city’s fabric” (Goodspeed, 2004). The politics of planning the urban routes
and weighing, ex ante, the consequences of their construction was a coordinated effort
in Detroit. The interstates promised to bring economic prosperity to the city. Yet
Detroiters expressed concerns over the urban routes – claiming they would create
noise and dirt while depressing property values (Mowitz and Wright, 1962). Fogelson
(2001) best recounts the realized effects of construction when he states, “the urban
interstates have polluted our air, ravaged the urban environment, and ruined its
parks and open spaces. They have worked to destroy viable minority low-income
neighborhoods and callously have evicted staggering numbers of residents and small
businessmen.”
In this paper, I outline the political economy of interstate placement within the
city of Detroit by distinguishing among motivating factors affecting route location. I
dig into the local history of Detroit and use observable characteristics at the census
tract level to determine that, on the margin, pre-interstate property values drove site
selection. While many perceived interstate placement to be an issue of race or slum
clearance, empirical evidence points to an overriding concern over costs. Neighbor-
hoods with low property values were chosen as suitable for interstate construction
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in order to minimize eminent domain costs and future losses to the city’s tax base.
Results suggest that when large scale infrastructure projects are built in urban areas,
there are strong financial incentives in place when making locational decisions.
After large scale construction of the interstates began in 1956, urban segments
received top priority in cities across the country. In Detroit, I show that construction
had otherwise negative effects on local outcomes – leading to short-run declines in
housing values, population density, and the percentage of Black residents. Effects
were particularly acute in neighborhoods closest to interstate construction. Results
indicate that displaced residents were disproportionately Black and that resettlement
took place within non-interstate tracts. Separately, I find that interstate construc-
tion led to depressed property values in the long run as housing values reflect the
disamenity value of living within close proximity of the roads. I find mixed evidence
that interstates affected average differences in population density and percent Black,
but there is evidence that tracts within close proximity did not fully recover along
either dimension by 1990.
My analysis not only contributes to the burgeoning literature on the US Inter-
state Highway System but engages a broader literature on the history of Detroit, the
role of politics in urban infrastructure placement, and the perceived effects of large
infrastructure on surrounding urban neighborhoods. Detroit’s transportation history
is a complex one and the interstate era is no different. While I quantify the effects
of interstate construction on neighborhood outcomes in Detroit, my contribution is
a partial equilibrium analysis. Examining the interstates’ general equilibrium effects
and how segments altered commuting costs within the city of Detroit – and elsewhere
– remains an important avenue for continued investigation.
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Figure 2·1: 1944 Plan of the US Interstate Highway System
Notes: The image depicts the plan for the US Interstate Highway System at the
national level as it appeared in 1944.
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Figure 2·2: Yellow Book Plan for Detroit
Notes: The thick black lines represent the “desire lines” that the Bureau of Bureau
of Public Roads designated for the city of Detroit in the 1955 Yellow Book. The
Yellow Book included plans at a similar level of detail for over 100 cities in 42 states.
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Log median property value in 1950
Notes: The figure is a binned scatterplot where 1950 log median property values
are grouped into 25 equal-sized bins. For each bin, the mean distance to the nearest
interstate in meters is computed (dots) and plotted against the line of best fit (thick
line). The figure shows a positive correlation between property values and distance
from the nearest interstate.
Figure 2·4: Construction of a 1950 Tract from 1990 Blocks
Notes: I calculate the geographic centroid of each census block in 1970 and 1990
and assign it to a 1950 census tract if the centroid falls within the boundaries of the
1950 tract. Here, all 1990 census blocks (grey polygons) are assigned to the 1950
census tract (thick outline).
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Figure 2·5: The City of Detroit and Interstate Location
(a) Constructed Routes (b) Constructed and Planned Routes
(c) Constructed and Simulated Routes
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Figure 2·6: Short-Run Effects of Urban Interstates on Neighborhood
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Notes: Each figure plots the results of a binned distance regression where census
tracts are placed into bins based on the distance between their centroid and the
nearest interstate open to traffic in 1970. The omitted category is the furthest bin –
census tracts greater than 2,500 meters away from an interstate – thus each estimate
should be interpreted relative to tracts furthest from an interstate (see Figure B·1
in the Appendix which drops the median-distance bin). Each regression controls
for differences in demographics, socioeconomic status, and housing characteristis in
1950 and is weighted by a census tract’s total population in 1950. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
Figure 2·7: Long-Run Effects of Urban Interstates on Neighborhood
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(c) Percent Black
Notes: Each figure plots the results of a binned distance regression where census
tracts are placed into bins based on the distance between their centroid and the
nearest interstate open to traffic in 1990. The omitted category is the furthest bin –
census tracts greater than 2,500 meters away from an interstate – thus each estimate
should be interpreted relative to tracts furthest from an interstate. (see Figure B·2
in the Appendix which drops the median-distance bin) Each regression controls
for differences in demographics, socioeconomic status, and housing characteristis in
1950 and is weighted by a census tract’s total population in 1950. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
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Table 2.1: Predicting Urban Interstate Location using 1950 Census Tract
Characteristics
Constructed Interstate Planned Simulated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log median -0.157*** -0.174*** -0.242*** 0.155 0.072
property value (0.058) (0.065) (0.077) (0.119) (0.109)
% No indoor 0.294 -0.345 -0.425 0.436 0.096
Plumbing (0.227) (0.507) (0.586) (0.636) (0.470)
% Black 0.121 0.058 0.033 0.058 -0.017
(0.081) (0.105) (0.130) (0.146) (0.114)
Observations 406 464 465 406 366 400 400
R-squared 0.169 0.148 0.149 0.170 0.185 0.068 0.097
1950 Characteristics No No No No Yes Yes Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable in each column reflects 1990-1950 differences. Inter-
state is an indicator for whether or not a census tract is bisected by an interstate
following the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. Columns (1), (3), and (5) control
for land area and county fixed effects only. Columns (2), (4), and (6) include ad-
ditional 1950 controls and are similar to those found in Collins and Shester (2013).
Census tract boundaries are fixed in 1950 delineations. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table 2.2: Effects of Urban Interstate Location on Neighborhood Outcomes
– Binary Treatment
Log Median Log Population Percent
Property Value Density Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1970 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.134* -0.133** -0.106***-0.100***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.038) (0.030) (0.006) (0.007)
N 315 315 318 318 240 240
R-squared 0.900 0.901 0.814 0.821 0.576 0.580
Panel A: 1990 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.161** -0.162** -0.076 -0.079 -0.025***-0.018***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.042) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000)
N 373 373 376 376 291 291
R-squared 0.713 0.713 0.522 0.530 0.537 0.542
1950 Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
% Change 1940-1950 No Yes No Yes No Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (2). Dependent variables
are measured in 1970 and 1990. Interstate is an indicator for whether or not a census
tract is bisected by an interstate following the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. 1950
pre-interstate characteristics include demographic and housing stock characteristics (see
text for a complete description). Pre-trend is simply the percent change in the dependent
variable between 1940 and 1950. Columns (1), (3), and (5) replicate baseline results for
the subset of tracts for which 1940 information is available. Details on the construction
of log median housing values from the census block level in 1970 and 1990 are outlined
in the Appendix. Each regression is weighted by a census tract’s total population in
1950. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table 2.3: Average Treatment Effects of Urban Interstate Location on
Neighborhood Outcomes – Results from a Propensity Score Analysis
Log Median Log Population Percent
Property Value Density Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1970 Outcomes
Interstate ATT -0.015 -0.020 -0.219** -0.214** -0.098* -0.095*
(0.045) (0.043) (0.085) (0.084) (0.053) (0.052)
N Treated 72 110 72 110 72 110
N Control 284 369 284 369 284 369
Panel B: 1990 Outcomes
Interstate ATT -0.155** -0.167** -0.155** -0.152** -0.051 -0.049
(0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.046) (0.046)
N Treated 97 142 97 142 97 142
N Control 284 369 284 369 284 369
Common Support Yes No Yes No Yes No
Note: Propensity scores are estimated on the following characteristics: log median
property value in 1950, a pre-trend in property value prior to 1950, distance from a
census tract to the CBD, and the size of the census tract, and a categorical variable
for which county the census tract is located in. Panel A displays results in 1970,
Panel B displays results for outcomes measured in 1990. Estimation in columns (1),
(3), and (5) imposes a common support assumption; estimation in columns (2), (4),
and (6) relaxes the common support assumption. Refer to Becker and Ichino (2002)




Financing Creativity: Crowdfunding in
British Fiction, 1790-1829
3.1 Introduction
New mechanisms for financing innovation directly from consumers have developed
rapidly in the past decade. Crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo
allow inventors, artists, and writers to raise funds by directly pitching to a large
number of small investors – bypassing traditional gatekeepers in the market. While
recent estimates from the World Bank project the global crowdfunding market to
reach $90-96 billion by 2025, crowdfunding’s effects on innovation, creativity, and,
ultimately, product quality remain ambiguous.1 On one hand, by lowering costs of
entry, crowdfunding may induce inventors, artists, and writers of low-quality to enter
a market who – without crowdfunding – would have been “weeded out.” On the
other hand, in the presence of uncertainty, traditional gatekeepers may systematically
underestimate demand. Then crowdfunding – by connecting creatives with future
consumers – allows for a direct assessment of expected demand prior to product
development and may ultimately improve outcomes. Despite the rapid growth of
crowdfunding as a financing mechanism, there is relatively little empirical research of
0This chapter is co-authored with Megan MacGarvie (National Bureau of Economic Research
and Boston University) and Petra Moser (National Bureau of Economic Research and New York
University).
1At the same time, the number of books self-published by authors has grown dramatically.
Reimers and Waldfogel (2015) find that the number of self-published books approximately tripled
in the decade after 2006, and now comprise the majority of published books.
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its effects on innovation, creativity, and product success.
In this paper, we ask whether alternative financing promotes innovation by im-
proving the identification of projects when demand is uncertain. We analyze data on
novels published between 1790 and 1830 in Britain, a context in which alternative
publishing mechanisms such as crowdfunding were relatively common. In contrast
to most studies using contemporary data, we observe projects funded by both tradi-
tional and non-traditional means, and we can measure the long-run success of creative
works.2
We study the uptake of crowdfunding during this period and whether or not crowd-
funded works are more (or less) successful relative to traditionally-published works.
First, we find that crowdfunding is more likely to be used in contexts with greater
demand uncertainty. During this period, both entrants and female authors have an
increased probability of crowdfunding their works. Next, we find that crowdfunded ti-
tles are, on average, associated with worse outcomes. Crowdfunded titles have fewer
subsequent editions, are less likely to be translated into a different language, and
appear in a smaller fraction of library catalogs than titles that are traditionally pub-
lished. However, in some cases, the use of crowdfunding is associated with improved
outcomes. Specifically, crowdfunded novels written for a female audience were more
successful – potentially connecting authors with growing female readership. Results
are robust to controlling for an author’s access to social networks, price and number
of advertisements for a particular title, and varying definitions of both crowdfunding
and demand uncertainty. Ultimately, our findings suggest that alternative financ-
2We use the term crowdfunding to describe what was at the time known as “publishing by
subscription,” in which authors would seek subscribers for an as yet unwritten work, who would
commit to buying the book once published, often putting up some money in advance. The title
of the project would be announced in the press, by circular, or by letters to likely subscribers.
Self-publishing is the modern analogue of what was known as “publishing on commission,” an
arrangement in which the author bore all the risk of the book’s production, and kept all the profits
minus a commission (usually 10%) paid to the publisher. Austen’s Sense and Sensibility was just
one of the books published in this manner.
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ing, specifically crowdfunding, may promote creativity by helping authors find an
audience.
3.2 Crowdfunding’s Historical Analogue: “Publishing by Sub-
scription”
Crowdfunding is not a new phenomenon: an analogue to this practice was estab-
lished in British publishing in the 18th and 19th centuries. During this period, books
were published “by subscription” and distributed to lists of subscribers that included
everyone from the nobility to members of the middle-class (hereafter, we use “crowd-
funding” and “subscription” publishing interchangeably). Some of the most notable
works of this period were published by subscription including the first illustrated edi-
tion of Milton’s Paradise Lost and Frances (Fanny) Burney’s Camilla, to name just
two.3
Authors publishing by subscription would seek subscribers for an unwritten work,
and these subscribers would commit to buying the book once published, often putting
up some money in advance.4 The title of the project would be announced in the press,
by circular, or by letters to potential subscribers (Bonham-Carter, 1978) (p. 27).
Figure 3·1 illustrates an ad soliciting subscribers taken out by Fanny Burney. This
was the first advertisement for Camilla that was printed in the Morning Chronicle. It
reads: “PROPOSALS for printing by Subscription a NEW WORK, in Four Volumes,
12 mo. By the AUTHOR of EVELINA and CECILIA: To be delivered on or before
the 1st day of July, 1796. The Subscriptions will be one Guinea; to be paid at the
3It was also possible for authors to publish their works “on commission,” an arrangement in which
the author bore all the risk of the book’s production, and kept all the profits minus a commission
(usually 10%) paid to the publisher. Austen’s Sense and Sensibility was just one of the books
published in this manner. For a detailed discussion, see Todd, ed (2005).
4We consider this to be the analog to present-day rewards-based crowdfunding which is where
individuals solicit varying degrees of financial commitment from “donors” in return for the product
or service. This differs from, say, equity-based crowdfunding where the crowdfunder(s) raise(s) funds
through the sale of securities where investors receive some sort of financial return.
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time of Subscribing.” Often, publishers would then use the subscription income to
fund the production of the book in exchange for a commission (Bonham-Carter, 1978)
(p. 26).5
Authors used subscription publishing for a number of reasons. First, publishing
via traditional means required an aspiring author to find a publisher willing to bear
the financial risk associated with publishing her work and this may not have been an
easy task (Downie, 2013) (p. 61). Publishers, however, may not have been willing
to bear the risk of buying copyrights of little-known authors due to increased un-
certainty about ultimate profitability. Separately, the certainty about demand for a
work provided by a subscription list allowed authors to bring to print titles that may
not otherwise have interested publishers. Subscription publishing may, then, have
facilitated entry by new and/or unknown authors. In fact, Stevens (1968) states that
through subscription publishing, “books were thus brought out that never would have
appeared under the ordinary conditions of popular sale” (p. 3).
Second, there were (potentially) large profits to be made publishing by subscrip-
tion. Established authors used subscription publishing as a way of circumventing
publishers who did not offer payments commensurate with authors’ expectations for
the success of the work. As Downie (2013) describes, subscription publishing “re-
mained an option for authors who wished to make as much money as possible” (p.
65). Alexander Pope earned a substantial sum publishing translations of Homer by
subscription in the early 18th century, and the success of this endeavor led Charles
Ford, a friend of Jonathan Swift, to observe to Swift in 1733, “All books are printed
here now by subscription” (Woolley, 1999-2007) (p. 698).
Finally, some authors turned to publishing by subscription out of more dire cir-
cumstances. As Downie (2013) point out, “there are numerous examples of authors,
5In other cases, the author was responsible for managing the production and distribution of the
book herself.
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particularly women, resorting to subscription publishing not as a means of squeezing
as much profit as possible...but simply in order to generate any income they could”
(p. 65). One example is Regina Maria Roche’s Contrast, published in 1828, whose
preface describes subscription publishing as a last resource. Another example is that
of Eliza Parsons – one of the most prolific authors of this period. Parsons was an
impoverished widow, left destitute with 8 children to support after the failure of her
husband’s business and his untimely death in 1797. Parsons crowdfunded her first
novel in 1790: The History of Miss Meredith. The preface describes her “trembling
anxiety” about publishing her work, which, nonetheless attracted an above-average
445 subscribers, and was the first of 19 total works written by Parsons before her
death in 1811.
The number of subscribers, and the composition of subscribers, varied from work
to work. Sir Samuel Egerton Leigh’s Munster Abbey garnered over 1,200 subscribers
while Anne Ker’s The Mysterious Count had only 28. In most cases, names of sub-
scribers would often be listed in the published work. Fanny Burney’s Camilla, pub-
lished in 1796, had more than 1,000 subscribers, and the list was akin to a “who’s
who” of English society during the period. Figure 3·2 shows the list of subscribers –
including the infamous Jane Austen. Subscribers included commoners, members of
the fmiddle class and present-day aristocrats in addition to members of the clergy,
military, and nobility.
3.2.1 The Case of Fanny Burney
Fanny Burney is, perhaps, the most well-known author publishing by subscription
during this period. Burney had achieved great success with her first novel, Evelina,
or The History of a Young Lady’s Entrance into the World, which was published
in 1778 when Burney was only 26 years old. The novel went through 4 editions in
its first year and elevated Burney to celebrity status. However, looking back on its
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publication, Burney is reported to have felt that she had thrown away the copyright
to Evelina for only twenty guineas (Gallagher, 2004) (p. 227). Subsequently, the
copyright to Burney’s second novel Cecilia, published in 1782, was sold by her father
to publishers Payne and Cadell for £250, without consulting her and while she was
away from home. Gallagher (2004) notes that “Dr. Burney had obviously not driven
a hard bargain...” and that Payne earned a profit of £500 in just the first four months
of sales of Cecilia (p. 250).
Burney felt that she had not received a fair share of the profits from both works.
Her father’s negotiations over Cecilia’s publication were lackluster. Gallagher (2004)
writes that Burney’s father “sacrificed his daughter’s individual financial interest
to what he probably saw as the family’s corporate good” and was “indifferent to
the cash value of his daughter’s copyright because he was not ambitious for her
financial independence” (p. 251). Gallagher surmises that Burney’s father sought
to use her authorship as a way to improve the family’s social status, rather than
as a profit-maximizing enterprise. Gallagher goes on to claim that Burney’s father
wanted Cecilia to be published simultaneously with his History of Music in 1781 to
take advantage of cross-promotional marketing opportunities (p. 232).
After her marriage in 1793, Burney was determined to receive a greater share of
the profits from her work. She wrote to a friend on June 15, 1795:
I have a long work, which a long time has been in hand, that I mean
to publish soon - in about a year. Should it succeed, like ’Evelina’ and
’Cecilia,’ it may be a little portion to our bambino. We wish, therefore,
to print it for ourselves in this hope; but...it is out of the question for us
to afford it. We have therefore been led by degrees to listen to counsel
of some friends, and to print it by subscription. This is in many, many
ways unpleasant and unpalatable to us both; but the real chance of real
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use and benefit to our little darling overcomes all scruples, and, therefore,
to work we go! Burney (1902) (p. 330)
Ultimately, Camilla was published by subscription, earning £2,000.6 Burney re-
ceived £1,000 from the subscriptions, and later sold the copyright for £1,000 to Payne,
Cadell, and Davies (Pink, 2006).7 With the proceeds, she and her husband built a
house they called “Camilla Cottage.”
Burney’s success left her with significant bargaining power. The copyright of her
next novel, The Wanderer, was sold to Longman and ultimately published in 1814.
Burney had asked her brother Charles to present it to multiple publishers with the
instruction that “one or two a day, & one after another, will certainly incur an idea
that the work is under examination, or has been, & is offered about in Succession”
(Bloom and Bloom, eds, 1978) (p. 105-107). Burney left open the possibility of
subscription publishing if she did not obtain a satisfactory offer for the title. In this
sense, Burney’s shrewd use of subscription publishing, and the ultimate success of her
novels, left her with significant bargaining power with publishers. Had it not been
for subscription publishing, however, Burney’s career may not have left such a lasting
literary impression.
3.3 Prior Literature
It is very difficult to predict which cultural products (books, movies, music) will be
profitable. According to Aguiar and Waldfogel, with lower costs of product introduc-
6According to Clery et al., eds (2002), in publishing Camilla by subscription Burney “managed
to overcome her scruples about the unwelcome amount of exposure that subscription publishing was
likely to bring her, citing her supporters (including Edmund Burke) as the instigators of the plan
and ensuring that her book-keepers...were women of impeccable morals and high social standing”
(p. 123). Separately, Pink (2006) argues that Burney was only able to earn a meaningful amount
from subscription publishing of Camilla because of the reputation derived from her prior literary
successes (p. 52).
7Cadell was also approached by Austen but declined to publish her work. Austen’s niece Caroline
later wrote that “Cadell was a great man in his day, and it is not surprising that he should have
refused the favor so offered from an unknown” (Sutherland, 2013) (p. 185).
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tion, “society in effect can take more draws from an urn of potential new products.”
(p. 493) If profitability is perfectly predictable, then lowering entry costs is like
adding shelf space: we see entry by the marginal (lower-profit) products. In the pa-
per’s model, when demand is perfectly predictable, products are ranked by quality
and enter in order from highest to lowest revenue. The last product to enter has zero
profits, and thus the cost of entry is equal to the last product’s revenue. Lowering
entry costs will result in marginal firm entry – in other words, firms with lower rev-
enue than the prior last entrant. This will result in a decline in average quality in the
market as a whole.
When demand is totally unpredictable, there is no rank ordering of revenue, since
all products have the same expected revenue, equal to total revenue divided by the
number of products entering. If entry costs are lowered and the number of products
expands, we can expect entering products to have the same average revenue as prior
entrants. That is, lowering entry costs leads to entry by products from the full
distribution of revenue, not just lower-revenue products. This means that lower entry
costs increase variety without reducing average quality in the market. This is precisely
what we find with regard to crowdfunded titles with greater demand uncertainty.
Aguiar and Waldfogel (2016) study popular music, a market in which the internet
has reduced the cost of distribution and increased the number of available products.
There is now a “long tail” in consumption which means that consumers can access
many different types of niche products, rather than just the most popular ones. Aguiar
and Waldfogel (2016) argue this consumption effect alone will lead to modest increases
in welfare, because of the substitutability of products. However, estimated welfare
benefits of cost reductions that lead to greater availability may be larger when one
factors in the unpredictability of product quality at the time of investment (the “long
tail in production”).
141
Strausz (2017) introduces a model which shows that crowdfunding increases wel-
fare by reducing demand uncertainty. Strausz focuses on reward-based crowdfunding
in which the fundraiser promises to develop a good in return for up-front commit-
ments from purchasers/investors, and argues that this form of fundraising can be
more efficient than traditional financing because it allows the fundraiser to obtain
information directly from consumers about whether demand is sufficient to warrant
the fixed costs of the project.8
Strausz (2017) also considers the relationship between demand predictability and
welfare from new product entry. In Strausz’s model, perfect predictability of demand
implies that an entrepreneur will invest in a new product when demand covers the cost
of production. With demand uncertainty, investments are made based on expected
demand, which can lead to either over or underinvestment and lower surplus. Crowd-
funding increases surplus in the context of demand uncertainty by making investment
conditional on observing demand above the cost of production. We combine the in-
sights of Strausz with those of Aguiar and Waldfogel (2016) in the model described
in the next section.
Other related research has focused on the role of gender and innovation financing.
Ewens and Townsend (2020) finds evidence consistent with gender bias in venture cap-
ital investing, with male investors expressing less interest in female entrepreneurs than
observably similar male entrepreneurs (while female venture capitalists express more
interest). Gompers and Wang (2017) find that VC funds with more female investors
have better deal and fund performance. Hebert (2020) shows that female-founded
start-ups are 25-35% less likely to raise external equity, but in female-dominated
sectors, female-founded start-ups are equally likely to raise financing.
Given this bias, emerging literature looks at the role of crowdfunding in enabling
8Strausz (2017) emphasizes two features of reward-based crowdfunding which solve moral hazard
problems: deferred payment and limiting the entrepreneur’s access to information about the size of
payments.
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access to capital for women entrepreneurs. Gorbatai and Nelson (2018) find that
women are more successful at raising money through crowdfunding, possibly because
they write better pitches. McGuire (2019) finds that a liberalization of the regulations
on crowdfunding led to an increase in female entrepreneurship.
3.4 A Simple Model of Crowdfunding
In this section we introduce a simple model that yields conditions under which authors
choose to crowdfund their works
Assume that, if published, a book’s profitability is uncertain. There are two possi-
ble levels of revenue for a book, RH (high)=1 and RL(low)=0. The author estimates
that the book will earn high profits with probability pa and the publisher estimates
that the book will earn high profits with probability pp. Assume the publisher’s esti-
mate of the book’s profitability pa is a fraction of the author’s estimate, denoted γ,
so that pp = γpa.
If they sign a profit-sharing contract with the author, publishers earn πp. In this
setting, δ is the share of share of profits shared with the author. During the period,
publishers offered “half-profits” schemes to authors, and while it is unlikely that
authors truly earned 50% of profits, let us for the sake of simplicity assume δ=0.5.
The publisher’s costs are Cp< 1. An authors expected profits from crowdfunding are:
πa = pa(1− Ca) (3.1)
Where Ca may include the additional cost, or disutility, of self-publishing. Assume





Authors will prefer crowdfunding if expected profits from crowdfunding are greater
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than expected profits from publishing with a firm:












(2Ca + γ − 2)
(3.5)
Figure 3·3 displays the conditions under which the author will thus prefer crowd-
funding, all else equal. Crowdfunding is preferred when the publisher’s estimate of
the book’s probability of success is low relative to the authors estimate (γ is low).
Authors will also prefer crowdfunding when pa is low (the author’s expected profits
are low), unless γ is also low. When both γ and pa are high, authors will prefer to
contract with a publisher.
When will γ be small? When there is disagreement between the author and the
publisher about the title’s expected profitability. This could either be because the
author is over-confident or because the author’s expectations are accurate but he or
she is inexperienced (with no track record of success). In both cases, the publisher
may potentially underestimate quality. There may also be disagreement if the title
is in an unproven new genre which publishers have not yet recognized as a profitable
opportunity, leading publishers to potentially, again, underestimate quality.
For a given γ and pa, authors will prefer crowdfunding when Ca is small (the
author has a low cost – including disutility – of crowdfunding). For example, we may
think of authors in desperate financial situations as having a low Ca because they
have no other choice but to crowdfund. Figure 3·4 illustrates how lower costs to the
author change the space, and ultimately the choice, of crowdfunding for authors.
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3.5 Data
We compile a comprehensive dataset on over 2,350 fiction novels published in Great
Britain between 1790 and 1829.9 Our main source is the online database British
Fiction 1800-1829: A Database of Production, Circulation, & Reception (hereafter
British Fiction data) which includes detailed information for 2,272 published works.10
We both supplement and extend the British Fiction data in the following ways. First,
we supplement the existing British Fiction data with a dataset of works published
by subscription from Garside (2004).11 This dataset contains 102 works published
by subscription between 1780 and 1829, 70 of which already appear in the British
Fiction data, 32 of which are titles that we append to our existing data. Second, we
extend the British Fiction data by digitizing entries from 1790 through 1799 from
The English Novel, 1770-1829: A Bibliographical Survey of Prose Fiction Published
in the British Isles, Volume I. Since more than 30% of the subscription works were
published prior to 1800, appending titles published before 1800 allows us to fully
exploit the richness of this dataset.
3.5.1 Identifying Crowdfunded Works and Their Characteristics
To study how crowdfunding, or subscription publishing, affects outcomes, we first
separate titles into two groups: (a) those published through traditional or conven-
9According to St.Clair (2004), “about 3,000 new prose fiction titles [were] known to have been
published between 1790 and 1830, with many reprints both of new and of older titles” (p. 173) so
our dataset covers nearly the universe of prose fiction published during this period.
10Much of the information available through the British Fiction database are digitized records
of Volume II of Garside et al., eds (2000) which is a two-volume bibliography The English Novel,
1770-1829: A Bibliographical Survey of Prose Fiction Published in the British Isles (ed. Peter
Garside, James Raven, Rainer Schwerling). The full database can be accessed at http://www.
british-fiction.cf.ac.uk. Volume I was not digitized but is available in print form.
11This dataset includes detailed information on the total number of subscriptions and the number
of additional copies printed of each work (if any). For a subset of the subscription titles, we have
information on the gender composition of subscribers, their location, and their occupation (i.e.
royalty, clergy, military).
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tional publishing and (b) those published by subscription.12 We describe the specific
process of identifying publishing methods below. To identify subscription-published
titles, we rely on the comprehensive list available from Garside (2004). It is important
to note, however, that Garside’s list of subscription titles reflects works for which the
original list of subscribers’ names could be identified. For reasons not completely
known, perhaps at the request of the subscribers themselves or due to the author’s
preferences, a complete list of names may not appear in the printed title, even if the
work was published by subscription.13 We supplement Garside’s list of subscription-
published works by manually identifying additional titles with detailed notes in the
British Fiction data that include information on the number of subscribers and/or
subscriber names. In total, we classify 118 subscription-published titles in our data.
Texts that were not published by subscription were published traditionally. Tra-
ditional channels were the most common methods of publishing in Britain during the
18th and 19th centuries and included lump-sum contracts – where authors sold the
copyright directly to a publisher – and profit-sharing agreements where both author
and publisher received a fraction of a title’s total profits. Authors who published un-
der lump-sum contracts or profit-sharing agreements are considered to have utilized
traditional financing mechanisms of this era.14
12We can also identify self-published works which may be considered a form of crowdfunding where
the crowd is exactly one (the author) but these novels are not included in this analysis.
13Consider Eliza Frances Robinson’s Destiny published by subscription in 1804. After the title
page, the following note appears: “The Author presents most respectful Thanks to those Ladies and
Gentlemen who did her the Honor of subscribing for this Work; but being few in number, and some,
from a Wish to conceal their Benevolence, having forbid their Names to appear, a List of Subscribers
is omitted.”





We collect information on the number of further editions from our three main data
sources. We partition each title’s further editions into the following variables: total
subsequent British (or domestic) editions, total subsequent American editions, and
total subsequent Irish/Scottish editions. American and Irish/Scottish editions were
identified based on the city noted in the text. We take the maximum of editions listed
to determine the total number of subsequent editions. For example: “2nd edn 1815
(Corvey), CME 3-628-48617-3; 3rd edn 1815 (NSTC); 4th edn 1817 (NSTC); 6th edn
1820 (NSTC).” We identify this title as having a total of 5 subsequent British (or
domestic) editions. We consider “reissues,” “revisions,” “abridgements” in years that
are different from the original publication year as subsequent editions. The number
of subsequent editions ranges from 0 to 26 with a mean of 0.87 subsequent editions.
Translated
The translation of a novel represents success outside of a title’s initial intended au-
dience and, perhaps, the pervasiveness of its success. Additional translations are not
included in the subsequent edition count. Instead, we create a dummy variable equal
to 1 if a title has been translated into another language. For example, in the British
Fiction data, a German translation of Amelia Opie’s novel Simple Tales published in
1806 appears as “German trans., 1819 [as Kleine Romane und Erzählungen (RS)].”
Percentage of Possible Libraries
We also collect systematic data on the size of library holdings for circulating libraries
from the British Fiction database. Circulating libraries and wealthy individuals were
the primary consumers of novels. St.Clair (2004) explains that roughly half of all
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first editions of Jane Austen’s novels were sold to “members of the titled classes and
gentry...the others probably going to circulating libraries” (p. 245).
Data on catalog holdings are available for a total of 24 libraries between 1800
and 1829, including 19 circulating libraries (for-profit libraries that charged fees for
borrowing books), and 5 subscription libraries (associations of upper class males that
allowed members to borrow books for free or at a reduced rate in exchange for a flat
fee, (Garside, 2004)). Catalog data are available in specific years (e.g. the catalog of
Kinnear’s Circulating Library of Edinburgh is available in 1808, 1814, 1819, 1823, and
1825, while J. Brown’s Circulating Library, Wigan, is only available in 1821). For the
construction of this variable, we compute the percentage of possible library catalog
in which the title is listed – that is, catalogs that could list the title given its date of
publication and the year of the catalog. It should be noted that this measure is very
incomplete, since St.Clair (2004) estimates that there were roughly 1,000 circulating
libraries in Britain in 1801, and 1,500 in 1821. We use this as one measure of a title’s
success.
Textual Novelty
We have complete text files for almost 1,500 titles in our dataset. While novelty and
innovation are ultimately subjective, we use the full texts for this subset of titles
to develop a quantitative measure to proxy for textual novelty. We calculate the
distance of each text to other texts published in prior years, and the distance to
texts published in subsequent years. We interpret the ratio of these two numbers
(distance to prior)/(distance to subsequent) as a measure of novelty. In other words,
we expect that more “novel” texts are further from texts that precede it and may
or may not be closer to subsequent titles – depending on how other authors mimic
the “novel” text. We interpret this as a measure of influence or being ahead of one’s
time (the numerator) while also reflecting the idea that once a novel book becomes a
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success, it may induce others to publish subsequent texts that are similar to it (the
denominator).15
3.5.3 Classifying Female-Focused Titles
According to St.Clair (2004), “a broad division can be seen between domestic novels
of the kind written by ’a Lady’ most notably of the kind written by Austen, seen as
predominantly a women’s genre, and historical romances of the kind popularlised by
’the Author of Waverley’, which were rightly assumed to have been mainly written
by men” (p. 220). We identify female-focused titles based on genre, the gender of
the protagonist, and the frequency of female pronouns in the text.
Genres
Courtship novels published between 1740 and 1820 are listed in Greene (1991). Ac-
cording to Greene, the distinguishing features of courtship novels were that “women,
no longer merely unwilling victims, became heroines with significant, though modest,
prerogatives of choice and action. [...] More often than not, however, a courtship
novel began with the heroine’s coming out and ended with her wedding. It detailed
a young woman’s entrance into society, the problems arising from that situation, her
courtship, and finally her choice (almost always fortunate) among suitors” (p. 2).
Any title after 1824 (the last year of the publication contained in Greene’s chronolog-
ical list), is coded as missing which includes titles published between 1825 and 1829.
The chronological list contains 49 titles; of those, we were able to match 15 titles to
our dataset.
We use Adburgham (2012) to identify titles in the silver fork genre. Critical
to this genre was particular detail paid to fashionable living. In her introduction,
15This process is similar to what is done when measuring “innovation” in the patent literature.
See Kelly et al. (2018) as an example.
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Adburgham describes titles in the silver fork genre in the introduction to her work
Silver Fork Society: Fashionable Life and Literature from 1814 to 1840 :
Novels were a valuable source of information about everything they wanted
to know [...] in what London square it was stylish to rent a house for the
Season, and when exactly the Season started; what shops and suppliers
to patrionise; at what time of day it was elegant to drive in the park,
to make calls, to dine, to arrive at the Opera and to leave the Opera.
The novels were handbooks to the language of the beau monde, to the
etiquette of chaperonage, to permissible and impermissible flirtations, to
extra-marital affairs, to all modish attitudes and affections [...] and there
was an ever increasing readership composed of middle-class subscribers to
circulating libraries in all parts of the country.
We hand collect data manually and match titles to our data based on author
name, title, and date of publication. Titles in Adburgham (2012) span the years 1814
- 1842, so titles in our dataset published outside of this range cannot be classified as
either silver fork or not. In total, there are 100 titles in Adburgham (2012) of which
18 can be matched to our data.
Information on domestic novels comes from Howard (2007). The defining features
of the domestic novel include “a unique emphasis upon sisterly relationships, and the
empowering potential for women of the religious, domestic life. This Moral-Domestic
fiction also facilitated an authoritative, educating voice for the female novelist” (p.
1-2). Titles from Howard (2007) span the years 1820 - 1829 and we identify a total
of 115 titles in our dataset that fit into the domestic genre.
We consider courtship, silver fork, and domestic novels to be “female-oriented”
or, perhaps more specifically, written with a female audience in mind.16 Trends in
16We classify novels into other genres that were prevalent during the Romantic period. In our
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writing change over time, as do genres. Figure 3·5 compares the female-oriented texts
as defined in this section with two other genres that were prevalent during this period:
gothic and historical. Between 1800-1809, a vast number of texts were published in the
gothic genre. The number of gothic peaks between 1805-1809 before experiencing a
sharp drop-off through 1829. The number of historical novels are relatively unchanged
over time, increasingly slightly after 1820. However, the trend in female-oriented titles
follows a different pattern. During the beginning of the period, between 1800 and
1809, there were less than 5 titles published in this genre. However, the frequency of
titles published in female-focused genres increases, with a slight dip between 1819-
1819, to reach a peak in 1820-1829. We validate this trend with a subsequent measure
– the she/he ratio – to ensure we are capturing the targeted audience of the novels
published in the courtship, silver fork, and domestic genres before, ultimately, linking
these measures to alternative financing and a text’s overall success.
Female Protagonist
One may expect novels written for a female-oriented audience to also have a female
protagonist. We use this as a second measure to capture the audience for which any
given title is written. The gender of the main character of the novel was assigned
by a doctoral student in English literature at Boston University. Information on the
gender of the protagonist was based on descriptions of the titles in books and articles;
or in some cases an inspection of the text itself. The doctoral student also used this
method to identify genres for 377 titles whose genres could not be identified from
the lists of books found in the literary scholarship which we used to define genre (as
described above).
analysis, we compare female-focused titles to works in two other genres: gothic and historical. We use
Levy (1995) and Potter (2005) to classify gothic titles and, separately, we use Schowerling (1989) to
classify historical titles. Other genres prevalent during this period included epistolary, anti-jacobian,
didactic/evangelical, national-tale, and oriental.
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She/He Ratio
We calculate the she/he ratio, which is the number of occurrences of the word “she”
divided by the number of occurrences of the word “he” in each of the sample titles. A
related approach has been used by Twenge et al. (2012), who analyze texts to provide
a measure of the status of women in the US between 1900 and 1945. While we use
the she/he ratio in our regression analysis, Figure 3·6 instead plots the mean shares
of “she” and “he” over time. Each share is defined as the frequency of “she” (or “he”)
divided by the frequency of “the” in a text. We may expect titles written for women,
with a female protagonist or even with a couple as protagonists to have a higher
mean “she” share than titles popular among men or with a male protagonist.
In the time series, the mean share of “he” remains roughly stable between 1795
and 1829. However, interestingly, there is a clear rise in the mean “she” share during
this same period. The mean share of “she” increases from less than 0.05 in 1795 to 0.2
in both 1813 and 1815. The trend in Figure 3·6 coincides with the evolution of genres
during this period as shown in Figure 3·5. In subsequent sections, we examine whether
a title’s characteristics – measured jointly by its genre, protagonist, and she/he ratio –
predict crowdfunding uptake and whether or not these same characteristics influence
a text’s overall success.
Titles that are in the courtship, silver fork, or domestic genres and have a female
protagonist are classified as female-focused. Titles with missing values on both of
these variables but with a she/he ratio greater than 1 are also classified as female-
focused. This describes 365 of the 2,053 titles in our dataset.
3.5.4 Control Variables
We control for a number of factors, including female gender of the author. Table 3.1
shows that while 52% of conventionally-published titles were female, 70% of crowd-
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funded titles were female. Similarly, 23% of conventionally-published titles are by
first-time authors, while 49% of crowdfunded titles are published by entrants. We
include a dummy equal to 1 if the title is published by an entrant, a measure of the
uncertainty over the expected success of the novel. The words “by the author of”
printed on the title page indicate that the author of the title had previously success-
fully published at least one other work, suggesting there may be less uncertainty over
the current title. Among conventionally published titles, 42% list “by the author of,”
while this is true of only 20% of crowdfunded titles (Table 3.1). Other measures of
uncertainty include whether the author was anonymous at the time of publication
(true of 18% of conventional titles and 12% of crowdfunded books), and whether a
pseudonym was used (4% of conventional titles and 0% of crowdfunded).
Research suggests that circulating libraries preferred editions that were split into
two or more volumes because they could charge readers separately for each volume
of a book (Feather, 2002; Gaskell, 2007). With this in mind, we control for a title’s
number of volumes. We also include a dummy for whether or not the work was printed
in London – the major publishing center of this period. Decade fixed effects control for
changes in tastes and publishing practices over time. In all of our regressions, standard
errors are clustered by author to account for correlation between observations of titles
by the same author.
3.6 Results
Guided by theory, we study determinants of crowdfunding and, subsequently, relative
success of crowdfunded titles relative to traditionally published works. Consistent
with theoretical predictions, we find that both entrants and female authors are more
likely to crowdfund their works but we do not find that characteristics of the title itself
predict an increase in the probability of being crowdfunded. Separately, we find that
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crowdfunded works are, on average, less successful than their traditionally-published
counterparts except for crowdfunded titles written for a female-oriented audience.
Crowdfunded titles written for female audiences are more successful along multiple
dimensions, consistent with demand in excess of expectations for these works.
3.6.1 Predictors of Crowdfunding
Using observable characteristics at the book level, we first test theoretical implications
under which an author will choose to crowdfund. Our empirical analysis also provides
insight into how crowdfunded titles may differ from those traditionally published.
Recall that an author prefers crowdfunding when the publisher’s relative estimate
of the book’s probability of success is low (small γ). We focus on two cases under
which publishers may disagree on a book’s future success or, more specifically, when
publishers may systematically underestimate a book’s expected profitability. In case
one, publishers may disagree with the authors expectation of a book’s success if the
author is inexperienced and has no track record of success. To test this empirically
using book-level data, we examine characteristics of the author publishing each title.
We look at whether or not titles published by anonymous authors (or psuedanony-
mous authors), authors who are entrants, and female authors are more likely to be
published through crowdfunding. In case two, publishers disagree with authors on the
expectation of a book’s success if the title is written in an emerging genre or, similarly,
for an emerging audience. In this case, publishers may underestimate profitability of
the title. To test this empirically, we focus on characteristics of the title. We examine
whether titles published in emerging, female-oriented genres or more novel texts have
an increased probability of being crowdfunded.
Both entrants and female authors are more likely to crowdfund their works. Using
a linear probability model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if
the title was crowdfunded, we report results in Table 3.2. All regressions include
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decade fixed effects to absolve any common shocks affecting all books published dur-
ing a given decade. Compared with experienced counterparts, entrants publishing
their first work are between 4 and 10 percentage points more likely to crowdfund,
depending on the specification. Similarly, female authors are between 4 and 7 per-
centage points more likely to crowdfund, on average, when compared to male authors.
In column (2), we interact female author with the “by the author” variable to cap-
ture whether or not female authors who had previously published were less likely to
crowdfund. We do find this to be the case: female writers who were not entrants
and had otherwise noted that they had been the “author of” a previously-published
title were less likely to crowdfund their work. Relative to both experienced and male
authors, entrants and female writers may have faced significant barriers to publishing
from traditional gatekeepers in the publishing industry. New authors, or entrants,
had no track record of previous success with publishers. Relatedly, female authors
were relatively new to the publishing industry during this period. Thus, there was
a greater degree of uncertainty surrounding the potential success for both entrants
and women. Traditional gatekeepers, or publishing houses, may have systematically
underestimated the demand for works written by both.
Did characteristics of the novel itself influence whether or not the work was crowd-
funded? We do not find evidence that more innovative texts or texts published in
emerging genres for a female audience had a significant increased probability of being
crowdfunded. In column (3), the coefficient on the novelty variable, which captures
the distance between any single texts and previously-published texts, is negative but
insignificant. In column (4) and (5), we account for a title’s targeted audience. In
column (4), we include the female audience dummy which captures whether or not a
title was written for a female audience based on its genre, protagonist, and he/she ra-
tio and, when doing so, the coefficient is almost precisely zero. In column (5), we add
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additional covariates to control for whether or not a title was written in the historical
or gothic genre. Historical novels are slightly more likely to be crowdfunded, but the
coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent level. Again, we find no evidence that
emerging female novels are more likely to be crowdfunded.
These results point to the importance of the author’s characteristics, and not
necessarily the features of the text itself, in predicting crowdfunding. This may shed
light on the source of information publishers used when evaluating not only which
titles to publish but which authors to contract with.
3.6.2 Crowdfunding and Success Measures
In this section, we study the success of crowdfunded titles compared to those tra-
ditionally published. Ex ante, it is unclear whether or not we may expect there to
be a difference in short- and/or long-run success measures for a title based on its
publishing mechanism. If crowdfunding brings superstars to the market that would
have otherwise, or were otherwise blocked by traditional gatekeepers, then we may
expect crowdfunded works to be more successful, on average. However, by lowering
the author’s cost of entry, crowdfunding may make it easier for authors to publish
works of lesser quality. In this case, we may expect crowdfunded titles to be less
successful relative to their traditionally-published counterparts.
In general, titles with higher demand uncertainty are less likely to be success-
ful across all measures.17 Titles by entrants and those published anonymously (or
psuedanonymously) are less likely to be successful, on average with fewer editions
(column 2) and less translations (column 3). Moreover, entry titles are circulated in
10% fewer libraries and anonymous titles are circulated in 16% fewer libraries. We do
17One might wonder whether our measures of success are correlated with a book’s total profits,
or total revenues, generated. In Table C.1 we show that for a sample of 208 titles, revenues are
positively correlated with all success measures. Revenue information is pulled from publisher data
in MacGarvie and Moser (2015).
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not find any significant relationship between entry titles and novelty. Interestingly,
we find differences in the relationship between these titles (entry, anonymous, and
pseudanonymous titles) and measures of novelty. Entry titles are neither more – nor
less – novel than titles published by experienced authors and the same is true of pseu-
danonymous titles. Purely anonymous titles – or those titles published anonymously
for whom the author still remains anonymous – are slightly less novel relative to titles
published by identified authors.
In the previous section, we show that titles with high demand uncertainty are
more likely to be crowdfunded, and Table 3.3 shows that crowdfunded works are
less successful across almost all success measures. Using a simple OLS approach,
we report our estimates of success in Table 3.3. Each column is a different success
measure as outlined in the previous section including: the number of subsequent
editions (columns 1 and 2), whether or not the title was translated into a different
language (columns 3 and 4), the percentage of libraries purchasing the title (columns
5 and 6), and the Euclidean distance-based measure of textual novelty (column 7 and
8).18 Odd columns include a crowdfunding dummy along with decade, volume, and
London fixed effects while even columns add additional observable characteristics at
both the book and author level. Crowdfunded titles have less subsequent editions,
are less likely to be translated into a different language, and have a smaller share of
libraries circulating their titles (columns 1, 3, and 5). These relationships are robust
to including additional book and author characteristics (columns 2, 4, 6). We find a
slight negative relationship between crowdfunded titles and novelty but this effect is
not statistically robust.
While crowdfunded titles in general were less successful, certain crowdfunded titles
were more successful than their traditionally-published counterparts. In the even-
18Results using subsequent editions as the outcome variable in column 1 are from a Poisson
regression due to the count nature of the dependent variable.
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numbered columns in Table 3.3, we interact our crowdfunded dummy with a dummy
for whether or not a title was published for a female-oriented audience (“female-
focused”). The coefficient on this interaction term is both positive and statistically
significant in almost all specifications.
Crowdfunded titles published for a female-focused audience are more successful
than traditionally-published titles targeting the same audience. Specifically, crowd-
funded titles published for women have (roughly) 85% more subsequent editions (col-
umn 2), are over 24 percentage points more likely to be translated (column 4), and
are 4% more novel. Interestingly, we do not find that these titles are circulated in
a higher percentage of libraries. This result is interesting in that it may shed light
on circulation libraries, at the time, as being an additional gatekeeper that may have
been unable to accurately predict the success of these titles. If they were able to do
so, we may have expected a significant positive relationship between these titles and
the libraries circulating them. In general, these results point to crowdfunding as a
particular mechanism that brought female-focused titles to market in a way that made
these titles more successful than the same type of titles published through traditional
publishing houses at the time.
3.6.3 Measuring Long-Run Impact
There are significant benefits to using historical data – one being the ability to study
outcomes over the very long run. In our setting, we are interested not just in the short-
run success of each title but also in the long-run impact of both authors and their
works. In this section, we ask whether authors publishing works using crowdfunding
have had a differential long-run impact on the literary world. To do this, we match our
existing dataset to dictionaries that document the biographies and works of influential
literary figures throughout history. In particular, we ask whether authors published
during this period appear in either the Dictionary of Literary Biography (DLB) or
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the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB).19
Authors who crowdfund are significantly less likely to appear in the DLB or
ODNB, unless they are publishing books for women. Results from a linear probabil-
ity model at the author level appear in Table 3.4 and tell a similar story to those in
Table 3.3. Authors who crowdfund are over 14 percentage points less likely to appear
in the DLB/ODNB and, separately, authors publishing in female-focused genres – via
traditional publishing – are up to 11 percentage points less likely. However, authors
publishing titles for women using crowdfunding (see the coefficient on “crowdfunded
x female-focused”) are significantly more likely to appear in the DLB/ODNB. Results
in Table 3.4 indicate that there is a unique synergy between authors who choose to
crowdfund their works that are written for a female audience. Results suggest that
crowdfunding may help writers find an audience when demand is uncertain.
3.7 Robustness
Our results are robust to controlling for an author’s access to social networks, the
price and number of advertisements for a particular title, and varying definitions of
demand uncertainty.
3.7.1 Crowdfunding and Social Networks
One alternative explanation for our results could be differences in social networks. For
example, perhaps female-focused titles were written by authors who had larger social
networks or were acquainted with wealthier people, and this made crowdfunding more
lucrative than contracting with a publisher. If this were the case, we could expect that
a larger share of high-quality female-focused titles would be crowdfunded, compared
19The Dictionary of Literary Biography is published by Gale and is a 375-volume set dedicated
to covering the biographies and works of influential writers in American and British literature. The
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography has been published since 1885 and is dedicated to covering
influential figures in British history, including writers.
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to titles that were not specifically targeted towards women. To account for this
possibility, we introduce a control for the number of subscribers.
The data from Garside (2004) includes rich information on the crowdfunded, or
subscription-published, works in our dataset. In addition to documenting the total
number of subscribers for each title, Garside also includes information on the gender,
location, and social composition of a title’s subscribers. To proxy for an author’s
access to wealthy social networks, we introduce a new control in our regressions that
is available for both traditionally-published and crowdfunded titles. This measure is
a dummy for whether a title was dedicated to a member of the nobility. This should
proxy for any sort of special kinship between the author and a member of a high
ranking class. Figure 3·7 provides an example of a dedication page where the work is
dedicated to “His Royal Highness, The Prince Regent.” For titles in our dataset for
which this information is available, 12% of traditionally published titles are dedicated
to nobility while over 26% of crowdfunded titles are.
Our results are robust to controlling for this measure as outlined in Table C.2.
When accounting for both dedication to nobility, titles that are both crowdfunded
and written for women are still among the most successful titles across a majority
of outcome measures. Crowdfunded titles for women are published in more editions,
are more likely to be translated, and are more novel. Interestingly, the coefficient on
the nobility dummy is not significant, indicating that the dedication of any particular
work to nobility has no significant impact on the title’s success.
3.7.2 Advertising and Price
To what extent did the price of each novel and its overall advertising affect its suc-
cess? We might expect publishing houses during this period to invest more heavily
in advertising, driving both price and success measures. Moreover, for titles that
were crowdfunded, publishing houses “did nothing to promote them, and may even
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have actively sabotaged their sales” (St.Clair, 2004) (p. 168). St. Clair describes
the publisher’s view on titles that were not published through traditional means:
“The publisher had little financial interest either way, whether the book sold well or
not...and there was no need for them to be promoted or sold, let alone read” (p. 167).
In other words, publishers not only advertised for their traditionally-published works
but, through informal means, may have actively discouraged the sales and success
of crowdfunded titles. Still on the other hand, if crowdfunding is unique in con-
necting authors with untapped markets, advertising may play a very little role since
crowdfunded works have a unique advantage of identifying a new source of demand.
To account for differences in both advertising and price, we introduce the following
measures as controls in a new set of regressions. First, we include dummies for whether
or not we observe the price and, separately, whether or not we observe a record of
a title’s advertising history. We also introduce a continuous variable controlling for
the book’s initial price in shillings and, second, a count variable controlling for the
number of ads for a particular title.
Original results are robust to controlling for each of these measures and can be
found in Table C.3. Crowdfunded women’s novels are still disproportionately more
successful. We also find that advertising matters significantly for the success of any
work, crowdfunded or not. Titles with no advertising have fewer editions, are less
likely to be translated, and have a smaller share of libraries circulating them. More-
over, investment into the number of ads matters for success. Additional advertising
is associated with more subsequent editions, increased likelihood of being translated,
more circulation among libraries, and even slightly increased novelty measures. While
advertising matters, we learn that it is not simply difference in investment into ad-
vertising that is driving the results of crowdfunded female titles.
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3.7.3 Self-Publishing and Anonymous Authors
In this section, we explore whether results are sensitive to the definition of crowdfund-
ing. We consider the case of self-publishing which, in some sense, can be considered
equivalent to crowdfunding where there is exactly one funder: the author, herself.
Self-publishing may mimic crowdfunding in its mechanisms, bringing authors to mar-
ket that may have otherwise been discouraged from publishing through traditional
publishing houses. In this section, we discuss self-publishing and consider, empiri-
cally, whether (a) self-published titles behave in a way that is similar to crowdfunded
novels where funding stems from subscribers and (b) whether our previous results are
sensitive to including self-published titles in the analysis.
Sher (2007) identifies self-published titles as those titles that were “printed for
the author” but other self-published novels include those that were published on
commission.20 We also consider novels that were published on commission. St.Clair
(2004) discusses publishing on commission as follows:
For authors who could not find a publisher willing to risk any of his own
money, there was publishing ’on commission’ ... it was the author who was
the investor who accepted all the costs and the risks, and the publisher who
took a royalty on sales...Publishing ’on commision’...was the recognized
way for an aspiring author to take a first step on the literary ladder (p.
165)
Authors wanting to see their own works in print could publish at his or her own
risk.21 The process of self-publishing, however, posed unique challenges. As Downie
20The profile of self-publishing authors does not differ much from crowdfunding authors. Most
of these authors were women (55%), a quarter of the titles that were self-published were done so
anonymously (27%), and 42% of the self-published titles were entry titles.
21As Downie (2013) notes, there was a difference between bookseller, printer, and publisher and
remarkable changes in publishing took place upon the (final) expiry of the Licensing (or “Printing”)
Act in 1695.
162
(2013) writes, “if booksellers were not necessarily willing to take the risk of buying
the copyright of works by little-known authors, they were not always prepared to
go to the trouble of publishing them ‘for the author’ either” (p. 69). Not all self-
publishing authors did so out of vanity or because they could not manage to find a
publisher. Downie points to Jane Austen as an example, “though she made a healthy
profit by publishing ’for herself’ (as she called it), scholars still seem reluctant to
accept that it was a shrewed business move, and not a desperate attempt on her part
to see her novels in print” (p. 66). Finally, while some self-publishing authors were
motivated financially, others simply out of vanity, still others faced no straightforward
choice. Both Downie (2013) and Sher (2007) discuss difficult assessment that authors
faced when deciding to retain or sell their copyright. Sher (2007) uses author James
Boswell’s decision regarding his self-published, (ultimately) best-selling work Life
of Johnson as an illustrative example of “the high degree of anxiety that authors
sometimes experience over the publication” (p. 220).
Regardless of an author’s de facto or de jure decision to self-publish, self-published
titles experienced varying degrees of success. In fact, we find that self-published
novels behave in a way that is similar to those that are crowdfunded and results are
included in Table C.4. Similar to crowdfunded novels, self-published novels are less
successful, on average but results are not necessarily robust except for those when
using the percentage of libraries as a success measure. However, self-published novels
published for a female-focused audience are more successful when considering the
number of subsequent editions and probability of being translated into a different
language. Results in Table C.4 show that estimates are not sensitive to the definition
of crowdfunding and that even those novels with a “crowd” of one (i.e. self-published
titles) exhibit patterns that mimic those with a list of subscribers (i.e. crowdfunded
titles).
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In previous sections, we show that both entrants and females were more likely to
crowdfund their works. We also found this to be the case of pseudanonymous authors
– or authors who chose to remain anonymous during the publishing process but whose
identity is now known. Anonymity was a way to protect one’s reputation but may
also be considered a measure of demand uncertainty. Authors of controversial, or
risky, titles wrote anonymously – perhaps to avoid negative stigma or other social
consequences.
When these same authors utilize crowdfunding to publish, what can be said about
the success of their works? Table C.5 shows that crowdfunded titles published by
anonymous authors are more successful, independent of the genre in which they are
published. Anonymous authors who utilize crowdfunding publish works that have
more subsequent editions and translations but, interestingly, are less novel. While this
coefficient is relatively small, it shows that while the works published via crowdfunding
by anonymous authors are more successful, they are not necessarily more novel.
3.8 Conclusion
We use new data in an unexplored setting to study whether alternative financing
mechanisms promote creativity, particularly in the presence of demand uncertainty.
Using book-level data from Britain’s Romantic period, we explore the uptake of
crowdfunding, or publishing by subscription, and ask under which circumstances are
crowdfunded works more (or less) successful than traditionally-published works.
We show that crowdfunding is more likely to be used in a context with greater
demand uncertainty. In our case, we find that both female writers and entrants into
the industry are more likely to crowdfund their works. Subsequently, we find that,
on average, crowdfunded novels experience less success than traditionally-published
counterparts. Titles that are crowdfunded have fewer editions, less translations, and
164
have a smaller share of libraries circulating them. However, if crowdfunded titles are
published in genres targeted for the then-growing female audience, crowdfunded is
associated with increased success. Crowdfunded titles written for female audiences
have more editions, are more likely to be translated, and are even more novel. This
suggests that there is a unique synergy between authors who choose to crowdfund
and those who choose to read crowdfunded titles. Results are robust to controlling
for an author’s access to social networks, the advertising and price of a particular
work, and alternative measures of both crowdfunding and demand uncertainty. Our
findings suggest that alternative financing may promote creativity by helping authors
of more novel works to find an audience.
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Figure 3·1: Soliciting Subscribers in the Press
Notes: The imag e illustrates a newspaper ad taken out by author Frances Burney.
The posting is soliciting donations for one guinea to be paid by subscribers in return
for a work published on or before July 1796.
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Figure 3·2: Camilla’s List of Subscribers
Notes: The image is a taken from the list of subscribersto Fanny Burney’s Camilla
where author Jane Austen appears as an original subscriber.
Figure 3·3: Visualizing Crowdfunding - Conditions for Crowdfunding
Notes: Authors will prefer crowdfunding when probability of success is low, unless
agreement is low.
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Figure 3·4: Visualizing Crowdfunding - Changing Author Costs
Notes: Lower costs - Ca shift the curve outward.















1800−04 1805−09 1810−14 1815−19 1820−24 1825−29
Historical Female−Focused Gothic
Notes: The figure above plots the number of titles in three popular genres during
the Romantic period over 5-year intervals.
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Figure 3·6: She and He Shares over Time
Figure 3·7: Dedication to Nobility – An Example
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Traditionally Crowdfunded
Published (N=2,267) (N=118)
Mean SD Mean SD
Number of volumes 2.658 1.076 2.314 0.874
Author’s name in title 0.509 0.5 0.5 0.502
Anonymous 0.176 0.381 0.118 0.325
“By the author of” 0.42 0.494 0.195 0.398
Female 0.517 0.5 0.703 0.459
Entrant 0.225 0.418 0.491 0.502
Printed in London 0.906 0.291 0.814 0.391
% libraries purchasing 0.331 0.2 0.193 0.093
Number of subsequent editions 0.898 1.943 0.356 0.843
In translation (dummy) 0.165 0.372 0.047 0.212
Listed in biographical dictionaries 0.352 0.478 0.154 0.359
Novelty 1.032 0.055 1.003 0.059
Female genre (N=841) 0.119 0.324 0.467 0.502
Female protagonist (N=996) 0.368 0.483 0.339 0.475
She/he ratio (N=1,713) 0.66 0.589 0.522 0.492
“Female-focused” (N=2,095) 0.175 0.38 0.229 0.422
170
Table 3.2: Predicting Crowdfunding, Linear Probability Estimates
Dep. Variable = 1 for Crowdfunded, 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anonymous 0.01 0.013 0.023*** 0.012 0.02
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
Psuedanonymous -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.019** -0.037*** -0.050**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021)
Female 0.046*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.068***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.01) (0.011) (0.016)
Entrant 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.044*** 0.072*** 0.109***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
“By the Author” 0.021
(0.014)










N 2,277 2,277 1,507 1,945 1,239
R-squared 0.188 0.19 0.084 0.193 0.21
Decade FE YES YES YES YES YES
Volumes FE YES YES YES YES YES
London Dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Note: The dependent variable in each column reflects a dummy equal to one if a title was
crowdfunded. Standard errors are clustered at the author level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p
<0.01
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Table 3.3: Crowdfunding and Success Measures
Editions Translation % Libraries Novelty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Crowdfunded -1.345*** -1.877*** -0.125*** -0.177*** -0.118*** -0.109*** -0.016* -0.012
(0.411) (0.261) (0.036) (0.035) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010)
Crowdfunded X 1.467*** 0.242*** 0.018 0.039**
Female-Focused (0.569) (0.084) (0.026) (0.017)
Female-focused 0.085 -0.067*** -0.01 -0.015***
(0.148) (0.026) (0.013) (0.004)
Anonymous -1.833*** -0.247*** -0.160*** -0.022***
(0.110) (0.025) (0.015) (0.003)
Pseudanonymous -1.455*** -0.173*** -0.070*** -0.003
(0.488) (0.026) (0.018) (0.007)
“By the Author” -0.320** -0.022 -0.022 0.003
(0.132) (0.028) (0.016) (0.003)
Female 0.085 -0.032 -0.033* -0.034***
(0.166) (0.033) (0.018) (0.004)
Entrant -0.774*** -0.132*** -0.106*** -0.001
(0.141) (0.029) (0.016) (0.004)
N 2,277 1,945 2,245 1,913 2,016 1,744 1,507 1,501
R-squared n/a n/a 0.069 0.127 0.181 0.246 0.051 0.238
Decade FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Volumes FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
London Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Estimation method in columns 1 and 2:
Poisson regression. All other columns: Ordinary least squares. The dependent variable in Columns
1 and 2 is the total number of subsequent editions (after the first edition). The dependent variable
in Columns 3 and 4 is a dummy for whether the title was subsequently translated into another
language after the first edition. The dependent variable in Columns 5 and 6 is the percentage of
potential libraries listing the title in their catalogs. The dependent variable in Columns 7 and 8 is
the ratio of a title’s distance to texts published before the title year to the title’s distance to texts
published after the title year. Decade fixed effects, volume fixed effects, and dummies for whether
or not a title was published in London are included in all specifications. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p
<0.01
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Table 3.4: Authors and Measures of Long Run Literary Suc-
cess: Dictionary of Literary Biography and Oxford Dictionary
of Literary Biography
Dep. Variable = 1 for DLB
or ODNB, 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3)
Female-Focused -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.077
(0.036) (0.037) (0.062)
Crowdfunded -0.180*** -0.166*** -0.147**
(0.045) (0.047) (0.064)
Crowdfunded X 0.225* 0.233** 0.485**
Female-Focused (0.115) (0.116) (0.208)






N 907 907 644
R-squared 0.018 0.021 0.017
Note: Each column is a separate linear probability regression where
the dependent variable is equal to 1 if an author is listed in the Dic-
tionary of Literary Biography (DLB) or the Oxford Dictionary of Na-
tional Biography (ODNB). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *p
<0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Appendix to Chapter 1
















0 Median=21 50 75 100 125 150
Fort Life (in years)
Distribution of Fort Life
Notes: The figure is a histogram of fort life. Fort life is the number of years that a
fort was in operation and is measured by the year of fort abandonment minus the
year of fort establishment. The red dotted line represented the median fort life for
all frontier forts which was 21 years.
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Figure A·2: US Military Post Return for Fort Apache, AZ – August,
1888
Notes: The figure shows a post return for Fort Apache, AZ in August of 1888. Each
post return contains information on fort size measured by the aggregate number of
Army personnel staffed at a fort. Post returns are availlable at a monthly frequency
for select years for 117 forts (see Table A.1 for a list of forts for which information is
available and corresponding years of coverage). Returns are available as microfilm
images as part of the US Returns from Military Posts dataset avilable on ancestry.
com.
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(d) Log Population Density
Notes: Each figure is a histogram of a different county-level population measure
pooled across all census years. Figure A·3a plots total population and figure A·3b
plots log of total population. Figure A·3c plots population density meausured as
the total population divided by county area in square miles and figure A·3d plots
the log of population density.
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Notes: The figure above plots the association between a county’s geographic posi-
tioning and year of fort establishment. The x-axis corresponds with the longitude
coordinate of a fort county’s centroid. Counties further east lie are situtated further
to the right of the x-axis. The y-axis corresponds with the year that a fort was es-
tablished within a county and is increasing in year of establishment such that forts
established later lie at the top of the y-axis. The red line is a best-fit polynomial
indicating that counties that lie futher east (west) are more likely to have a fort
established earlier (later) in the time series.
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Figure A·5: “Excluding Neighbors” Sample: An Example of Fort
Abercrombie, ND
Notes: The figure above uses the case of Fort Abercrombie, ND to illustrate the
“excluding neighbors” sample in column (4) of Table 1.2. In the figure, the black
triangle represents the location of Fort Abercrombie. Counties included in the
estimation sample are Fort Abercrombie’s county and surrounding counties in a 100-
mile radius that do not share an immediate border with Fort Abercrombie’s county
(blue, lightly-shaded). Counties excluded from the estimation sample include the
counties that share an immediate border with Fort Abercrombie’s county (green,
darkly-shaded).
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(b) Log Population Density
Notes: Each figure plots coefficients from the event study regressions in equation 1.4
for log of total population in figure A·6a and log of population density in figure A·6b.
Point estimates (blue line) are for decennial census years prior to and following the
establishment of a frontier fort within a county along with 95 percent confidence
intervals (dotted red lines). The reference category is the decennial census year
immediately preceding fort establishment. The sample mechanically restricts the
sample to fort counties for which 3 decennial censuses can be observed prior to fort
arrival. The sample is balanced because a value of 0.1 is imputed for counties for
which no data is reported under the assumption that if there is no population data,
there are no non-Native Americans residing in that county. Regressions include
census division-by-year fixed effects, geographic controls, and standard errors are
clustered at the county level.
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Notes: The figure illustrates the positive relationship between mean fort size and
the share of the men reported as “absent” from the fort at the time of enumeration.




























Notes: The figure plots the number of years between fort arrival and railroad arrival
for all fort counties that eventually received railroad access. Each bar represents a
different fort county. The y-axis is simply the year of railroad access minus year
of fort arrival. For forts where fort arrival proceeded railroad access, this value is
positive and these bars lie above the y = 0 line, to the right. For forts where fort
arrival followed railroad access, this value is negative and these bars lie below the
y = 0 line, to the left.
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Figure A·9: The Mississippi River System
Notes: The figure illustrates counties that are used in the “Mississippi River Sys-
tem” estmation sample described in Section 1.10.1 and whose results appear in
Table A.5. The 13 rivers that comprise the Mississippi River System are outlined
by the thick, blue line and include the following rivers: Arkansas, Canadian, Illi-
nois, Mississippi, North Platte, Ohio, Platte, Wisconsin, Missouri, Red, Tennessee,
Cumberland or Yellowstone. Counties that are intersected by at least 1 of the 13
rivers in the system that do not have a fort are shaded light-blue (non-fort control
counties). Counties that are intersected by at least 1 of the 13 rivers in the system
that do have a fort are shaded dark-blue (fort or treatment counties).
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Figure A·10: Railroad Access to Fort Atkinson and Fort Pierre
RR to Fort Atkinson























1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Fort Atkinson, KS Fort Pierre, SD
Notes: The figure above plots population density over time for two fort counties
along with timing of railroad access. The upper, blue line plots population density
for the county housing Fort Atkinson, KS and the left vertical line shows the timing
of railroad access to the county in 1880. The lower, red line plots population
density for the county housing Fort Pierre, SD and the right vertical line shows the
timing of railroad access to the county in 1910. The figure uses the two cases to
show (a) timing of railroad access followed initial growht in population density and
(b) counties connected earlier to the railroad network experienced larger gains to
population density.
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Table A.1: Fort Data Coverage from US Returns from Military Posts
Micro-Film
USRMP USRMP USRMP USRMP USRMP Coverage
Fort State Established Abandoned Yr. Start Yr. End Total Gaps?
Harrison IN 1812 1818 1816 1818 4
Edwards IL 1816 1824 1822 1824 6
Saginaw MI 1822 1824 1822 1824 4
Pierre SD 1831 1857 1855 1857 5
Kearny NE 1846 1848 1846 1848 5
Cobb OK 1859 1869 1859 1861 4
C.F. Smith MT 1866 1868 1866 1868 7
Phil Kearny WY 1866 1868 1866 1868 7
Collins CO 1864 1867 1863 1866 8
Polk TX 1846 1850 1846 1850 1
Atkinson KS 1850 1854 1850 1854 9
Merrill TX 1850 1855 1850 1855 11
Winfield Scott NV 1866 1871 1866 1871 2
Wayne IN 1794 1819 1813 1819 3
Atkinson NE 1850 1854 1821 1827 5
Scott KS 1842 1873 1858 1865 10 X
Camp Date Creek AZ 1867 1873 1866 1873 8
Hartsuff NE 1874 1881 1874 1881 4
Mitchell AL 1813 1837 1825 1837 4 X
Des Moines 1 IA 1834 1837 1834 1846 2 X
Des Moines 2 IA 1843 2019 1834 1846 2
Richardson TX 1866 1878 1866 1878 5
Miller CA 1851 1864 1851 1864 9 X
Humboldt CA 1853 1866 1853 1866 12
Sheridan IL 1887 1993 1887 1900 12
Rice ND 1864 1879 1864 1878 11
Duchesne UT 1886 1910 1886 1900 12
Fetterman WY 1867 1882 1867 1882 4
Sanders WY 1866 1882 1866 1882 5
Armstrong IL 1816 1836 1819 1836 4
Hancock Brks ME 1828 1845 1828 1845 8
Winnebago WI 1828 1845 1828 1845 8
Fred Steele WY 1868 1886 1868 1886 11
McKinney WY 1877 1894 1876 1894 11
Abercrombie ND 1857 1878 1858 1877 9
Halleck NV 1867 1886 1867 1886 12
Ellis MT 1867 1886 1867 1886 11
Dallas FL 1838 1858 1838 1858 5 X
Inge TX 1849 1869 1849 1869 1 X
Arbuckle OK 1851 1870 1850 1870 6 X
Niobrara NE 1880 1906 1880 1900 12
Dearborn IL 1803 1836 1816 1837 5 X
Belknap TX 1851 1867 1846 1867 8 X
Custer MT 1877 1898 1877 1898 4
Assinniboine MT 1879 1911 1879 1891 12
Concho TX 1867 1889 1867 1889 6
Meade SD 1878 1944 1878 1900 12
Missoula MT 1876 1947 1877 1900 12
Huachuca AZ 1877 2019 1877 1900 12
Jesup LA 1822 1846 1822 1846 1
McDowell AZ 1865 1891 1866 1890 12
McDermit NV 1865 1889 1865 1889 7
Hays KS 1865 1889 1865 1889 10
Shaw MT 1867 1891 1867 1891 9
Keogh MT 1876 1908 1876 1900 12
Lowell AZ 1862 1891 1866 1891 3
Yates ND 1874 1903 1875 1900 12
Wilkins MI 1844 1870 1844 1870 8 X
Robinson NE 1874 1948 1874 1900 12
Detroit MI 1796 1861 1815 1842 9 X
Washita OK 1842 1861 1842 1861 4
Stockton TX 1859 1886 1859 1886 6 X
Abraham Lincoln ND 1872 1891 1872 1900 12 X
Lyon (Wise) CO 1852 1889 1860 1889 11
Buford ND 1866 1895 1866 1895 9
Towson OK 1824 1854 1824 1854 5 X
Sully SD 1863 1894 1864 1894 10
Apache AZ 1870 1922 1870 1900 12
McKavett TX 1852 1883 1852 1883 6 X
Sill OK 1869 2019 1869 1900 12
Bowie AZ 1862 1894 1862 1894 10
D.A. Russell WY 1867 1948 1867 1900 12
Omaha NE 1868 1947 1868 1896 9
Howard WI 1816 1852 1818 1852 5 X
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USRMP USRMP USRMP USRMP USRMP Coverage
Fort (con’t) State Established Abandoned Yr. Start Yr. End Total Gaps?
Pickens FL 1829 1947 1834 1868 3
Duncan TX 1849 1927 1849 1883 8 X
Yuma CA 1850 1883 1850 1885 5
Grant AZ 1860 1873 1865 1900 12
Porter NY 1849 1926 1864 1900 12
Randall SD 1856 1892 1856 1892 11
Columbus Brks. OH 1861 1960 1864 1900 12
Davis TX 1854 1891 1854 1891 6 X
Whipple Brks. AZ 1863 1913 1863 1900 12 X
Macomb LA 1827 1871 1828 1866 8 X
Wingate NM 1862 1868 1862 1900 12
Douglas UT 1862 1979 1862 1900 12
Crawford WI 1816 1856 1817 1856 6 X
Union NM 1851 1894 1851 1891 4
Laramie WY 1834 1890 1849 1890 3
Pike LA 1827 1871 1828 1871 5 X
Walla Walla WA 1856 1911 1856 1900 12 X
St. Philip LA 1810 1922 1821 1866 8 X
Riley KS 1853 2019 1853 1900 12
Clark TX 1852 1946 1852 1900 12 X
Worth TX 1849 1853 1849 1898 12 X
Smith AK 1817 1824 1820 1871 8
Benicia Brks. CA 1849 1964 1849 1900 12 X
Vancouver Brks. WA 1849 1947 1849 1900 12
Ringgold Brks. TX 1848 1906 1848 1900 12 X
Presidio of SF CA 1846 2019 1847 1900 12
Brown TX 1846 1895 1846 1900 12 X
Stanton NM 1855 1896 1839 1896 7 X
Baton Rouge Brks. LA 1810 1879 1821 1879 6 X
Gratiot MI 1814 1879 1815 1879 5 X
Natchitoches LA 1804 1819 1806 1876 11 X
Jackson LA 1832 1922 1830 1900 12 X
Leavenworth KS 1828 2019 1827 1900 12
Jefferson Brks. MO 1826 1946 1826 1900 12
Gibson OK 1824 1890 1824 1900 12 X
New Orleans LA 1803 n/a 1821 1898 5 X
Madison Brks. NY 1815 1945 1823 1900 12 X
Snelling MN 1819 1946 1822 1900 12 X
Brady MI 1822 1945 1822 1900 12 X
Mackinac MI 1796 1895 1816 1895 8 X
Marion FL 1821 1900 1821 1900 12 X
Barrancas FL 1839 1945 1821 1900 12 X
Niagara NY 1796 1945 1813 1900 12 X
184
Table A.3: Covariates Used for Tree-Splitting in Causal Random Forest
Estimation
For Log Tot. Pop. For Log Pop. Den.
Mi. to Nearest Water Source X X
Mi.2 to Nearest Water Source X X
Mi. to Steam-Navigable River X X
Mi.2 to Steam-Navigable River X X
Mi. to Portage Site X X
Mi.2 to Portage Site X X
=1 if river mouth/source X X
Mean elevation X X
SD elevation X X
SD slope X X
Mi. to Tribal Boundary X X
Mi.2 to Tribal Boundary X X
Mi. to the Equator X X
Mi. to the International Dateline X X
Mean yearly rainfall X X
Mean yearly temperature X X
% of Max Attainable Yield, Wheat X X
% of Max Attainable Yield, Cotton X X
% of Max Attainable Yield, Potato X X
% Annual Growing Days X X
Railroad Length in Operation In forests with RR In forests with RR
State Dummies X X
Area in Mi.2 X
Notes: The table above includes the list of county-level covariates that are used in
causal random forest estimation where the outcome is either log total population or
log population density.
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Table A.2: Frontier Forts and Population Patterns, OLS Results
from a 100-Mile Sample, Census Division FE, 1790-2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.864*** 0.741*** 0.704*** 0.777***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.093) (0.102)
N County-Years 70,230 70,230 70,230 50,695
R-squared 0.016 0.507 0.682 0.694
Census Div X Year FE X X X
Geo X Year Controls X X
Excluding Neighbors X
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.301** 0.475*** 0.590*** 0.661***
(0.150) (0.135) (0.103) (0.112)
N County-Years 70,230 70,230 70,230 50,695
R-squared 0.002 0.490 0.713 0.711
Census Div X Year FE X X X
Geo X Year Controls X X
Excluding Neighbors X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-OLS regression of
equation 1.1 where the unit of observation is a county-year. The treatment
variable in each regression is a dummy equal to one if a frontier fort is lo-
cated within county i by census year t. The dependent variable in Panel A
is log total population and in Panel B is log population density in county i
in census year t. The sample used for estimation includes fort counties and
non-fort counties that lie within a 100-mile radius of a fort. Geographic
controls are those found in Table 1.1 and are interacted with census-year
dummies with the exception that regressions on log total population con-
trol for a county’s area in square miles as an independent variable while
those on log population density do not. Regressions excluding neighbors
(column 4) omit counties from the baseline sample that share an immedi-
ate border with fort counties. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table A.4: Frontier Forts and Path Dependence: Railroad Access, Fort
Locations, and Total Population in 2010
Log Total Population, 2010



































Abandoned Fort=1 × Railroad=1890 1.401***
(0.264)
Mean Dependent Variable 10.23 10.23 10.23 10.23 10.23 10.23
N Counties 159 206 445 276 516 493
R-squared 0.741 0.707 0.576 0.605 0.504 0.527
State FE X X X X X X
Geographic Controls X X X X X X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a cross-sectional OLS regression of
equation 1.7 where the unit of observation is a county. All regressions include a
dummy variable equal to one if county i ever had a frontier fort and if the frontier
fort was abandoned by the close of the frontier in 1890 (abandoned fort). RR is a
dummy equal to one for the year in which a county was connected to the railroad
network and the interaction Abandonedfort×RR is a dummy equal to one if county i
had an abandoned fort and was connected to the railroad in year t. The sample used
in each regression is a subset of the the abandoned fort counties and surrounding
counties within a 100-mile radius of an abandoned fort such that the comparison
group for each regression in columns (1) through (6) are counties without a frontier
fort that were never connected to the railroad network. Geographic controls are those
found in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.10 **p <0.05
***p <0.01
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Table A.5: Frontier Forts and Population Patterns: The
Mississippi River System, 1790-2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Fort 0.953*** 0.754*** 0.596***
(0.165) (0.147) (0.138)
N County-Years 16,586 16,533 16,533
R-squared 0.031 0.677 0.725
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Fort 0.606*** 0.717*** 0.530***
(0.220) (0.164) (0.147)
N County-Years 16,586 16,533 16,533
R-squared 0.011 0.691 0.763
State X Year FE X X
Geographic Controls X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-OLS re-
gression of equation 1.1 where the unit of observation is a county-
year. The treatment variable in each regression is a dummy equal
to one if a frontier fort is located within county i by census year
t. The dependent variable in Panel A is log total population and
in Panel B is log population density in county i in census year t.
The sample consists of fort counties (57) and non-fort counties
(410) – all of which are intersected by at least 1 of the major
13 rivers that comprise the Mississippi River System: Arkansas,
Canadian, Illinois, Mississippi, North Platte, Ohio, Platte, Wis-
consin, Missouri, Red, Tennessee, Cumberland or Yellowstone.
See Figure A·9 for a map of the sample. Geographic controls are
those found in Table 1.1 and are the same in Panel A and Panel
B with the exception that regressions on log total population in
Panel A control for a county’s area in square miles as an inde-
pendent variable while those on log population density in Panel
B do not. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *p
<0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table A.6: Frontier Forts and Population Patterns: Forts
West of the Mississippi, 1810-2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Western Fort 0.750*** 0.646*** 0.598***
(0.139) (0.134) (0.116)
N County-Years 35,583 35,576 35,576
R-squared 0.014 0.639 0.714
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Western Fort -0.046 0.378** 0.419***
(0.191) (0.168) (0.134)
N County-Years 35,583 35,576 35,576
R-squared 0.001 0.626 0.739
State X Year FE X X
Geographic Controls X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-OLS re-
gression of equation 1.1 where the unit of observation is a county-
year. The treatment variable in each regression is a dummy equal
to one if a frontier fort is located within county i by census year
t. The dependent variable in Panel A is log total population and
in Panel B is log population density in county i in census year
t. The sample consists of the subset of 98 frontier forts that lie
west of the Mississippi River and surrounding counties within a
100-mile radius of these Western forts. Geographic controls are
those found in Table 1.1 and are the same in Panel A and Panel
B with the exception that regressions on log total population in
Panel A control for a county’s area in square miles as an inde-
pendent variable while those on log population density in Panel
B do not. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *p
<0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table A.7: Frontier Forts and Population Patterns, OLS Re-
sults from a 75-Mile Sample, 1790-2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.820*** 0.668*** 0.670*** 0.755***
(0.114) (0.105) (0.093) (0.105)
Observations 54,223 54,174 54,174 35,787
R-squared 0.018 0.664 0.739 0.752
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.215 0.519*** 0.579*** 0.679***
(0.151) (0.120) (0.100) (0.111)
Observations 54,223 54,174 54,174 35,787
R-squared 0.001 0.667 0.763 0.775
State X Year FE X X X
Geo X Year Controls X X
Excluding Neighbors X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-OLS regression
of equation 1.1 where the unit of observation is a county-year. The
treatment variable in each regression is a dummy equal to one if a fron-
tier fort is located within county i by census year t. The dependent
variable in Panel A is log total population and in Panel B is log popula-
tion density in county i in census year t. The sample used for estimation
includes fort counties and non-fort counties that lie within a 75-mile ra-
dius of a fort. Geographic controls are those found in Table 1.1 and
are interacted with census-year dummies with the exception that re-
gressions on log total population control for a county’s area in square
miles as an independent variable while those on log population density
do not. Regressions excluding neighbors (column 4) omit counties from
the baseline sample that share an immediate border with fort counties.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05
***p <0.01
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Table A.8: Frontier Forts and Population Patterns, OLS Re-
sults from a 150-Mile Sample, 1790-2010
Panel A: Log Total Population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.900*** 0.727*** 0.688*** 0.736***
(0.108) (0.100) (0.091) (0.101)
N County-Years 85,929 85,883 85,840 65,514
R-squared 0.014 0.655 0.732 0.746
Panel B: Log Population Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 for Fort 0.384** 0.584*** 0.602*** 0.495***
(0.150) (0.118) (0.100) (0.104)
N County-Years 85,929 85,883 85,840 65,514
R-squared 0.002 0.667 0.764 0.790
State X Year FE X X X
Geo X Year Controls X X
Excluding Neighbors X
Note: Each column in the table above is from a pooled-OLS regression
of equation 1.1 where the unit of observation is a county-year. The
treatment variable in each regression is a dummy equal to one if a fron-
tier fort is located within county i by census year t. The dependent
variable in Panel A is log total population and in Panel B is log popula-
tion density in county i in census year t. The sample used for estimation
includes fort counties and non-fort counties that lie within a 150-mile
radius of a fort. Geographic controls are those found in Table 1.1 and
are interacted with census-year dummies with the exception that re-
gressions on log total population control for a county’s area in square
miles as an independent variable while those on log population density
do not. Regressions excluding neighbors (column 4) omit counties from
the baseline sample that share an immediate border with fort counties.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Why the Instrumental Variables Approach Fails in De-
troit
Empirical strategies that work across cities (or counties) do not necessary work within
cities. Previous contributions to the literature on the impact of the IHS adopt an
instrumental variables (IV) approach to identify causal effects. The IV framework
requires a strong correlation, or first-stage, between the instrument(s) used and the
location of interstate routes to overcome the endogeneity of interstate highway loca-
tion. A survey of the literature reveals the following IVs that have been previously
exploited: national plans of the interstate highway network, 19th century railroad
routes, expedition routes followed by European explorers prior to the mid-19th cen-
tury, and shortest-distance routes obtained via simulation. This work relies on cross-
city or cross-county variation while mine relies on within-city variation at the census
tract level. Differences in the geographic extent of the unit of observation proves to
be a first-order issue in an IV framework and previous case studies cite the difficulty
in finding plausible, within-city instrumental variables.
Consider the following example. Assume that I am interested in using 19th cen-
tury railroad routes as an IV for future interstate location around the Detroit area
where the unit of observation is a county. Detroit’s SMA boundary encompasses 3
counties: Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne. A map of 19th century railroads indicates
that all three counties have a railroad within their boundaries and all three counties
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subsequently received an interstate highway. This 1:1 relationship would result in a
robust first-stage since 19th century railroad routes are significantly correlated with
future interstate placement at the county level. In my analysis, the unit of observation
is a significantly smaller geographic unit: a census tract within the city of Detroit.
Because the unit of observation is substantially smaller, there is more opportunity
for interstate routes to deviate from 19th century railroad routes. In other words,
there are significantly more opportunities for the railroads to fail at predicting future
highway placement simply due to the finer geographic unit. Deviations are, in fact,
a function of the geographic unit of observation.
To further shed light on this issue, I included the results of a first-stage regression
in Table B.8 where I instrument for constructed interstate location with historical
railroad placement (column 1), simulated highway placement (column 2), and planned
interstate placement as outlined in the “Yellow Book” (column 3). Previous literature
has relied on a variation of each of these instruments in previous work related to the
US Interstate Highway System – albeit not at the census tract level. A regression
of census tract interstate placement on a dummy for 19th century railroads yields
coefficient of 0.028 (SE 0.064) with an F-statistic of 0.77 – suggesting that 19th
century railroad routes are not, in fact, strong predictors of interstate placement in
Detroit at the census tract level. Results using simulated routes suffer from the same
issue with a coefficient of -0.054 (SE 0.060), an F-statistic less than 1. If we consider
planned routes in the “Yellow Book” as an instrument, the first stage is stronger but
the an F-statistic of 5.54 still raises concerns associated with a weak instrument. I
should note that, for simplicity, I touch only on the failure of each instrument in
the first stage. Naturally, an instrument must satisfy not only a first-stage but the
exclusion restriction as well which I do not discuss here.
Separately, consider the 1944 Plan (see Figure 2·1) or maps of historical European
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exploration routes. Both are drawn at the national level and an attempt to digitize
maps of this level of detail would introduce substantial imprecision at the census tract
level. Consider the sheer thickness of the drawn routes – it is nearly impossible to pin
down their trajectory at the census tract level as they extend outward from Detroit.
In the case of national plans and exploration routes, the information is simply not
granular enough to be used for a census tract-level, within-city analysis. As such, I rely
on varied econometric specifications and a propensity score matching methodology to
illustrate the effects of interstate construction on urban neighborhoods.
B.2 A Note on Aggregation and Median Housing Values
I fix census tract boundaries in the year 1950. To create a comparable geographic unit
in 1990, I rely on census block delineations to aggregate blocks ”up” to the 1950 census
tract level. This creates an issue in the construction of the following variable: median
housing value. In the 1990 census, I have the following information: (1) number
of total housing units in each census block, (2) median housing value in each census
block, and (3) number of housing units by housing value intervals in each census block
(for example, 5 housing units valued between $50,000-$59,999; 8 housing units valued
between $60,000-$69,999; etc.). To construct an ”aggregate” median (from the block
level in 1990 to a comparable tract in 1950), I follow the following process: (1) order
housing value intervals from smallest to largest and create a corresponding CDF by
summing the total number of housing units that fall within and below each interval,
(2) divide the total number of housing units by 2 (when the total number of housing
units is an odd number, I divide by 2 and round up to the nearest integer); this value
represents the location of the median when values are sorted from smallest to largest;
(3) determine the interval where the median is located; (4) calculate the midpoint of
the interval to construct a measure of the median. Note that I make no distribution
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assumptions within housing value intervals. For example, if the median is located
in the 10th position in the ordered set of intervals and that is $50,000 - $59,999, I
calculate the median to be $54,999.50. There are a set of 99 census tracts that do not
change boundaries between 1950 and 1990. For this set, I have information on the
true median housing value. I estimate equation (2) using the true median housing
value and my constructed measure on the restricted sample of census tracts whose
boundaries remain fixed over time. Results are comparable.
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Figure B·1: Short-Run Effects of Urban Interstates on Neighborhood
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Notes: Each figure plots the results of a binned distance regression where census
tracts are placed into bins based on the distance between their centroid and the
nearest interstate open to traffic in 1970. The median distance to the closest inter-
state across all census tracts is 1,328 meters; the omitted category in each regression
is 1,000 1,500 meters and thus each estimate should be interpreted as relative to
median-distance tracts (see Figure 2·6 in the main text which drops the furthest
distance bin). Each regression controls for differences in demographics, socioeco-
nomic status, and housing characteristis in 1950 and is weighted by a census tract’s
total population in 1950. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Figure B·2: Long-Run Effects of Urban Interstates on Neighborhood
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(c) Percent Black
Notes: Each figure plots the results of a binned distance regression where census
tracts are placed into bins based on the distance between their centroid and the
nearest interstate open to traffic in 1990. The median distance to the closest inter-
state across all census tracts is 1,328 meters; the omitted category in each regression
is 1,000 1,500 meters and thus each estimate should be interpreted as relative to
median-distance tracts (see Figure 2·7 in the main text which drops the furthest
distance bin). Each regression controls for differences in demographics, socioeco-
nomic status, and housing characteristis in 1950 and is weighted by a census tract’s
total population in 1950. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
198
Table B.1: Summary Statistics by Interstate Location
No Interstate Interstate Difference
Log population density -5.455 -5.690 0.234
(1.049) (1.367) (0.127)
% Black 0.123 0.175 -0.051
(0.255) (0.321) (0.030)
Income less than 2K 0.184 0.198 -0.013
(0.098) (0.116) (0.011)
% Units vacant 0.011 0.013 -0.002
(0.015) (0.021) (0.002)
% Units owner-occupied 0.553 0.549 0.004
(0.245) (0.271) (0.026)
Log median rent 3.759 3.711 0.047
(0.269) (0.226) (0.025)
Log median property value 9.085 8.975 0.111***
(0.306) (0.265) (0.030)
% No indoor plumbing 0.048 0.073 -0.025*
(0.092) (0.114) (0.011)
% Units 30+ years old 0.351 0.396 -0.045
(0.350) (0.375) (0.036)
Distance to CBD (KM) 10.419 10.590 -0.171
(6.093) (6.808) (0.653)
% Change Housing Value, 1940-50 0.831 0.900 -0.069**
(0.193) (0.181) (0.021)
% Change Population Density, 1940-50 0.213 0.194 0.020
(0.561) (0.581) (0.060)
% Change Percent Black, 1940-50 6.554 3.167 3.388*
(21.507) (9.659) (1.618)
Observations 369 142 511
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Table B.2: Predicting Urban Interstate Location using 1950 Cen-
sus Tract Characteristics – Results from Probit and Logit
Logit Estimates Probit Estimates
Raw MFX Raw MFX
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log median property value -1.981** -0.275** -1.075** -0.275**
(0.807) (0.108) (0.442) (0.111)
% No indoor plumbing -3.524 -0.489 -1.795 -0.460
(3.880) (0.535) (2.203) (0.563)
% Black 0.263 0.036 0.178 0.046
(0.834) (0.116) (0.469) (0.120)
Log population density -0.136 -0.019 -0.078 -0.020
(0.348) (0.048) (0.200) (0.051)
% Units vacant 11.377 1.578 5.901 1.512
(9.266) (1.282) (5.447) (1.396)
% Units owner-occupied 0.842 0.117 0.476 0.122
(1.281) (0.178) (0.706) (0.181)
Log median rent -0.500 -0.069 -0.263 -0.067
(0.715) (0.099) (0.412) (0.105)
% Units 30+ years old -0.592 -0.082 -0.374 -0.096
(0.769) (0.107) (0.433) (0.111)
Income less than 2K 2.498 0.346 1.172 0.300
(4.501) (0.624) (2.511) (0.644)
Observations 366 366 366 366
Note: The dependent variable in each column is an indicator for whether
or not a census tract is bisected by an interstate following the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1956. All independent variables are measured in 1950.
Estimates reflect a logit model (columns 1-2) and probit model (columns
3-4). In columns (1) and (3), I report raw coefficients while columns (2)
and (4) report marginal effects for ease of interpretation. I drop tracts from
both estimation strategies where an interstate was already constructed by
1950. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table B.3: Effects of Urban Interstate Location on Neighbor-
hood Outcomes in 1970 – Results from a Subset of Census Tracts
with No Boundary Changes, 1950-70
Log Median Log Population Percent
Property Value Density Black
(1) (2) (3)
=1 for Interstate -0.044** -0.055 -0.051***
(0.005) (0.030) (0.000)
Observations 275 278 211
R-squared 0.910 0.859 0.594
1950 Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
%∆ 1940-1950 Yes Yes Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (2). De-
pendent variables are measured in 1970. Interstate is an indicator for
whether or not a census tract is bisected by an interstate following the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. The sample used in estimation is the
subset of census tracts whose boundaries did not change between 1940
and 1970. Pre-trend is simply the percent change in the dependent vari-
able between 1940 and 1950. Each regression controls for differences in
demographics, socioeconomic status, and housing characteristics in 1950
and is weighted by a census tract’s total population in 1950. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table B.4: Effects of Urban Interstate Location on Neighborhood Out-
comes in 1990 – Results from Controlling for Distance to Riot Epicenter
Log Median Log Population Percent
Property Value Density Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1970 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.042*** -0.040** -0.141* -0.141** -0.118*** -0.112***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.037) (0.031) (0.005) (0.005)
N 315 315 318 318 240 240
R-squared 0.907 0.908 0.812 0.818 0.604 0.607
Panel A: 1990 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.151*** -0.153*** -0.082 -0.085 -0.044*** -0.036***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.040) (0.033) (0.002) (0.002)
N 373 373 376 376 291 291
R-squared 0.730 0.730 0.543 0.551 0.568 0.571
1950 Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
%∆ 1940-1950 No Yes No Yes No Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (2). Dependent
variables are measured in 1970 and 1990. Interstate is an indicator for whether or
not a census tract is bisected by an interstate following the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1956. 1950 pre-interstate characteristics include demographic and housing
stock characteristics (see text for a complete description). Pre-trend is simply
the percent change in the dependent variables between 1940 and 1950. Each
regression controls for distance to the 1943 and 1967 riot epicenters in Detroit.
Regressions are weighted by a census tract’s total population in 1950. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table B.5: Effects of Urban Interstate Location on Neighborhood
Outcomes – Results from Unweighted Regressions
Log Median Log Population Percent
Property Value Density Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1970 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.104* -0.094* -0.098*** -0.092***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002)
N 315 315 318 318 240 240
R-squared 0.899 0.899 0.858 0.867 0.571 0.575
Panel A: 1990 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.088 -0.085 -0.025*** -0.017**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.036) (0.029) (0.002) (0.002)
N 373 373 376 376 291 291
R-squared 0.682 0.683 0.557 0.566 0.508 0.514
1950 Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
%∆ 1940-1950 No Yes No Yes No Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (2). Dependent
variables are measured in 1970 and 1990. Interstate is an indicator for whether or
not a census tract is bisected by an interstate following the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1956. 1950 pre-interstate characteristics include demographic and housing
stock characteristics (see text for a complete description). Pre-trend is simply
the percent change in the dependent variable between 1940 and 1950. Columns
(1), (3), and (5) replicate baseline results for the subset of tracts for which
1940 information is available. Details on the construction of log median housing
values from the census block level in 1970 and 1990 are outlined in the Appendix.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table B.6: Effects of Urban Interstate Location on Neighbor-
hood Outcomes – Results including All Pre-trends
Log Med. Log Population Percent
Property Value Density Black
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: 1970 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.063** -0.090*** -0.096***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
N 240 240 240
R-squared 0.904 0.850 0.591
Panel B: 1990 Outcomes
=1 for Interstate -0.192** -0.105** -0.078***
(0.032) (0.012) (0.004)
N 272 272 272
R-squared 0.728 0.523 0.549
1950 Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
%∆ 1940-1950 Dep. Variables Yes Yes Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (2).
Dependent variables are measured in 1970 and 1990. Interstate is an in-
dicator for whether or not a census tract is bisected by an interstate
following the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. 1950 pre-interstate
characteristics include demographic and housing stock characteristics
(see text for a complete description). Pre-trend is simply the percent
change in the dependent variables between 1940 and 1950. Each regres-
sion includes a pre-trend in median housing value, population density,
and percent Black. See the main text for a table where each pre-trend is
included separately. Regressions are weighted by a census tract’s total
population in 1950. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
*p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table B.7: Effects of Urban Interstate Location on Log Total Pop-
ulation
Log Total Population, 1970 Log Total Population, 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
=1 for Interstate -0.102* -0.131* -0.134** -0.069 -0.099 -0.103
(0.028) (0.034) (0.031) (0.078) (0.045) (0.042)
Observations 335 318 318 400 376 376
R-squared 0.898 0.902 0.903 0.846 0.843 0.844
1950 Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
%∆ 1940-1950 No No Yes No No Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (2). Depen-
dent variables are total population measures in 1970 and 1990. Interstate is
an indicator for whether or not a census tract is bisected by an interstate
following the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. 1950 pre-interstate charac-
teristics include demographic and housing stock characteristics (see text for a
complete description). Pre-trend is simply the percent change in the depen-
dent variable between 1940 and 1950. Columns (2) and (4) replicate baseline
results for the subset of tracts for which 1940 information is available. Each
regression is weighted by a census tract’s total population in 1950. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
Table B.8: Predicting Urban Interstate Place-
ment – Results of a First Stage using Previous In-
struments








Observations 291 291 291
F-Statistic 0.185 0.807 5.544
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *p
<0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
Table C.1: Book Revenues and Measures of Success
Dep. Variable: Ln(Total Revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsequent Editions 0.182**
(0.082)






N 122 122 118 101
R-squared 0.147 0.269 0.455 0.100
Note: Each column is from a separate ordinary least squares regression
where the outcome variable is the natural logarithm of a book’s total
revenue. This information is available for a subset of 208 titles from
MacGarvie and Moser (2015) that contains detailed publisher data. *p
<0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table C.2: Crowdfunding and Success Measures – Accounting for the role of
Social Networks
Editions Translation % Libraries Novelty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crowdfunded -1.883*** -0.178*** -0.106*** -0.013
(0.260) (0.034) (0.018) (0.010)
Female-Focused 0.088 -0.068*** -0.010 -0.015***
(0.149) (0.026) (0.014) (0.004)
Crowdfunded X 1.463** 0.244*** 0.017 0.038**
Female-Focused (0.573) (0.083) (0.027) (0.017)
Dedicated to Nobility 0.029 -0.008 -0.010 0.006
(0.155) (0.031) (0.016) (0.004)
N 1,945 1,913 1,744 1,501
R-squared n/a 0.126 0.245 0.239
Decade FE YES YES YES YES
Volumes FE YES YES YES YES
London Dummy YES YES YES YES
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Estimation method in column
1: Poisson regression. All other columns: Ordinary least squares. The dependent variable
in Column 1 is the total number of subsequent editions (after the first edition). The
dependent variable in Columns 2 is a dummy for whether the title was subsequently
translated into another language after the first edition. The dependent variable in Column
3 is the percentage of potential libraries listing the title in their catalogs. The dependent
variable in Column 4 is the ratio of a title’s distance to texts published before the title
year to the title’s distance to texts published after the title year. Decade fixed effects,
volume fixed effects, and dummies for whether or not a title was published in London are
included in all specifications. Other controls account for whether the title was published
anonymously or pseudanonymously, whether the author was an entrant, and the authors
gender. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table C.3: Crowdfunding and Success Measures – Accounting for Price
and Advertising
Editions Translation % Libraries Novelty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crowdfunded -1.756*** -0.134*** -0.072*** -0.010
(0.285) (0.029) (0.014) (0.010)
Female-Focused -0.044 -0.070*** -0.014 -0.015***
(0.151) (0.023) (0.011) (0.004)
Crowdfunded X 1.490** 0.216*** -0.003 0.037**
Female-Focused (0.620) (0.082) (0.022) (0.016)
Price (shillings) -0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.000
(0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Dummy(No price) 0.081 0.066 0.083*** 0.011
(0.226) (0.050) (0.024) (0.007)
Number of Ads 0.035*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.001***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Dummy(No Ads) -0.640*** -0.119*** -0.088*** -0.007
(0.221) (0.042) (0.019) (0.005)
N 1,945 1,913 1,744 1,501
R-squared n/a 0.205 0.475 0.252
Decade FE YES YES YES YES
Volumes FE YES YES YES YES
London Dummy YES YES YES YES
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Estimation method in
column 1: Poisson regression. All other columns: Ordinary least squares. The depen-
dent variable in Column 1 is the total number of subsequent editions (after the first
edition). The dependent variable in Columns 2 is a dummy for whether the title was
subsequently translated into another language after the first edition. The dependent
variable in Column 3 is the percentage of potential libraries listing the title in their
catalogs. The dependent variable in Column 4 is the ratio of a title’s distance to
texts published before the title year to the title’s distance to texts published after
the title year. Decade fixed effects, volume fixed effects, and dummies for whether
or not a title was published in London are included in all specifications. Other con-
trols account for whether the title was published anonymously or pseudanonymously,
whether the author was an entrant, and the authors gender. *p <0.10 **p <0.05
***p <0.01
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Table C.4: Crowdfunding and Success Measures – Self-Publishing
Editions Translation % Libraries Novelty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crowdfunded -1.706*** -0.192*** -0.131*** -0.016*
(0.240) (0.036) (0.020) (0.010)
Female-Focused -0.041 -0.093*** -0.030** -0.018***
(0.164) (0.023) (0.014) (0.003)
Crowd X Female-Focused 1.519*** 0.240*** 0.018 0.040**
(0.553) (0.092) (0.029) (0.018)
Self-published -0.476 -0.055 -0.099*** -0.006
(0.314) (0.047) (0.024) (0.008)
Self X Female-Focused 0.988* 0.294** 0.092 0.016
(0.519) (0.140) (0.119) (0.024)
N 2,051 2,019 1,812 1,549
R-squared n/a 0.047 0.156 0.224
Decade FE YES YES YES YES
Volumes FE YES YES YES YES
London Dummy YES YES YES YES
Other Controls YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Estimation method in column
1: Poisson regression. All other columns: Ordinary least squares. The dependent variable in
Column 1 is the total number of subsequent editions (after the first edition). The dependent
variable in Columns 2 is a dummy for whether the title was subsequently translated into
another language after the first edition. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the percentage
of potential libraries listing the title in their catalogs. The dependent variable in Column 4 is
the ratio of a title’s distance to texts published before the title year to the title’s distance to
texts published after the title year. Decade fixed effects, volume fixed effects, and dummies for
whether or not a title was published in London are included in all specifications. Other controls
account for whether the title was published anonymously or pseudanonymously, whether the
author was an entrant, and the authors gender. *p <0.10 **p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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Table C.5: Crowdfunding and Success Measures – Anonymous Authors
Editions Translation % Libraries Novelty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crowdfunded -2.124*** -0.211*** -0.122*** -0.009
(0.296) (0.036) (0.020) (0.010)
Female-Focused 0.046 -0.076*** -0.014 -0.015***
(0.150) (0.026) (0.014) (0.004)
Anonymous -1.553*** -0.194*** -0.119*** -0.022***
(0.099) (0.020) (0.012) (0.003)
Crowd X Anonymous 0.842*** 0.090*** -0.006 -0.028***
(0.278) (0.034) (0.023) (0.009)
Crowd X Female-Focused 1.454** 0.231*** 0.001 0.038**
(0.583) (0.085) (0.026) (0.017)
N 1,945 1,913 1,744 1,501
R-squared n/a 0.104 0.206 0.238
Decade FE YES YES YES YES
Volumes FE YES YES YES YES
London Dummy YES YES YES YES
Note: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Estimation method in column
1: Poisson regression. All other columns: Ordinary least squares. The dependent variable in
Column 1 is the total number of subsequent editions (after the first edition). The dependent
variable in Columns 2 is a dummy for whether the title was subsequently translated into
another language after the first edition. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the percentage
of potential libraries listing the title in their catalogs. The dependent variable in Column 4 is
the ratio of a title’s distance to texts published before the title year to the title’s distance to
texts published after the title year. Decade fixed effects, volume fixed effects, and dummies
for whether or not a title was published in London are included in all specifications. *p <0.10
**p <0.05 ***p <0.01
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